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THE BURGER COURT, "STATE ACTION," AND
CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE
CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS
Larry W. Yackle*
All that is gold does not glitter, Not all those who wander are lost.
-Bilbo Baggins'
There is an uncertainty abroad in the land. At its root, to speak

boldly, lies the fear that the fate of individual liberty in this Nation is
in the hands of a Supreme Court whose newest members, cast in the
intellectual likeness of a disgraced Executive, lack sufficient sensitivity
to libertarian ideals to preserve the American democracy as we know
it. Particularly for those who found in the Warren Court the moral
leadership necessary to move the country toward a just resolution of the
perplexing social problems that plague us all, the skies seem dark. Our
constitutional system has always recognized that majorities can be expected to show little respect for individual liberty and that, accordingly,
the power of legislatures and executive officers must be held in check
by adherence to enduring principles of law that fix the boundaries of
governmental action. This is the place of the Bill of Rights and its
analogue, the fourteenth amendment. And it is, of course, the Supreme
Court's role to enforce those limitations in order to protect the individ*
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ual rights and liberties so critical in a free society. Against this background, intransigence in the judicial department is sobering. The doubt
runs deep; it will not easily be dispelled. Nevertheless, we do well to
examine the Burger Court on its record, for it is only on the reported
decisions that the Court's performance, indeed its character, can fairly
be judged. This article will evaluate the Burger Court's "state action"
decisions-those in which the Court has defined the reach of the Federal
Constitution for the protection of individual liberty. At the outset, it will
be necessary to review some fundamentals and to trace the development
of the state action concept from the earliest cases following the Civil
War through the Warren Court years. Then, the Burger Court's decisions will be treated, with a view toward identifying the extent to which
the present Court has rejected the expansive notion of state action
forged by its predecessor and adopted in its place a much more restrained approach.
This article will contend that the Burger Court has retreated from
the Warren Court's view of state action for two essential reasons. First,
the Court perceives for itself a sharply limited role in this legal system
and recoils from any approach to constitutional adjudication that suggests activism-the unnecessary or premature exercise of federal judicial power. Second, the Burger Court understands the state action limitation in the fourteenth amendment as a key constitutional recognition
of a fundamental tenet of the American scheme-federalism. To the
extent the definition of state action is broadened, thereby making more
activities subject to constitutional attack, the Court is increasingly
called upon to intervene in local affairs. Through this process social
problems are constitutionalized, taken away from other agencies of
government-particularly state legislatures. In the view of the Burger
Court, the state action concept is thus crucial to the balance between
state responsibility and federal judicial power.
This article will argue that in cases involving not state action within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, but "government action"
sufficient to bring into play the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights,
the Court's failure to invoke constitutional safeguards cannot justifiably
rest on the values of federalism. Only the Court's sense of appropriate
judicial restraint impedes a decision that significant governmental involvement in challenged action is sufficient to invoke the Constitution.
In some cases the Court will determine that the Bill of Rights is applicable and will turn to the substantive question whether the conduct under
attack is valid. But in other cases, those in which the Congress has
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become involved in ostensibly private conduct in order to further the
same interests protected by the Constitution, the Court's tendency to
avoid confrontation with a coordinate branch of government will counsel restraint. In a final section this article will defend the thesis that the
Burger Court will generally uphold congressional action designed to
protect individual liberty. The Court will approve not only congressional
enactments that give effect to the Bill of Rights but also legislation
based on the enforcement provisions of the three Civil War amendments. In the latter cases the Court will uphold federal statutes that
govern the very matters the Court itself refuses to reach by deferring,
through the state action device, to state legislatures. This is true because
in construing enforcement legislation the Court's concern is not the
precipitous intervention of federal judicial power, grounded in the Constitution of its own force, but instead the application of federal
legislative power. In the Burger Court's view, the exercise of legislative
power, while certainly posing questions of federalism, is still less intrusive than Court decisions. In addition, the Court's predisposition to
defer to reasonable attempts by the Congress to deal with social problems leads inexorably to decisions upholding enforcement legislation.
If this proposition is correct, and it is the design of this article to
show that it is, then the Burger Court may be a good deal more supportive of individual liberty than is popularly assumed. If liberty in the
1970's can be as effectively safeguarded by the enlightened construction
of legislative enactments as by interpretation of the Constitution itself,
there is no obvious reason to object to the route the newly constituted
Court has chosen. It will be urged here that in a real sense the future of
individual liberty now depends upon the Burger Court's continued willingness to give a liberal reading to the civil rights legislation enacted in
the last two decades, its concurrent willingness to broadly construe
similar legislation enacted during the Reconstruction period, and,
perhaps most important, the Congress' willingness to enact new and farranging legislation to protect individual liberty against encroachment by
ostensibly private action. This last bears close attention. For in the
modem industrial state, even as the public sector necessarily increases
in size and importance, the enormous economic and political power
wielded by corporate enterprise poses the most serious threat to individual liberty. As the Nation moves into its third century, the extent to
which the Congress is prepared to deal with private intrusions upon
liberty is the great question in constitutional law.
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THE CONCEPT OF STATE ACTION

It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject of the amendment.
-Mr. Justice Bradley2

A.

The Early Decisions

It is a commonplace that the key constitutional provision regarding
individual rights and liberties, the fourteenth amendment, applies only
to the actions of state government.3 Thus, the Constitution of its own
force offers protection from the acts of private persons only insofar as
they can be linked with the state,4 leaving purely private disputes and
misdeeds for regulation under the police power.5 As a prerequisite to
federal intervention, a state must be shown to have deprived an individual of life, liberty, or property or to have denied him or her the equal
protection of the laws. Buried as it is in the inscrutable records of the
period, the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment-and its
sister Civil War amendment, the fifteenth '-remains a matter of dis2. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11(1883) (opinion of the Court).
3. The fourteenth amendment provides:
Section I. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ I, 5 (emphasis supplied).
4. The language used in the text is left vague here with the expectation that later sections of
this article will to some extent define what state actions may be subject to constitutional limitation
under the fourteenth amendment.
5. P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 137 (1962).
6. The fifteenth amendment, which like the fourteenth contains a .state action" limitation,
provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend XV (emphasis supplied); see James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903) (state
action required under fifteenth). The fifteenth amendment was adopted in 1870, two years after
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pute. 7 At all events, the fourteenth amendment was the child of abolitionists, specifically the Radicals in the Republican Party. Men like
Sumner, Wilson, Bingham, Howard, and Stevens saw in the amendment
a necessary and final blow against the remnants of slavery, itself put to
rest by the thirteenth amendment. 8 Thus it is clear that the fourteenth

amendment was intended to invalidate the Black Codes that had sprung
up in the South to perpetuate a caste system and, to the extent possible,
to ensure that the southern states were unable in the future to deny civil
rights to former slaves.9 More than this it is difficult to say. Whether
the Nation had approved the fourteenth. See generally Note, The Strange Career of"State Action"
Under the Fifteenth Amendment, 74 YALE L.J. 1448 (1965). It has been suggested that the
Radicals' motives were practical as well as principled. Indeed, blacks may well have been enfranchised primarily to strengthen the Republican Party in the South. Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 U.S.
112, 254-56 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting); see Watt & Orlikoff. The Coming
Vindication of Mr.Justice Harlan,44 ILL. L. REV. 13, 16 (1949).
7. The literature on the subject is voluminous and contradictory. The following list is merely
representative. E.g., 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1083-1118 (1953): H.
FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908): W. GUTiHRIE. LECTURES ON TilE
FOURTEENTH ARTICLE OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1898): J.
TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965) (originally published as THE ANTi-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
of Rights? The Original Understanding.2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Frank & Munro. The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protectionof the Laws." 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950): Graham. Our
"Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1954): Graham. The "Conspiracy
Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment (pts. 1-2), 47 YALE L.J. 371, 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938). On
the question whether the framers intended to prohibit segregation, as distinguished from slavery,
see J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 201 (1956); Bickel. The Original
Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. I (1955).
8. The thirteenth amendment was adopted in 1865. It provides as follows:
Section I. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States. or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Significantly, the thirteenth amendment on its face is not subject to a "state action" limitation.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-39 (1968). Taken together, the three Civil War
amendments have been termed a second American Constitution, fixing the temper of political life
in the years since. Frank & Munro, supra note 7, at 166.
9. See G. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY (1968): T. WILSON. THE
BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH

(1965). While there was considerable disagreement among the ranks

of Republicans, the majority intended to ensure equality of "civil rights" and at the same time to
put "social rights" outside the reach of the Constitution.
Thus the original distinction appears to have been that the law should know no distinctions of color, but that personal taste should be left to govern itself. In this the practical
difference between the abolistionist [sic] and the middle position was that the abolitionists
as a moral matter encouraged complete intermingling even though this entered the zone of
taste, while the middle group lacked any such fervor.
Frank & Munro, supra note 7, at 149; see Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226. 293 (1964) (Goldberg.
J., concurring).
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the Radicals themselves, not to say a majority in the Congress and state
legislatures, intended the amendment to create new rights protected by
federal power, to protect existing or new rights against both state action
and private conduct apart from the state, or to enable the Congress to
enact supplemental legislation to do any of these things is at most
debatable and at least unknowable from the materials available."0 From
the outset, then, the interpretation of the amendment fell to the Court,
which in its earliest decisions gave the new amendment a narrow reading.
The most influential of the Court's early opinions came in the Civil
Rights Cases, decided in 1883." Justice Bradley's majority opinion directly addressed the question whether the 1875 Civil Rights Act'" was
authorized by the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments. But the opinion
additionally set forth in some detail the reach of the fourteenth amendment of its own force. Viewing the language of the amendment on its
face, the Court said:
[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against
State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals,
unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial
or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported
by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that
individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it istrue, whether
they affect his person, his property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the State, or not done under State authority, his
rights remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort
to the laws of the State for redress."3
No matter what the precise holding of the Civil Rights Cases may have
been-and that is a matter this article will consider-it is this language
that has ruled interpretation of the fourteenth amendment to the present
day. The fundamental proposition is that the state action limitation
draws a line, however difficult to discern in the particular case, between
10. As the Court stated in the Segregation Cases, the sources are "inconclusive." Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954); Cox, The Supreme Court. 1965 Term, Foreword:
ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. Ri.,v. 91. 110
(1966).
II. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
12. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (codified in scattered sections of 10. 42
U.S.C.). Congressional power to enforce the Civil War amendments through legislation will be
examined infra.
13. 109 U.S. at 17.
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legal arrangements wholly within the sphere of the state police power

and others subject to federal intervention. If it were otherwise, the division of authority between the states and the national governmentfederalism-would be threatened."

Other cases decided in the same period consistently adhered to this
theme. In UnitedStates v. Cruikshank,5 in the midst of a bitter dispute
over the outcome of the 1872 election, a number of blacks had assisted a sheriff in taking control of a local courthouse. A mob of whites
set fire to the building and shot at the blacks as they emerged. Several
blacks were killed, and the Department of Justice sought an indictment
charging the whites with conspiracy to deprive their victims of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution. 6 In the course of its opinion quashing the indictment on various grounds, the Supreme Court intimated the
result later reached in the Civil Rights Cases-that federal power cannot intrude into the province of state law to punish private conduct
unless the state itself is linked with the private action.',7 Similarly, in Ex
parte Virginiat" the Court sustained the indictment of a state judge for
14. That federalism was at the forefront of the Nation's thinking when the Civil Rights Cases
were decided is well documented. Vestin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of
Negroes: The Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637 (1957). Justice Harlan was the
lone dissenter in the case. After stating his general position verbally on the day the Court's decision
was announced, he worked for weeks to set his thoughts down in writing. At one point his thinking
stalled, and he was put back on track only when Mrs. Harlan produced the very inkstand Chief
Justice Taney had used to write his opinion in the Dred Scott case. The sight of the inkstand
reportedly inspired Harlan to complete a dissent that would finally put to rest the notion that the
Constitution permits the denial of civil rights to black people. The dissent took four paths to its
result. First, Harlan argued that one of the cases, which involved discrimination by a railroad
operating in interstate commerce, might be controlled by commerce clause precedents. Second.
even granting Justice Bradley's contention that Congress could act to protect individuals from state
action only, Harlan argued that innkeepers and common carriers are agents of the state, charged
with the responsibility to serve all comers on an equal basis. Third. Harlan took the position that
the 1875 Act was a valid exercise of the Congress' power to enforce the thirteenth amendment by
prohibiting the remaining incidents of slavery. And, finally, Harlan maintained that in order to
enforce the fourteenth amendment Congress has power to reach purely private action. See
generally Watt & Orlikoff, supra note 6, at 31-32; Westin, supra at 674-85.
15. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
16. See Frantz, CongressionalPower to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1365 (1964).
17. Specifically, the Court said:
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life. liberty.
or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen
against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by
the States. ...
92 U.S. at 554.
18. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
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excluding blacks from the jury list only because the judge was an agent
0 the Court
of the State of Virginia. 9 And in United States v. Harris"
held a key section of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 unconstitutional
on the ground that it impermissibly reached private action, in that case
the lynching of four blacks by a band of whites."'
In succeeding years, however, the Court's opinions extended the
scope of the fourteenth amendment through an analytical process that
gradually undermined the wooden notion of state action set forth in the
early cases. Instead of tying the definition of state action to the text of
the amendment itself, the Court expanded the concept on several fronts
to subsume quasi-official action in various forms. The Court first disposed of the argument that a state officer who exceeds his authority

under state law or custom, who indeed violates state law, cannot be held
to have acted for the state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
That proposition has some appeal on first blush. On an analogy to
general tort principles it seems plausible to conclude that the state is not
involved in the ultra vires actions of its employees. 3 Yet on closer
examination the argument is untenable; it would limit the application
of the fourteenth amendment to an extremely narrow class of
19. In the Civil Rights Cases Justice Bradley pointed particularly to Ey parte Virginia to
illustrate his view of the limits on federal power. 109 U.S. at 15. The pertinent language from Ex
parte Virginia is:
We have said the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed to the
States. . . . A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can
act in no other way.
100 U.S. at 346-47; see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
20. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
21. In strong language Harris made it clear that, for that time at least, the scope of the
fourteenth amendment was restricted to official action:
When the State has been guilty of no violation of [the amendment's] provisions: when
it has not made or enforced any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; when no one of its departments has deprived any person of life, liberty.
or property without due process of law, or denied to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws; when, on the contrary, the laws of the State, as enacted by its
legislative, and construed by its judicial, and administered by its executive departments,
recognize and protect the rights of all persons, the amendment imposes no duty and confers
no power upon Congress.
106 U.S. at 639.
22. The argument was made and rejected without elaboration in Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339 (1879); see Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REV. 347. 352-53 (1963).
23. Indeed, several eminent names have been associated with this position. E.g.. Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 147-48 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
I, 17 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20,
41 .(1907) (Holmes, J., dissenting). But see Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239,
244-45 (193 1) (Brandeis, J., opinion of the Court).
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cases-those in which positive state law or custom itself is invalid.
Under this approach the great majority of cases in which state authorities mistreat individuals, albeit also in violation of state law, would not
be cognizable under the Federal Constitution.21 To avoid such a result,
the Court recognized that a state agent possesses power by virtue of his
or her position, and it is that power that links all official actions to the
state.s2 Thus, a police officer who brutalizes a suspect on the way to the
stationhouse is in a position to do so only because he is clothed with
official authority, and it is clear that his action must be ascribed to the
state.26 By contrast, if the same officer strikes his neighbor in a dispute
over a boundary line between their properties, he acts in a private capacity, and it is just as clear that the fourteenth amendment is not implicated. z7
In the white primary cases the Court enlarged the concept of state
action to encompass the conduct of private persons exercising power
delegated by the state.2s In the first case to reach the Court Justice
Holmes struck down a Texas statute that prohibited blacks from participating in a political party primary.29 The state action presented-a positive enactment of the state legislature-was clear, and the Court found
ample support in the precedents for its result. In a like manner the Court
had no difficulty striking down a subsequent statute, obviously drafted
to circumvent the Court's first ruling, that authorized the party executive committee to determine the qualifications of voters in the primary.
When blacks were once again excluded, the Court held that Texas had
still not avoided the reach of the fourteenth amendment." By placing
24. Williams, supra note 22, at 352; Lewis, The Meaning of State Action. 60 COLUi. L.
REv. 1083, 1087 (1960).
25. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1951).
26. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
(1941); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
27. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109-10 (1945). There are, of course. close cases.
E.g., Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975) (off-duty police officer %ho used chemical
mace and service revolver in barroom brawl acted under color of state law). For examples of the
early treatment of the question whether the fourteenth amendment comes into play when the action
complained of violates state law, see Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles. 227 U.S. 278
(1913); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907): Barney v. City of New York.
193 U.S. 430 (1904). See also Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375, 378-81 (1958).
28. Both the fourteenth and the fifteenth amendment, which prohibits race discrimination
in voting, were involved in these cases. Both, of course, contain "state action" limitations. See notes
3 & 6 supra.
29. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
30. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
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authority to determine voter qualifications in a particular committee
rather than in the party as a whole or its state convention, the state had
intervened in the affairs of the party to empower a few of its members
to make decisions binding on all. "Power so intrenched," said the Court,
"is statutory, not inherent. ' 31 When, however, the state party convention itself decided that blacks would be excluded from the primary, the
Court at first let the discrimination stand. Reasoning that the extensive
state regulation of the primary was neutral, the Court deferred to the
determination of the private political group. 3 Yet that decision was
soon expressly overruled when the Court held that a political party is
essentially performing a state function in conducting a primary that the
legislature has established as an integral part of the election scheme. 3
To round out the picture, the Court ruled 9 years later that primaries
conducted by the Jaybird Association, which operated with minimal
state contacts in a single Texas county, must be open to blacks. 3' The
generalization to be drawn from the white primary cases is that, at least
in the crucial area of the selection of public officials, the state cannot
avoid its constitutional obligations by delegating key functions to pri3
vate organizations. 1
31. Id. at 85.
32. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
33. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The Court placed heavy reliance upon its then
recent opinion in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), which held that the right to vote
for federal officers, guaranteed by article I, § 2 of the Constitution, extends to a party primary
that influences the ultimate selection of public officials. Smith's use of Classic has since been
questioned. E.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw. 73 HARv. L. R v.
I, 28-29 (1959). However, at the time the Court was persuaded that Classic had a bearing on
Grovey v. Townsend:
The fusing by the Classic case of the primary and general elections into a single instrumentality for choice of officers has a definite bearing on the permissibility under the Constitution of excluding Negroes from primaries. This is not to say that tie Classic case cuts
directly into the rationale of Grovey v. Townsend. This latter case was not mentioned in
the opinion. Classicbears upon Grovey v. Townsend not because exclusion of Negroes from
primaries is any more or less state action by reason of the unitary character of the electoral
process but because the recognition of the place of the primary in the electoral scheme
makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power tofix the qualifications ofprimarr
elections isdelegation of a state function that may make the party's action the action of
the State.
321 U.S. at 660 (emphasis supplied).
34. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
35. In Smith, for example, the Court said:
The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants to all citi/ens
a right to participate in the choice of elected officials without restriction by any State
because of race. This grant to the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified
by a State through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private organi/a-
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The decade of the 1940's closed with two decisions that promised
to expand the scope of state action even further-perhaps to obliterate

the notion altogether as a significant restraint on the intervention of
federal judicial power. In Marsh v. Alabama3l a member of a religious

sect had been convicted of criminal trespass for distributing literature
in the company town of Chickasaw, Alabama.Y The state contended
that since Chickasaw was wholly owned by a private corporation, the

ordinary protections of the first amendment, applicable against the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth, were inapplicable.381 Put simply, a private concern rather than the state had denied the
petitioner the freedom of speech.39 In an opinion by Justice Black, the

Court cut through the superficial argument that the decision should turn
on property law principles and held instead that "[tihe more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general,
the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."" ° Since Chickasaw was in all
respects indistinguishable from "any other American town,"'" it must
be treated similarly for constitutional purposes. Marsh thus underscored
the premise of the white primary cases-that the state cannot turn over
tion to practice racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights uould be of little
value if they could be thus indirectly denied.
321 U.S. at 664.
36. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
37. The Court explained that Chickasaw was a suburb of Mobile. The Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation owned the principal property, consisting of residential buildings. trets, a scuer
system, and a block of business establishments used freely by the inhabitants. The deputy sheriff
who arrested the petitioner was responsible to the sheriff or Mobile County. but his salary %as
paid by the company. Id. at 502.
38. Existing precedents made it clear that. if the case had arisen in an ordinary municipalit).
the conviction for distributing literature could not have withstood constitutional challenge. Eg.
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (municipal ordinance forbidding door-to-door
distribution of literature cannot constitutionally be applied to Jehovah's Witness distributing religious literature), Lovell v. City of Griffin. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (right to distribute literature cannot
constitutionally be conditioned on obtaining a permit rrom public officials operating uithout
objective standards).
39. As the Court put it:
[lit is the State's contention that the mere fact that all the propert) interests in the to%%n
are held by a single company is enough to give that company pouer. enrorceable h) a state
statute, to abridge these [first amendment] freedoms.
. . . The State urges in effect that the corporation's right to control the inhabitants of
Chickasaw is coextensive with the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his
guests. ...
326 U.S. at 505-06.
40. Id. at 506.
41. Id. at 502.
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essentially public functions to private hands and in that way circumvent
constitutional limitations. Moreover, it was now clear that the expansive
definition of state action taking shape in the Court's decisions would not
be limited to the protection of blacks through the equal protection
clause, but would also be brought to bear in other constitutional contexts.4" In the aftermath of Marsh, the argument was advanced that any
entity that exercises sufficient power over individuals to limit liberty in
the manner of government must be subject to the same constitutional
restraints as would apply to the state.43
The second decision of far-reaching import came in Shelley v.
Kraemer,44 perhaps the most criticized case of its time. Property owners
in St. Louis had voluntarily entered into an agreement to restrict the
sale of parcels of land to members of the white race. The covenant
expressly stated that its purpose was to exclude blacks and orientals.
Some 30 years later, a black couple purchased one of the lots without
knowledge of the restrictive covenant. A group of adjoining property
owners then obtained an order from the state courts restraining the
couple from taking possession, divesting them of title, and revesting title
42. In Marsh itself the Court applied the fourteenth amendment due process clause to a
private company performing the public function of operating a town.
43. St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State lction. Equal
Protection.and "'Private"Racial Discrimination,59 MicH. L. REV. 993, 1016 (1961). It is plausible to argue that the framers of the fourteenth amendment were not so much interested in placing
limitations on state power as in protecting individual liberty. At the time the principal threat to
that liberty came from government and not private organizations and, so goes the argument, the
framers reasonably couched the new amendment in terms to meet only the present evil. Today,
when great private corporations and associations exercise enormous power over individuals, it is
consistent with the purpose of the framers to apply the fourteenth amendment to their actions as
well as to those of government. In the case of corporations chartered by the state, the argument is
even stronger. See, e.g., Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity- Protection of
Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1952); Friedmann, Corporate Power. Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 CouUI. L. Rlv. 155
(1957): Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN. L. REv. 620, 661-66
(1958). Similarly, labor unions are subject to extensive governmental regulations and they, too.
have been offered as quasi-public entities to which constitutional limitations should apply. See, e.g.
Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 LABOR L.J. 874 (1957). On the other hand,
there is perhaps more support for legislative protection. E.g.. Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving
Union Democracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 609, 611 (1959): Wellington, The Constitution. the Labor
Union, and "Governinental Action," 70 YALE L.J. 345, 348-49 (1961). Of course. the Court has
not applied constitutional restraints directly to unions. See American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds. 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950); Local 1498 v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees. 522 F.2d
486 (3d Cir. 1975). But see Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944) (relying
ultimately on a statutory ground).
44. 334 U.S. I (1948).
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in the grantor.4" In the Supreme Court Chief Justice Vinson's majority
opinion held that the state court enforcement of the restrictive covenant
constituted invalid state-action within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. While the Court allowed that the covenant standing alone
was not unconstitutional-since it was created by private as opposed to
state action-the court order giving legal effect to the covenant sufficiently involved the state in the private discrimination to invoke the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 8
The logical possibilities of the Shelley analysis prompted exhaustive attention in the law reviews. "What," asked Professor Wechsler, "is
the principle involved? '47 If Shelley meant that private racial discrimination in the abstract may be immoral but not unconstitutional, but that
the Constitution forbids the states from recognizing the private person's
discrimination, what case was as a practical matter left outside the reach
of the fourteenth amendment? A parade of horribles came easily to
mind. Can a state probate a will that "draws a racial line" among its
devisees? 8 Can the state arrest and prosecute a black defendant for
trespass when the complaint was filed by a racist property owner who
regularly permits whites to cut across his lawn?"9 Pushing the argument
to extremes, can the state prosecute a trespasser who wears black shoes
when the complaint was filed by an exceedingly narrow-minded property owner who regularly permits white shoe wearers to use his property?50 Taken to its logical conclusion, the analysis in Shelley would
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Wechsler, supra note 33, at 29.
48. Id. The application of Shelley to wills, charitable trusts, and similar devices ruiecd
complex questions in an area that previously had not been thought to have a constitutional dimension. After holding in Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). that public officials
cannot act as trustees of a private will that requires racial discrimination, the Court held in Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). that even the transfer of title to private hands is insufficient to
save a discriminatory trust, if the property is to be continued as a public park from Qhich black
people are excluded under terms fixed by the testator. On the other hand, in Evans v. Abney. 396
U.S. 435 (1970), the Court approved the state court's action on remand-dissolving the discriminatory trust so that title might revert to the heirs. In the latter case there were vigorous dissents from
Justices Brennan and Douglas, who argued that the city continued to be linked to the managemnent
of the property so long as it remained a park. On the general question. see Clark. Charitable Truft..
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will ofStephen Girard. 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957): Nelkin. Ct"
Pres and the Fourteenth Anmendment: A Discriminating Look at Very Private Schools and Not
So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEo. L.J. 272 (1967): Shanks, "State Action' and the Girard F.state
Case, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 213 (1956); Note, Mandatory Cy Pres and the Raciall" Restrictive
Charitable Trust, 69 COLUs,. L. REV. 1478 (1969).
49. Wechsler, supra note 33, at 29-30.
50. Cf. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion. IOU.
0
PA. L. Ri-% 473.
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erase the previously unclear line between public and private 'esponsibility for racial discrimination and would usher the exercise of federal
constitutional power into virtually every case in which black people
suffer from unequal treatment.

Although some found this prospect desirable, indeed long overdue,"' others found in Shelley "a skeleton key to constitutional law's
Finnegan's Wake,"5 and many set out to find justifications for limiting
the opinion's logic. It was argued, for example, that Shelley was merely
another illustration of the principle that the state cannot avoid constitutional limitations by delegating public functions to private parties who
discriminate. s3 To the extent the restrictive covenant might be considered essentially a zoning regulation designed to govern the use of property in the area, it was contended that the real evil in the case lay in the
state's delegation of zoning authority to a private group, which in turn
performed that public function in a discriminatory fashion. 4 A more
persuasive view was that Shelley condemned not judicial recognition of
private discrimination, but merely enforcement of private agreements
against the will of participants. In fact, the seller in Shelley wished to
477 (1962). Professor Henkin pointed out that the equal protection clause bars the state rrom
discriminating on any arbitrary basis. Shelley might then mean that "the enforcement of trespass
would not be possible, even where the exclusion had nothing to do with racial discrimination but
was based upon some other caprice." Id.
51. See. e.g., Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendnent: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases, 16 U. CI. L. REV. 203 (1949). For pre-Shelley urgings that the fourteenth
amendment be invoked to prohibit restrictive covenants, see Lowe, Racial Restrictive Covenanis,
I ALA. L. REV. 15 (1948); McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation byState Court Enforcement
of Restrictive Agreements. Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional, 33 CAl. L. Ri.v.
5 (1945); Note, Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 YALE L.J. 426 (1948).
52. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in
Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 148
(1964).
53. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Parenthetically, it should be noted that
some have suggested the reverse is true-that Marsh was actually an early application of the
Shelley principle that a state cannot use its judicial machinery to enforce private action that would
be barred to the state itself. The argument holds that the invalid state action in Marsh was not the
company's suppression of the petitioner's speech but the state's criminal prosecution for trespass.
See Berle, supra note 43, at 950. The obvious difficulty with this view is that it would seem to follow
that the company might have used self-help to remove the Jehovah's Witness from Chickasaw.
Frank, The United States Supreme Court. 1947-48, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 24 (1948); Lewis, supra
note 24, at 1097 n.52.
54. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 383 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring); Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 326-35 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917) (city ordinance that zones real property on the basis of race is unconstitutional); Lewis,
supra note 24, at 1115.
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ignore the covenant and sell to blacks in direct violation of it. The
discrimination occurred only because the state courts required the seller
to conform to the agreement, thus helping the adjoining property owners to coerce the recalcitrant seller into racial discrimination." It was
argued that when a private person relies upon a similar covenant in
he desires voluntarily to do with his property,
seeking to enforce what
56
Shelley is inapposite.

Proposals for limiting Shelley aside, the enormous potential of the
decision's logic gave rise to revisionist thinking on the subject generally.
It appeared after Shelley that perhaps even a state's inaction-in the
face of private discrimination-might constitute a violation of the equal
protection clause.57 If state courts cannot give legal effect to private
conduct that would be barred to the state itself, it seemed to follow that.
55. Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment.4 VAND. L. REv. 555, 569 (1951):
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler 108 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 13 (1959).
56. In a case decided after Shelley a majority of the Court neither embraced the "coercion"
theory of Shelley nor explicitly rejected it. In Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc..
245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953), aff'd by an equally divided Court. 348 U.S. 880 (19S4).
vacated and petitionfor cert. dismissed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955). the Court apparently could not agree
on the question whether Shelley made void an action for damages for breach of a contract to sell
a burial plot-when the refusal to perform was based on the race of the purchaser. The writ was
finally dismissed as improvidently granted when a new state statute banning similar contract
provisions was enacted. Then, in Black v. Cutter Laboratories. 351 U.S. 292 (1956). a majority
avoided the constitutional question whether California courts could uphold an arbitration award
of reinstatement in a case in which the discharge of an employee was based upon Communist Party
membership. The state courts had declined to enforce the award on the ground that the underlying
collective bargaining agreement permitted the employer to dismiss an employee for "just cause."
Although the majority found only a state contract law issue and no substantial federal question in
the case, Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent maintained that Shelley barred the state courts from sustaining the discharge of an employee on the basis of her associations. 351 U.S. at 302-03 (Douglas. J..
dissenting). Since Black seemingly involved no coercion by the state courts ora private individual
who did not want to discriminate, the Douglas position, concurred in by the Chief Justice and
Justice Black, apparently was that Shelley was not limited as Professor Pollak suggested. See
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1963) (Douglas, J.,concurring); The Supreme Court.
1955 Term, 70 HARV. L. REv. 123, 124-25 (1956). On the other hand, Justice Douglas* opinion in
Black did not speak for the majority, and in subsequent cases the Court has studiously avoided
applying Shelley across the board to the many cases its logic might conceivably reach. E.g., Bell
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). Moreover, in a number of cases individual justices have taken
the position, contra Douglas, that Shelley is indeed limited to cases involving coercion. E.g.. Id.at
331 (Black, J., dissenting with Harlan & White. JJ.). cf Evans v. Abney. 396 U.S. 435.456 (1970)
(Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 261 (1953) (Vinson, C.J.. dissenting).
For recent unsuccessful attempts to expand Shelley to its logical limit, see Girard v. 94th Street &
Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117 (N.D.
Ohio 1974).
57. See Abernathy, supra note 27; Lewis, supra note 24.
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at least through a process of case-by-case adjudication, the state could
be compelled to do everything within its power to prohibit discrimination by private individuals. 8 If in any case to come before state courts
a judgment that furthers discrimination is barred, the law tends over
time to protect the interests of black people by thwarting the discriminatory purpose of other litigants. Put simply, state courts can no longer
prefer private rights founded on state law over the constitutional right
of black people to be free of state-sponsored discrimination. This is only

to recognize that "state action" is present in every case in which the
state gives legal consequences to transactions between private persons."
If a white property owner has a right to refuse to sell his property to a

black buyer, it is because state law gives him that right. And if the right
to discriminate among buyers is recognized as a defense to an action
for breach of contract, it is once again only because state law declares

it to be so. In Shelley itself the invalid state action may have vested,
not in the use of state judicial machinery to enforce the restrictive
covenant, but in the underlying common law that recognized the validity
of such covenants.60 Thus, the state law that defines and gives meaning
58. In light of Shelley, Professor Lewis found inescapable the conclusion that the white
primary cases involved a "court-declared state duty to prevent systematic discrimination against
Negro voters by private interests." Lewis, supra note 24, at 1093. Although those cases were
supported by the fifteenth amendment, which may alone be a basis for limiting the principle, Lewis
also suggested that Marsh might best be explained as recognizing that a state's responsibility under
the fourteenth amendment "may rest not on its positive acts but on its omission to act .... Id.
at 1097. See also Silard, A ConstitutionalForecast.-Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855 (1966).
59. As Professor Horowitz put it:
[W]henever, and however, a state gives legal consequences to transactions between private
persons there is "state action"-Le. ....the definition by a state of legal relations between
private persons is, for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a matter of "state
action."
Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S.
CAL. L. REV. 208, 209 (1957). See also Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial
Discrimination in "Private" Housing, 52 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Racial
Discrimination in "Private" Housing]. It is perhaps noteworthy that Horowitz carefully avoided
taking the position that private persons may somehow be subject to the limitations of the fourteenth
amendment. Instead, he made clear his view that in some cases the ever-present state law underlying the relationship between private persons is so intertwined with private discrimination that the
fourteenth amendment is invoked. There is a difference. Id. at 21-22; cf. note 175 infra.
60. Although the Court's statement that the covenant standing alone was valid would seem
to preclude this view, Professor Lewis pointed out that Chief Justice Vinson. who wrote for the
Court in Shelley, dissented in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), which extended Shellh'i'
to preclude a suit for damages for breach of a restrictive covenant. In Barrows the Chief Justice
found no invalid state action because the black buyer would remain in possession, and the state
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to legal arrangements among individuals is always at work, and the

significant question for analysis is not whether state action exists but,
on the contrary, whether the state action that concededly is present is

constitutional."' Though the contours of their analyses did not precisely
coincide, the writers who explored the cases generally came to the same

conclusion-that at least after Shelley the search for state action in the
wooden sense of some identifiable link to government is misleading.

Rather, the validity of even superficially private arrangements should
be judged according to a delicate balance of interests." Thus, Professor Henkin put the paradigm case-the conviction of a trespasser or-

dered to leave the premises by a racist homeowner solely on the ground
that he is black-as, in truth, the question whether the black's right to
be free of racial discrimination is sufficient to outweigh the homecourt judgment would affect only the seller who had railed to comply %%ith a covenant uhich was
itself valid. Since the Barrows Court did not distinguish Shelley on Vinson's ground. it can be
argued that a majority had never been convinced that the state court's enforcement order in that
case was the controlling factor, Vinson's opinion notwithstanding. "But if Sheller" %tand. ror the
principle that the power to enter into a covenant restricting land use and occupancy on the basis
of race is lacking because that part of the common law that provides the particular property rights
necessary for such an arrangement is invalid, then the majority's decision that a court cannot a%ard
damages for breach of restrictive covenant is easier to understand." Lewis. supra note 24. at 1114.
61. Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1961).
62. A few quotations from the literature will suffice here:
The sun is setting on the concept of state action ....
. . . There is no formula.
. . . The issue must become one of the merits of accommodating the interests, not one
in the nature of a formula which is irrelevant to the interests involved.
Williams, supra note 22, at 389-90.
Any proper discussion of the cases. . . must. . . begin with recognition that the state
action requirement is no more unitary than the requirement that equalprotection has been
denied. These verbal formulations are simply an awkward shorthand to describe a multiplicity of interests which compete for respect in each case. Among these interests are several
which are functionally related to the presence or absence of participation by a government
in the alleged constitutional invasion. Thus while the search for a merely formal connection-for 'state action'-is misleading, the search for the values which stand behind the state
action limitation is indispensable.
Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 61, at 7 (emphasis in original).
The determination of the existence of state action is a preliminary problem only, and must
be followed by a determination as to which of several conflicting rights is to be protected ....
. . . ITihe ultimate decision of the constitutional issue will hinge upon a balance struck
between several interests, public and private.
Note, The Disintegrationof a Concept-StateAction Under the 14th and 15th Amendments. 96
U. PA. L. REv. 402,413-14 (1948); see Note, State Action Reconsidered in the Light a Sheller 1r
Kraemer, 48 CoLUtI. L. REv. 1241, 1245 (1948).
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owner's due process right to choose the persons he will invite into his
home.13 No serious writer suggested that the right of privacy might not
prevail. 4 On the other hand, most agreed that as the interest of the
person seeking to discriminate takes on a public character the interest
of blacks in freedom from discrimination becomes paramount., ' As the
activism of the Warren Court years gathered momentum, the consensus
was that even more significant doctrinal developments lay just
ahead-perhaps even demise of the state action concept as a limitation
on the exercise of federal judicial power.
B.

The Warren Court Years-The Demise of State Action?

The Court launched the decade of the sixties with Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,6 which was viewed variously as opening
the door to "the abandonment of the state action concept as a means
of deciding the constitutional issue on discrimination"67 and as "singularly uninstructive"'6 8 as a guide to future developments. In Burton a
black man had been denied service at the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, located
in a publicly owned and operated parking garage in Wilmington, Delaware. Although the petitioner made the straightforward argument that
Eagle's lease from the Parking Authority was alone sufficient to bring
the case within the fourteenth amendment, the majority opinion by
Justice Clark avoided such a broad holding. Instead, the Court lamented that it was unable to perform the "impossible task" 9 of fashioning a precise formula for determining the application of the equal protection clause in a wide variety of cases: "Only by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance." '70 The Court then
turned to a detailed examination of the contacts between the state of
Delaware and the coffee shop. And only after laboriously detailing that
the land had originally been condemned for public use, that the lease to
63. Henkin, supra note 50, at 498.
64. See Haber, Notes on the Limits of Shelley v. Kraemer, 18 RUTGERS L. Rev. 811 (1964).
65. Henkin, supra note 50, at 498-99; Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 61, at 46.
66. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
67. Williams, supra note 22, at 382.
68. Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61
Cot u,%i.L. Rev. 1458, 1459 (1961).
69. 365 U.S. at 722, quoting Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552,
556 (1947).
70. 365 U.S. at 722.
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Eagle constituted an essential portion of the state's income from the
entire facility, that the building was kept in repair at public expense, and

that the restaurant enjoyed tax exemptions for its improvements, did
Justice Clark conclude that the state was sufficiently involved in Eagle's

discriminatory policy to implicate the Constitution."
The Burton holding was a classic illustration of an ad hoc balancing
approach to constitutional adjudication-law that is good for this day

and this case only. Nevertheless, language in the opinion lent support
to the view that the state action concept was indeed on the wane. For

example, at one point the Court noted that the Parking Authority might
have required Eagle to serve blacks by merely inserting a prohibition

on discrimination in the lease contract. The failure to do so gave rise to
the charge that the state had impermissibly abdicated its constitutional
responsibilities "by either ignoring them or by merely failing to dis-

charge them whatever the motive may be."712 The notion that the state's
inaction in failing to bar race discrimination at the restaurant was the
crux of the case in Burton understandably fed the growing suspicion
that, while the Court might continue to say that state action must be
shown-citing the Civil Rights Cases in a perfunctory manner at the
71. The Court was careful to tie its holding closely to the facts of the case at hand, apparently
in order to avoid the state's contention that a judgment for the plaintiff would mean "nigh universal
application of a constitutional precept ....
" Id. at 726. In a concurring opinion Justice Stewart
suggested that the Court might have avoided saying even as much as it did by resting its finding
of state action on an existing statute in Delaware that expressly permitted the operators of
restaurants to discriminate among clientele. Justice Stewart was prepared to rule flatly that if the
statute authorized racial discrimination in public accommodations it was unconstitutional. Id, at
726-27 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices Harlan and Frankfurter agreed with Stewart that Delaware might not by statute authorize racial discrimination: but because the) '%erc not %urethat the
Supreme Court of Delaware had actually construed the statute in that way, they urged a remand
for clarification. Id. at 727-28 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting): Id. at 728-30 (Harlan, J.. dissenting).
Remarkably, all three Justices, and presumably Justice Whittaker who joined Justice Harlan's
opinion, viewed possible reliance on the statute as an "easy route to decision" that would reach

the same result but would avoid the "circuitous route" followed by Justice Clark. Id. at 728
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Of course, if the statute had been construed to require racial discrimination, a wealth of precedent would have supported a finding of unconstitutional state legislative
action. But on its face this statute required nothing; at most it authorized.Did the Justices w'riting
separately mean to say that a state legislature cannot be neutral, that it must speak against
discrimination if it speaks at all? No prior case had gone so far. At all events, such a conclusion
would hardly have been a narrower ground of decision in Burton. It is true that Justice Harlan
distinguished the possible common-law right of a restaurant operator to serve %hom he pleases.
suggesting a vaguely defined difference between a statute expressly authorizing discrimination and
mere common-law understanding, but that distinction only further confused the view he took of
state action in the case.
72. 365 U.S. at 725.
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outset of every opinion-in reality the Court would in the future tend
always to find sufficient contacts with the state to justify the exercise
of federal power. 3 The Burton nonanalysis was seen as little more than
a rough balancing process with a decided preference for equality.

Then came the first round of Sit-In Cases in 1963. Ostensibly,
Peterson v. City of Greenville,74 Lombard v. Louisiana," and the two

per curiam decisions" handed down with them presented the precise
issue that had long awaited decision-whether the fourteenth amend-

ment of its own force prohibits the states from enforcing racial discrimination in public accommodations." But the decision did not come. Only
two of the cases were given full treatment. In Peterson the Court failed

to reach the question because the City of Greenville had an ordinance
that expressly prohibited serving white and black people in the same

room. There was evidence in the record tending to show that when the
manager of a Kress store refused service to black children, he did so in
order to comply with the ordinance. The Court held that the ordinance
removed the decision whether to serve black people from the sphere of

private choice and, accordingly, the state had so involved itself in the
resultant racial discrimination that the fourteenth amendment was
brought into play.78 Similarly, in Lombard the Court rested its finding
73. Williams, supra note 22, at 382-84.
74. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
75. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
76. Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S.
374 (1963).
77. See Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 101. Actually,
one factually similar case had come before the Court 3 years earlier. In Garner v. Louisiana, 368
U.S. 157 (1961), the Court overturned the convictions of several black students for disturbing the
peace. The majority avoided the merits of the state action issue by holding that the convictions
were "so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to render them unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 163; see Thompson v. City of Louisville,
362 U.S. 199 (1960). Justice Douglas, on the other hand, reached the more significant question in
a concurring opinion. He contended that the state action requirement was met by the custom or
racial discrimination in Louisiana, the public interest affected by the operation of restaurants, and
the licensing regulation of restaurants by the state. The Douglas opinion is criticized in Karst &
Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-Ins and State Action-Mr. Justice Douglas, Concurring, 14 STAN.
L. REV. 762 (1962).
78. Indeed, the Court held that even if the manager had acted independently the result would
have been the same, because the convictions had the unquestioned effect of enforcing the ordinance.
"When a state agency passes a law compelling persons to discriminate against other persons
because of race, and the State's criminal processes are employed in a way which enforces the
discrimination mandated by that law, such a palpable violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
cannot be saved by attempting to separate the mental urges of the discriminators." 373 U.S. at
248. It is tenable, then, to argue that the Court did find the criminal prosecutions and not merely
the existence of the ordinance crucial to the result-perhaps relying on Shelley without citation.
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of invalid state action on the public statements of the mayor and police
superintendent, who had earlier threatened prosecution of blacks for sitins at local restaurants. It was apparent, to use the Court's words, that
"the State cannot achieve the same result [discrimination] by an official

command which has at least as much coercive effect as an ordinance.""9
In the next Term the second round of Sit-In Cases yielded more

analysis but still no resolution of the crucial state action issue. Of the
five cases decided in 1964, only Bell v. Maryland"e was treated in depth."'

The Court once again evaded the state action question by remanding
the criminal trespass convictions involved in the case to the state courts,
which, the majority apparently hoped, might dismiss them in light of
an interim change in state law.82 But three other opinions, written by
79. 373 U.S. at 273. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas would have applied Shelley
and held that the criminal penalty imposed upon the demonstrators by the state courts constituted
state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Citing Professor Henkin, note 50
supra, Douglas let it be known that he would permit the Shelley analysis to reach a great many
cases involving businesses subject to state regulatory control of some sort.
[Slurely Shelley v. Kraemer. . . and Barrows v. Jackson. .. show that the day has passed
when an innkeeper, carrier, housing developer, or retailer can draw a racial line, refuse
service to some on account of color, and obtain the aid of a State in enforcing his personal
bias by sending outlawed customers to prison or exacting fines from them.
Business, such as this restaurant, is still private property. Yet there is hardly any private
enterprise that does not feel the pinch of some public regulation-from price control, to
health and fire inspection, to zoning, to safety measures, to minimum wages and working
conditions, to unemployment insurance. When the doors of a business are open to the
public, they must be open to all regardless of race if apartheidis not to become engrained
in our public places. It cannot by reason of the Equal Protection Clause become so engrained with the aid of state courts, state legislatures, or state police.
373 U.S. at 280-81 (Douglas, J., concurring), see Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292. 30203 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
81. In Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964), the Court held that trespass convictions of
demonstrators in a department store lunch counter must be reversed because two Florida agencies
had issued regulations requiring separate toilet facilities for black patrons, thus imposing an
impermissible burden upon restaurants serving both white and black clientele. In Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964), the Court reversed the convictions of blacks who had entered a privately
operated amusement park. The park detective who ordered the demonstrators to leave was paid
by the private owner to enforce a policy of segregation but acted as a deputy of the local sheriff in
arresting the protesters for failing to obey his orders. In Bouie v. City of Columbia. 378 U.S. 347
(1964), the Court reversed more trespass convictions on the ground that the statute involved had
been rendered impermissibly vague by retrospective construction by the South Carolina Supreme
Court. Finally, in Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964), the Court once again relied on
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), to hold that the convictions of civil rights
workers were not supported by sufficient evidence. In the case the Court could find no basis for a
finding that a nonviolent sit-in at a lunch counter constituted a breach of the peace. See Paulsen.
The Sit-In Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None." 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 137.
82. After the Maryland Supreme Court had affirmed the trespass convictions in Bell, the
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Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and Black, finally faced squarely the ques-

tion whether state enforcement of discrimination in public accommodations is unconstitutional. Justice Douglas had little difficulty finding a
violation of both the equal protection clause and the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.83 Justice Goldberg's
similar position rested on his conclusion that the framers' intent was to
guarantee to blacks the right to be served at all places of public accommodation."' But the dissent could not follow. Picking apart the very

historical materials used by Justice Goldberg to make his case, Justice
Black concluded that the evidence of original intent was inadequate to

the task Justice Goldberg would have it perform. 5 Accordingly, Black
concluded that while the Court should and would continue to protect
individuals against discrimination in all ways within its power, "the
Fourteenth Amendment of itself does not compel either a black man or
a white man running his own private business to trade with anyone else
against his will."8 6 With the Court thus split on the fundamental question presented, the final decision in the Sit-In Cases, already delayed to

the final day of the term, was in. Ten days later President Johnson
city of Baltimore and the state legislature enacted public accommodations legislation. The state
enactment went into effect only days after the petition for certiorari had been granted. The crux
of Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court was that the question of the applicability of the state
savings clause should be left to the state courts. While it seems clear that Justice Brennan "pushed
the legal materials to their limit," it has been suggested that restraint was appropriate in the
circumstances. Paulsen, supra note 81, at 144.
83. Reliance upon the "privileges" clause as a vehicle for the protection of individual liberty,
while not surprising in a Douglas opinion, has never been accepted by a majority of the Court.
Compare, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring), with
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Accordingly, Justice Douglas fortified his
result by once again contending that Shelley prohibits state judicial enforcement of private discrimination-at least in cases in which corporations rather than individuals open the doors of their
establishments to the public for the purpose of making profits. 378 U.S. at 252-60 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
84. The Goldberg opinion has been criticized in C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND VIE
USES OF HISTORY 105-12 (1969). While Professor Miller finds Justice Goldberg's treatment of the
historical materials inadequate-principally because of their inherent inscrutability-he gives the
Justice high marks for avoiding the theory put forward by the Solicitor General, albeit under
pressure, that state action might be found in the officially recognized tradition of segregation which
historically characterized the Southern States. Id. at 102-03.
85. At one point Justice Black wrote:
We have confined ourselves entirely to those debates cited in Brother GOLDBERa'S
opinion the better to show how, even on its own evidence, the opinion's argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment without more prohibits discrimination by restaurants and other
such places rests on a wholly inadequate historical foundation.
378 U.S. at 340 (Black, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 342-43 (Black, J., dissenting).
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signed into law the 1964 Civil Rights Act,"' which provided federal
protection for the very conduct for which the petitioners in all nine cases
had been prosecuted.
The Warren Court soon made it clear that, having survived the
emotional outpouring and intellectual maneuvering of the Sit-In Cases,
the Court would not again take up the question whether Shelley extends
to all cases in which a state court gives effect to private discrimination.
In so doing, on the other hand, the Court seemingly opened the way for
even further erosion of the state action concept. In the fall of 1964 an
initiated measure was submitted to the people of California in a statewide ballot."8 Proposition 14 was intended to effectively repeal existing
open housing legislation by amending the state constitution to bar state
interference with the exercise of unrestricted personal choice in real
estate transactions.' After the proposition had been adopted by an
87. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of
28, 42 U.S.C.). As Professor Miller described the circumstances of the Court's consideration of
Bell, "the Supreme Court . . . strove mightily to lose the race with Congress in elucidating the
Constitution with respect to sit-ins." C. MILLER, supra note 84, at 103.
The course that Bell and its companion cases took in the Supreme Court is intertwined
with the consideration by Congress, during the same months, f the Civil Rights Act of
1964. In the light of the split on the Court, the justices would certainly have been grateful
for congressional legislation to refer to in reaching a decision. Many members of Congress.
on the other hand, would have welcomed a clearcut constitutional decision to refer to in
their own debate-although, whichever way the decision went, it would have entangled even
more the legislative maneuvering. Caught in the middle was the Department of Justice
Id. at 100 (footnote omitted). Caught in the middle, indeed. The executive branch was at the time
working diligently in the Congress for civil rights legislation it contended was desperately needed.
That position seemed inconsistent with an argument before the Court that the fourteenth amendament of its own force barred racial discrimination in public accommodations. Accordingly, at first
the Solicitor General maintained that the cases could be decided on narrow grounds-avoiding the
crucial state action question. Only when the Court prodded did the government file a supplemental
brief which argued not only that judicial enforcement of discrimination was unconstitutional but
that state action might be found in the Jim Crow tradition of the Southern States. Id. at 100.03:
see Bell v. Maryland, 375 U.S. 918 (1963) (mem.).
88. California has long maintained a well-developed process by which citizens may place
questions that concern them on the ballot for decision by the electorate. See generally CAL
ELECTIONS CODE §§ 3500-08 (West Supp. 1975); Note, The CaliforniaInitiativeProcess:A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 922 (1975).
89. The language, neutral on its face, was deemed by the California Supreme Court to have
been intended to "overturn state laws that bore on the right of private sellers and lessors to
discriminate, and to forestall future state action that might circumscribe this right." Mulkey v.
413 P.2d 825, 829, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881. 885 (1966). The significant
Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, -,
text was as follows:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge,
directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent
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overwhelming majority, two cases arose to challenge the validity of the
new constitutional provision. In Mulkey v. Reitman90 a black couple
sued in state court for an injunction and damages, alleging that an
apartment manager had violated state open housing statutes by refusing
to rent them an apartment solely because of race. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the theory that the adoption of Proposition 14 had made preexisting open housing legislation
null and void. In Prendergastv. Snyder9 a black couple sued under the
California open housing statutes, alleging that they had been evicted
from their apartment on racial grounds. Unlike the trial court in
Reitman, however, the court in Prendergastdid not reach the question
of the validity of Proposition 14. Relying on Shelley, the court held that,
the state constitution aside, judicial enforcement of an eviction based on
race would violate the equal protection clause." The two cases were

considered together by the California Supreme Court, which held the
new state constitutional provision void.93 In its opinion in Reitman the
court referred to but did not place great weight upon Shelley:"' in
Prendergastthe court indicated misgivings about the trial court's analysis but nevertheless concluded that the judgment for the tenants must
be affirmed both because Proposition 14 itself was void and because

judicial enforcement of the eviction might run afoul of Shelley.'
any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such
person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
CALIF. CONSr. art. I, § 26.
90. 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
91. 64 Cal. 2d 877, 413 P.2d 847, 50 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966).
92. Id. The trial court also placed reliance upon an earlier California case that had held that.
in light of Shelley, it was prejudicial error to deny a black tenant in an eviction case the opportunity
to show that the landlord acted on the basis of race. Proof of race discrimination would bar the
state court from holding for the landlord. Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242,
22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
93. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr, 881 (1966).
94. Id. at 413 P.2d at 831, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 887. A vigorous dissent in the case would
have distinguished Shelley on the coercion theory. See notes 55 & 56 supra and accompanying text.
95. The court's brief opinion contained the following key passages:
The trial court . . . held that the Fourteenth Amendment . . . proscribed discrimination based on race where directly practiced by a state and also if practiced by private persons
where. . . "a state court enforces the racial discriminatory act of a private individual ....
(Shelley v. Kraemer...
. . . We have held today that [Proposition 14] . . . is, in its entirety, an unconstitutional infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Mulkey v. Reitman . . .) For that
reason, as well as those relied upon by the trial court, defendant's cross-complaint is not
meritorious, and judgment for plaintiffs is affirmed.
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In the Supreme Court Justice White's majority opinion in Reitman

v. Mulkey"t mentioned the reliance upon Shelley in Prendergast, but
then left the question arid never returned to it. Focusing only upon the
validity of Proposition 14, the Court could find "no sound reason for

rejecting" the state court's reasoning. 7 The meaning of the decision was

not immediately clear. The majority apparently viewed Proposition 14

as invalid state encouragement of private racial discrimination." but
Justice Douglas added the argument that, like ShelleI, Reitman in-

volved the delegation of zoning authority to private persons who discriminate. 9 In dissent, Justice Harlan complained that the state consti-

tutional amendment had been nothing more than a repeal of open housing legislation. "This runs no more afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment
than would have California's failure to pass any such antidiscrimination
statutes in the first instance."' ' U Yet the Court's opinion clearly disclaimed reliance on any theory that the mere repeal of open housing

legislation might violate the Constitution. California had not merely
repealed statutory provisions forbidding discrimination, but had given
state constitutional authority to discriminatory action by private persons."' Moreover, California had placed a new barrier in the way of
those who would have the state prohibit race discrimination. In general,
Prendergast v. Snyder, 64 Cal. 2d 529, _,413 P.2d 847,848-49. 50 Cal. Rptr. 903.904-05(1966)
(emphasis supplied).
96. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
97. Id. at 376.
98. Id. at 381. The California Supreme Court had called up the suggestion in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Burton that a state statute that authorizes private racial discrimination
would be invalid, see note 71 supra, and Justice White followed suit-to the obvious discontent of
Justices Stewart and Harlan, who dissented without mentioning their Burton opinions. In this vein,
Reitman has been the principal cited authority for the argument that state statutes that authorize
self-help repossession and mortgage foreclosure procedures without prior notice and a hearing
impermissibly "encourage" private creditors to do what the state itself may not do. The argument
has roundly failed. See. e.g., Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (mortgage foreclosure); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.). cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank. 492 F.2d 324 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974) (self-help repossession under § 9-503 of the Unifrm
Commercial Code). See generally Burke & Reber, State Action. Congressional Power and
Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 S. CAit_. L. RE%. I (1973). The
"encouragement" theory, though strong in the immediate wake of Reitman. has since been eroded
by more recent Burger Court decisions, discussed infra. See Bond v. Dcntzer. 362 F. Supp. 1373
(N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 837 (1974).
99. 387 U.S. at 381 (Douglas, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 389 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
101. As Justice White put it, the California court had dealt with the case as though the new
constitutional provision "expressly authorized and constitutionali:edthe private right to discriminate." Id. at 376 (emphasis supplied).
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citizens who desire legislative change need only persuade a majority in

the legislature to enact it; after the adoption of Proposition 14 in California, persons seeking legislative protection from discrimination in the

housing market-protection that is clearly within the power of the legislature to give-were immediately faced with the task of amending the

02
state constitution.
The possible significance of the state constitutional dimension of

the case aside, the decision in Reitman, if read broadly, pointed far
down the road to the final-and long-awaited-emasculation of the
state action limitation in the fourteenth amendment. Justice Harlan

properly pointed out that if the state cannot be neutral, if it cannot
repeal statutes that prohibit racial discrimination, it follows that the
state must have a federal constitutional obligation to enact open housing

legislation.'"3 The state's failure to affirmatively prohibit racial discrimination then involves the state in the private discrimination
permitted by the state's inaction. If, indeed, Reitman's logic led inexorably to such a result, the expansive theories developed in the wake of
Shelley seemed now to be the law of the land. 04 As Justice Harlan put
it, "Every act of private discrimination is either forbidden by state law
or permitted by it." ' If Reitman held that a state cannot validly permit
discrimination, then it must prohibit it. In subsequent cases, the lower

courts took the decision at face value and looked closely at any state
attempt at "neutrality."'0

6

102. See Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California'sProposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967).
The rule I would propose, then, as a basis for the Reitman decision, is that where a
racial group is in a political duel with those who would explicitly discriminate against it as
a racial group, and where the regulatory action the racial group wants is of full and
undoubted federal constitutionality, the state may not place in the way of the racial minority's attaining its political goal any barriers which, within the state's political system taken
as a whole, are especially difficult of surmounting, by comparison with those barriers that
normally stand in the way of those who wish to use political processes to get what they want.
Id. at 82. Compare James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (similar requirement for public housing
projects upheld), with Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (requirement that open housing
legislation secure approval by referendum held invalid).
103. 387 U.S. at 394-95; see Black, supra note 102, at 73 (contending that this position is
correct even if Reitman cannot be read to support it). See generally A. Cox, TiE WARREN COURT
43-50 (1968).
104. See notes 57-65 supra and accompanying text.
105. 387 U.S. at 394.
106. E.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd (on this point),
445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 921 (1973) (school board's revocation of
resolutions designed to aid desegregation held invalid); Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp.
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II.

ENTER THE BURGER COURT

[A]ll that is good is not commanded by the Constitution and all that
is bad is not forbidden by it.
-Mr. Chief Justice Burger'

A.

The Revitalization of State Action
On June 23, 1969, the last day of the October 1968 Term, Earl

Warren retired after 16 years on the Court, and Warren Earl Burger
was sworn in as Chief Justice of the United States. In 1970 Justice

Blackmun came to the Court, followed by Justices Rehnquist and Powell in January 1 9 7 2 .111 In retrospect it may safely be said that the Court's
view of the concept of state action changed dramatically with the change
in membership. As late as May 1968, in A inalgamatedFood Employees

Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.'2 the Court had extended
Marsh v. Alabama"' 0 to protect labor picketing at a shopping center,
even though the land used by the pickets was privately owned. Justice

Marshall wrote for the Court; Justice Black, increasingly unreceptive to
expansive state action arguments since the Sit-In Cases,"' dissented."12

Then, in January 1970, after Chief Justice Burger had joined the Court
264 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (city resolution that ordinances restricting the right to deal with real property
would not be passed held not to be neutral); cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), discussed
in note 102 supra.
107. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 228 (1971) (concurring opinion).
108. Justice Blackmun was appointed to fill the vacancy left by the resignation of Justice
Fortas. Justices Rehnquist and Powell succeeded Justice Black, who died on September 25, 1971.
and Justice Harlan, who had retired with poor health 2 days earlier and later died on December
29, 1971.
109. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
110. 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see notes 36-43 supra and accompanying text.
Ill. See notes 85 & 86 supra and accompanying text.
112. 391 U.S. at 327. Justice Black, of course, had been the author of the Court's opinion
in Marsh. In Logan Valley, however, he found no similarity between the company town in AMarsh
and a shopping center.
The question is, Under what circumstances can private property be treated as though it were
public? The answer that Marsh gives is when that property has taken all the attributes of a
town, i.e., "residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a
'business block' on which business places are situated." . . . I can find nothing in Marsh
which indicates that if one of these features is present, e.g., a business district, this is
sufficient for the Court to confiscate a part of an owner's private property and give its use
to people who want to picket on it.
id. at 332.
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and just before Justice Blackmun was sworn in, Justice Black was able
to gain the upper hand in Evans v. Abney."' Now, with Justice Marshall not participating, Black held a majority."' By the next summer
Justice Blackmun had joined Justice Black and the Chief Justice in what
seemed a conscious effort to dampen the Court's enthusiasm for exercising federal judicial power in aid of the civil rights movement."' When
Justices Rehnquist and Powell came to the Court, judicial restraint

increased even more, and in the major state action cases of the last three
Terms the revival of the concept as a limitation on the application of
the fourteenth amendment is self-evident.

Nevertheless, while it is easy enough to explain the Court's decisions in many fields by referring to the personalities of its members, and
perhaps even easier to fault the Court's results as opposed to its analysis,
the temptation to despair must be resisted. The truth of the matter is
that, so long as the newly constituted Court can justify its decisions in
principle and precedent rather than personal predilection, the Court has

every right to steer a course different from that of its predecessor."' On
another level, it is hardly fruitful to leap to the conclusion that the
Warren Court jurisprudence is now to be rooted up and rejected-and
individual liberty lost in the process. Intellectual responsibility requires
a closer look. It is the thesis of this article that, if indeed a closer look
is given, the Burger Court's state action decisions, seen in the light of
contemporaneous opinions in related fields, suggest a basis for cautious
113. 396 U.S. 435 (1970); see note 48 supra.
114. It would, of course, be simplistic to imply that the results in these cases can be explained
by reference to the personalities of the Justices participating alone. Indeed, Justice Stewart, who
had been with Justice Marshall in Logan Valley, voted with Justice Black in Evans v. Abney. On
the other hand, Justices White and Harlan had dissented with Black in Logan Valley. They,
together with Stewart and the new Chief Justice, formed Justice Black's majority in Evans when
Justice Marshall failed to participate and Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented, Cf Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), discussed in the text accompanying notes 134-46 Infra.
115. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). In Palmer the Court upheld the closing
of a swimming pool in Jackson, Mississippi in the face of a desegregation order. The presence of
state action in the case was undisputed, and Justice Black's majority opinion dealt principally with
the substantive question whether the city's action denied black people the equal protection of the
laws. Yet the petitioners placed some reliance on Reitman, and the case thus emerged as an
indicator of the Court's developing mood on state action matters. The Chief Justice and Justice
Blackmun filed separate concurring opinions. After the decision in Palmer, Professor Kurland
pointed out that although Evans v. Abney was recent and very similar, the majority thought it
prudent to ignore rather than cite it. Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger
Court, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 265, 276.
116. See Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 SuP. CT. RE~v.
181, 329.
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optimism. A survey of the cases will indicate a clear purpose to back
away from federal judicial intrusion into local affairs affecting individual liberty, but a simultaneous willingness to approve the exercise of
federal legislative power to accomplish the same result by a different
means. We begin with a review of the state action cases.

On the first Sunday after Christmas in 1968 a member of Moose
Lodge No. 107 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania invited his friend, LeRoy

Irvis, to the dining room for drinks and dinner. The Lodge employees
denied service to Mr. Irvis on the sole ground that he was black and

the local policy-consistent with the policy of the national organization-barred blacks from the dining room."17 Reviewing the incident 4
years later in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,"8 the Supreme Court found
in the case a vehicle for reaffirming the proposition in the Civil Rights
Cases"" that the fourteenth amendment protects the individual only

from actions of the state.120 Without expressly overruling Warren Court
precedents that seemed to look the other way,' 2 ' the majority opinion

by Justice Rehnquist held that the licensing scheme by which the state
of Pennsylvania regulated the sale of liquor did not sufficiently implicate
the state in the discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge No. 107.'2

The Court began with the Burton litany that state action can be ascertained "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances."'1

Burton

117. Under the local charter issued by The Supreme Lodge of the World. Loyal Order of
Moose, a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of Indiana, Lodge No. 107 was committed to recognize the constitution and bylaws of the national organization. The constitution of the
Supreme Lodge expressly limited membership to "male persons of the Caucasian or White race
above the age of twenty-one years, and not married to someone of other than the Caucasian or
White race ...." Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246, 1247 (M.D. Pa. 1970). Although there was
some doubt whether the Supreme Lodge merely barred blacks from membership or from all
participation in Lodge affairs, while the case was pending in the courts the bylaws of the Supreme
Lodge were amended to expressly bar even the guests of members if the guests were not eligible
for membership. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178 (1972).
118. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
119. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
120. The Court's narrowly drawn opinion held first that the district court's order had improperly reached the Lodge membership policy. Since Mr. Irvis had never applied for membership.
he had no standing to raise the question whether the discriminatory admissions policy was invalid.
On the other hand, because he had been denied service in the dining room, he did have standing to
challenge the practices of the Lodge concerning the serving of food and drink to guests. 407 U.S.
at 171.
121. Indeed, the Court's opinion cited and apparently relied upon Shelley. Burton. and
Reitman. Significantly, however, there was no attempt to draw the precedents together in order
to identify the developing doctrine.
122. 407 U.S. at 177.
123. 407 U.S. at 172, quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority. 365 U.S. 715. 722
(1961).

508
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itself was distinguished as involving a "symbiotic relationship" '

be-

tween the Eagle Coffee Shoppe and the state. It was the race discrimina-

tion practiced by Eagle that enabled it to make sufficient profits to pay
its rent and ultimately to keep the publicly owned parking facility afloat,

Just as Eagle benefited from various contacts with the state, the state
benefited from the very practice of which the petitioners complained-racial discrimination. The Sit-In Cases were distinguished as

involving affirmative state enactments requiring racial discrimination.2"
In Moose Lodge, on the other hand, with one exception "' the Court
found nothing in Pennsylvania law that compelled discrimination and,
perhaps as importantly, found no benefit derived by the state from the

discrimination practiced by Moose Lodge. The case was thus reduced
to the bare question whether any benefit conferred upon private activity
by the state sufficiently involves the state in the private activity to
implicate the equal protection clause. The Court had no difficulty rejecting that proposition out of hand. "Since state-furnished services include
such necessities of life as electricity, water, and police and fire protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the distinction between
private as distinguished from state conduct .. . ."12 Moose Lodge,

then, effectively braked the growing line of cases holding that state
action might be found in state aid to private action. 2 Disregarding the
407 U.S. at 175.
125. Id. at 173. The opinion dealt with only one case - Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1963) (trespass conviction invalid when based upon ordinance requiring racial discrimination).
126. The Court did find one provision of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's regulations questionable. The rule expressly required private clubs with liquor licenses to adhere to the
provisions of their own constitutions and bylaws. All parties agreed that the regulation was intended to reach a case in which a place of public accommodation seeks to evade other applicable
state regulations by presenting itself as a "private club." Cf.Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969)
(evasion of 1964 Civil Rights Act held invalid). Yet the Court agreed that if the rule were applied
to require the local organization to follow the national prohibition on serving blacks, the fourteenth
amendment would come into play. Accordingly, the Court held that Mr. Irvis was entitled to a
decree enjoining the enforcement of the rule insofar as it required race discrimination. 407 U.S.
at 179.
127. 407 U.S. at 173.
128. Compare cases cited in note 106 supra, with Howe v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 379 F.
Supp. 667 (S.D. Iowa 1974). The tax exemption and financial aid cases also provide an illustration
of the impact of Moose Lodge. Compare Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d
959 (4th Cir. 1963) (governmental action found in private hospital's receipt of federal funding under
the Hill-Burton Act), with Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp., 507 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hill.
Burton funding even coupled with tax exemption insufficient to invoke the Constitution); see
Marker v. Schultz, 485 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (tax exemption insufficient to bring a labor
union within constitutional restrictions). But see Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d
124.
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pervasive regulatory scheme under which the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board monitored the sale of alcoholic beverages, Justice Rehnquist's opinion was at pains to make clear that, so long as the state does
not become a joint venturer in discrimination as in Burton, the publicprivate dichotomy established by the fourteenth amendment would continue to restrict the exercise of federal judicial power in essentially
private affairs. 29
If the opinion in Moose Lodge had surface plausibility, the decision
loomed as a significant departure from recent state. action precedents.
Analysis aside, the result in Moose Lodge was startling. For the first
time in years the Court had failed to find sufficient state involvement
in private discrimination to justify the application of constitutional safeguards. 13 1 Prior to 1970 the development of the state action doctrine
had moved inexorably toward a broader definition of the circumstances
that justify the exercise of federal judicial power in the civil rights field.
But now the mood had clearly changed. In Moose Lodge the change
seemed rooted in a revitalized appreciation for the ideal of federalism.
The Rehnquist opinion reaffirmed "the essential dichotomy between
discriminatory action by the State, which is prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause, and private conduct, 'however discriminatory or
wrongful,' against which that clause 'erects no shield.' " Echoing the
Civil Rights Cases,' the Court was saying that there are some problems that must, in this constitutional framework, be left to the states to
resolve for themselves without interference from the national government. In Justice Rehnquist's view, the dissenting holdover Justices from
the Warren Court, in urging a broad view of state action that would
invoke the Federal Constitution in a variety of cases, failed to fully
comprehend the consequences of their position for federalism.'3 The
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975) (tax exempt status together with a detailed regulatory
scheme with connotations of governmental approval may justify a finding of state action in the
conduct of charitable foundations). On the question of state licensing and state action, see Millenson v. New Hotel Monteleone, Inc., 475 F.2d 736 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973).
129. 407 U.S. at 172-73. On the continuing viability of Burton, see note 157 Infra.
130. As Professor Black said in 1967: "In the sixty-one years since Hodges v. United States
1203 U.S. 1 (1906)], astoundingly few Supreme Court holdings have been based, affirmatively, on
the state action doctrine, and fewer have escaped explicit or clearly implied overruling." Black,
supra note 102, at 85.
131. 407 U.S. at 172, quoting Shelley v.Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
132. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See text accompanying note 13 supra.
133. Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan dissented in opinions arguing that the Pennsylvania regulatory scheme sufficiently involved the state in the actions of Moose Lodge to invoke
the equal protection clause. 407 U.S. at 179-90 (dissenting opinions).
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deplorable actions taken by Moose Lodge might well be made unlawful
by local legislation, but the newly constituted Court was not prepared
to force that resolution upon the State of Pennsylvania.
Ten days later, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,' the Court again fixed
limits on the reach of recent cases. Lloyd Corporation owned and operated a large shopping center occupying 50 acres of land in Portland,
Oregon. The Lloyd Center was the site of more than 60 commercial
businesses and professional offices, opening on one side to public sidewalks and streets and on the other to an interior mall. The mall covered
approximately 26 acres of land, described by the district court as "a
multi-level complex of buildings, parking facilities, sub-malls, side"I"
walks, stairways, elevators, escalators, bridges, and gardens ...
for
facilities
and
other
auditorium,
rink,
an
It also included a skating
the use of the Center's customers. All told, the Center was in many
respects indistinguishable physically from the shopping center in the
Logan Valley case, 36 decided 4 years earlier. But while Logan Valley
had held that a labor union could not be enjoined from picketing a
grocery store at a shopping center in Pennsylvania, the Court in Tanner
concluded that the distribution of leaflets concerning the draft and the
Vietnam War could be prohibited in the Lloyd Center mall in Portland.
In an opinion by Justice Powell the majority concluded that both Marsh
v. Alabama3 7 and Logan Valley were distinguishable. Marsh had involved a company town, in Justice Powell's telling an "anachron134. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
135. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128, 129 (D. Ore. 1970).
136. Indeed, in dissent Mr. Justice Marshall wrote:

The Lloyd Center is similar to Logan Valley Plaza in several respects: both are bordered by public roads, and the entrances of both lead directly into the public roads; both
contain large parking areas and privately owned walkways leading from store to store; and
the general public has unrestricted access to both. The principal differences between the two

centers are that the Lloyd Center is larger than Logan Valley, that Lloyd Center contains
more commercial facilities, that Lloyd Center contains a range of professional and nonpro-

fessional services that were not found in Logan Valley, and that Lloyd Center is much more
intertwined with public streets than Logan Valley.

407 U.S. at 575 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also noted but apparently did not rely
on the lower court's finding that Lloyd employed twelve security guards who were given full police
power by the city of Portland. Id. It was these security guards who first warned the respondents
that they were not free to distribute leaflets in the mall and that if they persisted they would be
arrested and charged with trespassing. After the warning, the respondents left the mall and without

further incident commenced passing out leaflets on the public sidewalks outside the Center. Id. at
556 (opinion of the Court).
137. 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see text accompanying notes 36-43 supra.
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ism,"' 13 an "economic anomaly of the past."'3 In that case the Court
had properly held that when a corporation takes over all the functions
of a municipality, the balance between an individual's right of expression and the private property interest must be struck in favor of free
speech.' If anything, Logan Valley had improperly extended Marsh to
reach a modem shopping center that only vaguely resembled the business district in Chickasaw, Alabama."' Nevertheless, it was unnecessary
in Tanner to overrule Logan Valley. That case had expressly left open
the question whether expression unrelated to the use to which private
property is put might be enjoined."' Logan Valley involved picketing
regarding the employment practices of one of the stores in the shopping
center. Thus, it was essential to the pickets to be able to reach the
persons doing business with that store. Since the only entirely public
area in the vicinity was some distance from the store, pickets established
there would have been ineffective. The leaflets distributed at Lloyd
Center, on the other hand, concerned general political issues not directly
related to the stores at the center or, more precisely, to the use to which
the Center grounds were being put. It was, then, not essential that the
leaflets reach these particular people at this particular location; the
same expression might be just as effective elsewhere. Indeed, in Tanner
the respondents had been able to move to the public sidewalks and
streets adjoining the Center and to distribute their leaflets to the same
3
people on their way home."1
Whatever the persuasiveness of these distinctions, and the dissenters found them not at all persuasive,"' the majority opinion in Tanner
138. 407 U.S. at 558.
139. Id. at 561. Notwithstanding Tanner, several courts have found Marsh controlling in
cases involving migrant worker camps, which still resemble in many respects the company town

of Chickasaw. E.g., Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975):
Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973); see Asociacion de Trabajadores
Agricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975).
140. Surprising as it seemed coming from Justice Black, the Marsh opinion did contain
language indicating a balancing approach: "When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners
of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here,
we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position." 326 U.S. at 509.

141.

Justice Powell's majority opinion in Tanner quoted at length from Justice Black's

dissent in Logan Valley, in which the author of the Marsh opinion objected to its extension to a
shopping center case. See note 112 supra.
142. 391 U.S. at.320 n.9.
143. 407 U.S. at 566-67.
144. Justice Marshall's dissent, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, was
stinging. He read the majority opinion as "an attack not only on the rationale of Logan Valley

[where Justice Marshall had written for a six-member majority], but also on this Court's longstand-
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once again indicated a changed mood. Put most simply, the Court
declined to further undermine the state action concept as a limitation
on federal power. On the contrary, as in Moose Lodge, the Court held
the line against further erosion, choosing instead to recall once again
that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free
speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the
owner of private property .

.

. ."I's Perhaps even a more significant

ing decision in Marsh.
...
407 U.S. at 571. Justice Marshall pointed to the district court's
finding that Lloyd Center was the functional equivalent of a public business district-much like
the business district in Marsh. Moreover, the history of the Center illustrated that the city of
Portland had participated in the planning of the Center. The city had vacated public streets to make
room for the Center and had planned and constructed new streets to accommodate the increased
traffic in the area. "From its inception," added Justice Marshall, "the city viewed it as a 'business
district' of the city .... " Id. at 576. All this led Justice Marshall to conclude that the city or
Portland had effectively delegated a public function to Lloyd Center, just as had occurred in Logan
Valley. As a second ground of his disseint, Justice Marshall took issue with the majority's hasty
conclusion that the leaflets distributed at Lloyd Center were not "generally consonant with the use
to which the property is actually put." Id. at 578, quoting Amalgamated Food Employees Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 320 (1968) (footnote omitted). Marshall noted that
the Center invited schools, Veterans organizations, volunteer groups, and political candidates to
use its facilities to express their views on a variety of issues. The Center had thus opened its doors
to the public, not only for the purpose of shopping at its stores, but for expression as well. That
being the case, Justice Marshall would have held that Lloyd was not free to discriminate among
groups on the basis of the content of their expression. Apparently on an analogy to the public forum
cases, he argued that these leaflets were related to the purpose to which the Center was being
put-at least so long as the Center embraced others with dissimilar views. Finally, Justice Marshall
made the common sense argument that given the inaccessibility of other forms of expression many
people, particularly the poor and the powerless, must resort to leaflets in order to be heard. I f cities
tend to depend more and more on "private" shopping centers as they plan for the future, the ability
of these groups to express themselves effectively will surely be curtailed. "As governments rely on
private enterprise, public property decreases in favor of privately owned property. It becomes
harder and harder for citizens to find means to communicate with other citizens." 407 U.S. at 586.
In order to ensure that the purpose of the first amendment is achieved, Justice Marshall would
apply that constitutional limitation to shopping centers like Lloyd. Cf.T. EIERSON, TtnE SYsTUNM
OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 645-53 (1970) (examining the state's duty to furnish physical facilities
for expression-related activities).
145. 407 U.S. at 567 (emphasis in original). A caveat, however, is in order. The quoted
language to the contrary, there is some basis for reading the Marsh-Logan Valley-Tanner line of
cases as outside the mainstream of the development of the state action concept. Clearly, all three
opinions were written with as much attention paid to the first amendment implications as to the
extent of the state's involvement in the actions of private landowners. Thus Justice Powell's opinion
in Tanner may better illustrate his balancing approach to first amendment questions than his
thinking on the related state action question. It can be argued that the holding in Tanner was not
that there was insufficient state involvement in Lloyd Center to implicate the fourteenth amendment but rather that, the application of the fourteenth amendment assumed, on balance the first
amendment rights of the respondents were not violated by a rule that restricted leafletting to the
public sidewalks outside the mall. Support for such a reading can be found in his opinion: "It would
be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First
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case than Moose Lodge, Tanner rejected the proposition that private
action becomes subject to constitutional limitations to the extent it takes
on public characteristics. The clear message from Tanner was that pri-

vate property does not become public merely because it is used for
activity associated with public affairs. Thus, in the future it would not
be enough to show that a private entity is performing what normally is
a public function. Rather, it would be necessary to show that the state

has played a significant, perhaps a conscious, role in bringing about the
challenged private action.'

Perhaps both the Moose Lodge holding-that state aid to private
Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues or communication
exist. Such an accommodation would diminish property rights without significantly enhancing the
assertedright of free speech." Id. (emphasis supplied). By his use of the adjective asserted, Justice
Powell may have intended to convey to the reader that he was merely pointing out what the
constitutional analysis would be if the first amendment issue were presented, that is. if sufficient
state action were shown. On the other hand, read literally this language suggests that Justice Powell
saw the task in Tanner as balancing competing constitutional rights and not merely ascertaining
whether the fourteenth amendment came into play at all in the case. This, of course, would not be
the first instance in which the Court has blurred the threshold question regarding state action with
the substantive question whether the challenged action, if sufficiently state-related, violates the
Constitution. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 129
(1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 195-224 infra. See also 412 U.S. at 133-34 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (suggesting that the Marsh. Logan Valley, and Tanner cases constitute an independent basis for applying constitutional restrictions-apart from the "evolution of the 'state action'
concept").
146. After this article went to galleys, the Supreme Court decided Hudgens v. NLRB, 44
U.S.L.W. 4281 (U.S. March 2, 1976), another case that, like Logan Valley, involved labor union
picketing at a privately operated shopping center. In an opinion by Justice Stewart, who had been
with Marshall dissenting in Tanner, the Court held that Tanner could not be squared with the
reasoning in Logan Valley. Accordingly, even though the majority opinion in Tanner had been at
pains to distinguish Logan Valley and to leave that decision intact, Justice Stewart was prepared
to face reality: "Our institutional duty is to follow until changed the law as it now is,
not as some
members of the Court might wish it to be. And in the performance of that duty we make clear
now, if it was not clear before, that the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's
decision in the Lloyd case. . . . [T]he ultimate holding in Lloyd amounted to a total rejection of
the holding in Logan Valley." Id. at 4285. In a concurring opinion, Justice White admitted his
discontent with Logan Valley, but nevertheless argued that the case need not be overruled. Justice
Powell, also concurring, conceded that White offered tenable factual distinctions, but chose not to
rely upon them. Instead, he acknowledged that his opinion for the Court in Tanner would have
done better "to have confronted this disharmony [with Logan Valley) rather than draw distinctions
based upon rather attenuated factual differences." Id. at 4287. The most interesting opinion came
from Justice Marshall, who asserted that, while in Tanner he had argued that Logan Valley could
not be distinguished and thus must have been overruled, he had "on reflection" decided that the
two cases were reconcilable after all-for the very reasons given by Justice Powell at the time.
Accordingly, in Marshall's view at least, Logan Valley remained "good law" to control Hudgens,
a case he found closer to Logan Valley than Tanner. Id. at 4290-91.
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entities will not alone justify upsetting the balance between state and
national power-and the Tanner warning-that what looks public may
nevertheless be private-contributed to the confusion the Court experienced in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery.'47 That case involved the

validity of the city's policy permitting segregated private groups to use
public recreational facilities. The circuit court had approved an injunction against the exclusive use of facilities by school groups, but held that
the district court's order barring use of public facilities by nonschool
groups was not founded upon a sufficient showing of state action.' In
the Supreme Court Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court affirmed
the holding that the city could not validly give segregated private schools
exclusive use of such things as playing fields and parks. But the Court
found the record inadequate for a resolution of the question whether
nonexclusive use by school groups might be enjoined and the final ques-

tion whether nonschool groups might also be barred from public facilities.' 49 Gilmore has been examined elsewhere, and it will suffice to say
147. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
148. At the culmination of longstanding civil rights litigation in Montgomery, the district
court had enjoined city authorities from permitting the use of public recreational facilities by any
private segregated school group or any nonschool group that had a racially discriminatory admissions policy. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 337 F. Supp. 22 (M.D. Ala. 1972). On appeal the
Fifth Circuit drew a distinction between a private school's exclusive possession and use of a facility
and independent use by individual students, saying of the latter: "[T]o the extent that the [district]
court's order may be read to prohibit the use and enjoyment of public recreational facilities by
individual children or groups of students enrolled at private schools in common with other members
of the public, we find the order to be overbroad." 473 F.2d 832, 837 (5th Cir. 1973). So long as
the order barred only the exclusive use of facilities for official functions, the circuit court could
approve, but it would not countenance depriving individual students enrolled at segregationist
academies the opportunity to use public facilities independently. On the further question whether
private non-school groups might be enjoined from using facilities, the issue changed considerably.
In the context of schools, any state aid to segregated private schools might frustrate the state's
affirmative duty to disestablish the dual public school system. See Green v. County School Bd.,
391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). But there is no affirmative duty to desegregate private nonschool
groups, and the case for state involvement in the discrimination practiced by such groups is much
more difficult to make. See National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010
(4th Cir. 1973). In Gilmore the circuit court concluded that the Montgomery petitioners had failed
to make that case.
149. Since Gilmore the Fifth Circuit has indicated that in some cases nonexcluslve use of
public facilities will be found sufficient to implicate the fourteenth amendment. Golden v,Biscayne
Bay Yacht Club, 521 F.2d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court in Gilmore also indicated
uncertainty about the petitioners' standing. While the petitioners were parties to an outstanding
order requiring the desegregation of public parks in the city, it was not altogether clear that they
were entitled to have the benefit of another order commanding desegregation of public schools. It
was the latter that might support the claim that nonexclusive use of facilities would have a "significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination," so as to frustrate the
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here that the decision sheds little light on the significant questions presented.' 0
Yet Justice Blackmun's opinion offered scattered indications of the
considerations the Burger Court finds relevant to the identification of
state action. Citing Moose Lodge, the Court reminded the district court
that the provision of "traditional state monopolies, such as electricity,
water, and police and fire protection" does not sufficiently involve the
state in the activities of the groups that receive such "generalized governmental services."'' In Gilmore Justice Blackmun added parks and
similar recreational facilities to the list from Moose Lodge, concluding
accordingly that to the extent the district court's order barred the mere
use of facilities by any segregated group it was invalid for want of a
proper finding of state action.5 2 That said, the Court went on to suggest
that a different result might be reached if the petitioners were able to
show that the city rationed recreational facilities that otherwise would
be freely accessible to all. As an example, Justice Blackmun suggested
that if the city were to engage in scheduling softball games for an allwhite church league, the city's role in the racial discrimination practiced
by the league would be "dangerously close to what was found to exist
in Burton .

.

."I'

Perhaps the Court meant to attach crucial signifi-

cance to the conscious role of city officials in planning the exclusive use
of public facilities by segregated groups. In other cases the Court had
not demanded that agents of the state participate consciously in racial
discrimination before the fourteenth amendment came into play; such
a holding would break with numerous cases in which state action was
found apart from intentional discrimination by a public employee.' 5 '
city's affirmative responsibility to disestablish the dual public school system. See Gilmore v. City
of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 570 n.10 (1974), quoting Norwood v. Harrison. 413 U.S. 455, 466

(1973).
150. See Yackle, Private Use of Public Facilities: A Comment on Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 659 (1974). See also Gooden v. Mississippi State Univ..
499 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
151. 417 U.S. at 574.
152. Id. Echoing the views expressed by those who would develop a more expansive state

action concept, see text accompanying notes 57-65 supra,Justice White's concurring opinion would
have made it clear that "there is very plainly state action of some sort involved in the leasing...
of scarce city-owned recreational facilities to . . . private groups. . . . (Tihe question is not
whether there is state action, but whether the conceded state action by the city. . . is such that
the State must be deemed to have denied the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 582.
153. Id. at 574.
154. E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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Nevertheless, Gilmore seemed to look in a new direction, perhaps suggesting further developments to come.

The next Term, in Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co., 5' what had
been only a suggestion in Gilmore was apparently turned into an express
holding. In another opinion by Justice Rehnquist the Court held that
the action of a privately owned utility company in terminating service
to a customer for alleged nonpayment of bills was not subject to the
constraints of the fourteenth amendment. The customer contended that
she possessed an entitlement to electrical service under state statutes and
that she could not be deprived of that property interest without due
process of law.' Although Metropolitan was not formally an agent of
the state, she argued that the extensive state regulatory scheme to which

the company was subject sufficiently involved the state in its actions to
implicate constitutional protection for individual customers. Rejecting
that position, Justice Rehnquist said that "the inquiry must be whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged
action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself."' 57 Standing alone, this is a
155. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
156. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972), the Court held that property protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment is determined by nonconstitutional law that explicitly or implicitly creates an
entitlement to a benefit dispensed by government in the form of largesse. For example, at least
since Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the receipt of public assistance has been considered
such an entitlement, a property interest of which a recipient cannot be deprived without sufficient
procedural safeguards to assure correct fact-finding. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78. 8I
(1971); Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). In Jackson the petitioner contended
that a provision of the Pennsylvania statutes relating to public utilities, which expressly required
the power company to provide service without unreasonable interruptions, created such a property
interest in her. Accordingly, she argued that the company was barred by the due process clause
from terminating service to her home prior to notice and a hearing into the facts surrounding her
alleged failure to pay her bills. See 419 U.S. at 348 n.2: Note, Specifying the Procedures Required
by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. Ruv. 1510 (1975).
157. 419 U.S. at 351. In dissent, Justice Douglas complained that the majority had repudiated Burton by examining each contact with the state separately. "It is not enough to examine
seriatim each of the factors upon which a claimant relies and to dismiss each individually as being
insufficient to support a finding of state action. It is the aggregate that is controlling." Id. at 360.
Of course, since the majority opinion did just that it seems clear that, at least after Jackson, the
aggregate is not controlling. In his separate dissent Justice Marshall also complained that the
majority had given "short shrift to the extensive interaction between the company and the State,"
choosing to focus instead "solely on the extent of state support for the particular activity under
challenge." Id. at 369. Although Burton was distinguished in Jackson as involving a "symbiotic
relationship" between the state and private discriminatory activity, there is some question whether
that case remains good authority. See text accompanying note 124 supra. It seems clear that the
Buhton Court did not attach constitutional significance to any particular contact between the
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demanding standard. Apparently what is required is a close, rational
connection between the state and the particular conduct challenged by
the individual. After Jackson it is no longer sufficient to show numerous
contacts between the state and the private entity; the only contacts that
merit attention are those that rationally relate to the specific action

under attack. 5 ' In Jackson itself Metropolitan was heavily regulated by
the state, but neither its monopoly status nor its effect on the public
interest established a rational nexus between the state and the procedure
by which the company had terminated the petitioner's electrical service. 159
Parking Authority and Eagle, but instead rested its decision on the aggregate of contacts, precisely
the rationale rejected in Jackson. Nevertheless, at least so far as the "symbiotic relationship"
analysis will take it, Burton continues to be cited. E.g., Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285
(2d Cir. 1975); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 392 F. Supp. 118, 125 (W.D. Pa. 1975). But
see Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975) (giving Burton a very narrow
reading).
158. This has been the view of lower federal courts in decisions since Jackson. E.g., Taylor
v. Saint Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975); Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference.
516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975); Spark v. Catholic Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975):
Blouin v. Loyola Univ., 506 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit has taken the position
that even when government financial aid is conditioned upon a private entity's agreement to comply
with antidiscrimination rules the Constitution is not implicated unless the action under attack
relates to those rules. Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
874 (1974). The Supreme Court's rational nexus test is perhaps analogous to its approach in
Tanner, in which the Constitution was not invoked in a shopping center case because the plaintiffs'
expression-related activity was not tied to the purpose for which the center was open to the public.
In cases involving governmental funding of private activities it might be argued that even though
government money is not used in the particular activity under attack, funding is fungible and
money saved on other projects that are paid for by government may be diverted to the project
involved in the litigation. The argument, where made, has not been successful. See Greenya v.
George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Junior Chamber of Commerce v.
Missouri State Junior Chamber of Commerce, 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975). To the extent that
analogy to establishment clause precedents is reliable, it may be noted that the Supreme Court
has rejected the argument that all aid to sectarian schools is forbidden "because aid to one aspect
of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 743 (1973).
159. In rejecting the petitioner's argument that Metropolitan's monopoly status would support a finding of state action, Justice Rehnquist said that the company was a naturalmonopoly.
It did not owe its monopoly status to the state but to the economics of the marketplace that made
it infeasible for others to compete. On this theory, since the company was regulated not to maintain
its monopoly position but only to ensure adequate service to the public, the state was considered
less responsible for the actions of the utility. 419 U.S. at 350 n.7. In dissent, Justice Marshall found
in these facts even more reason to subject the company to constitutional limitations. In his view,
the state's policy of regulating the company's operations in the public interest was tied to its
decision not to provide electrical power itself but instead to offer service to consumers through
the private company. Effectively, then, the state had delegated a public function to Metropolitan.
419 U.S. at 371; see The Supreme Court. 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 47. 142 (1975).

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 27:479

In dissent, Justice Marshall argued persuasively that, at least b,
implication, the majority opinion had gone even further. Focusing upor
the portion of the majority opinion that had distinguished Public Ulili
ties Commission v. Pollak,'

Marshall concluded that the majorit'

would require conscious action by a state agent before invoking tht
fourteenth amendment.' In Pollak the Court had found no substantive
violation of the first amendment in a District of Columbia transit company's practice of piping music into its buses. The Court had apparently0'

found sufficient governmental involvement" 3 in the case nol

only because the transit company was subject to extensive regulation a
a public utility, but also because the Public Utilities Commission had
investigated the music policy and affirmatively approved it." 4 In
Jackson, argued the majority, "there was no such imprimatur placed

on the practice of Metropolitan about which petitioner complains."'"
On the facts, this conclusion was arguable at best, for Metropolitan
had submitted its procedure in termination cases to the state Public
160. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
161. 419 U.S. at 368 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Jackson, it is unclear from the opinion in the case
whether the Court found sufficient governmental action to require a decision on the substantive
issue or instead merely assumed the threshold governmental action question for purposes of treating the merits. 419 U.S. at 356 n.16. In dissent, Justice Marshall maintained that, even if the Pollak
opinion was itself unclear on this point, decisions since had read the case as having squarely decided
the "stat& action" question presented. Id. at 371 n.3.
163. Since the District of Columbia is not subject to the fourteenth amendment, the Court
in Pollak was presented with a case arising directly under the first amendment, not filtered through
the due process clause of the fourteenth. Accordingly, the case cannot properly be considered a
state action decision at all. On the other hand, since the first amendment protects the individual
only from the actions of the national government, similar governmental action questions arise.
Indeed, courts often treat the issues-state action under the fourteenth amendment and governmental action under the provisions of the Bill of Rights-as the same. E.g., Junior Chamber of
Commerce v. Missouri State Junior Chamber of Commerce, 508 F.2d 1031, 1033 (8th Cir. 1975):
Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511, 513 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1974): Jackson v.
Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 627 n.5 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). At
most the issues are only analogous. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 133 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). In an argument constructed Infra, this
article will suggest that a clear distinction between state and governmental action cases is crucial
to an understanding of the present stage of doctrinal development in this area.
164. Pollak is perhaps best remembered for Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion explaining his decision to recuse himself in the case. Fearing that subconscious feelings might affect his
objectivity, he said: "My feelings are so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy
that I had better not participate in judicial judgment upon it." 343 U.S. at 467. The Justice used
the buses and was subjected to the piped-in music about which Pollak complained-one might
suspect, in Frankfurter's estimation, with some justification.
165. 419 U.S. at 357 (emphasis in original).
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Utilities Commission in a tariff filed with that office. Although the
Court noted that it was questionable whether state law required the
company to file the tariff, and even whether the commission was empowered to disapprove it, it conceded that the tariff became effective
only when the commission did not affirmatively disapprove it within
60 days of submission. Still, the Court maintained that, since the commission's consideration of the tariff had been merely perfunctory-as
opposed to the extensive consideration given the music policy in Pollak
-the case for state action had not been made out. 6 '
Justice Marshall seized upon the precise language used by the majority opinion and found in the words a significant departure from state
action precedents. The Court wrote:
The nature of governmental regulation of private utilities is such that a
utility may frequently be required by the state regulatory scheme to
obtain approval for practices a business regulated in less detail would be
free to institute without any approval from a regulatory body. Approval
by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility,
where the Commission has not put its own weight on the side of the
proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated
by the utility and approved by the Commission into "state action."' "
Read literally, this seems to say that even the affirmative approval of
the termination practice by the commission would have been insufficient. The fourteenth amendment would have been applicable only if
the commission had actually ordered Metropolitan to terminate service according to the procedure challenged by Mrs. Jackson. Justice
Marshall could not accept such a proposition in light of the precedents,' and it seems unlikely that the Burger Court will take it to its
166.

In dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall argued:

the Commission
The majority's test puts potential plaintiffs in a difficult position: if
approves the tariff without argument or a hearing, the State has not sufficiently demonstrated its approval and support for the company's practices. If, on the other hand, the State
challenges the tariff provision on the ground, for example, that the "reasonable notice" does
not meet the standards of fairness that it expects of the utility, then the State has not put
its weight behind the termination procedure employed by the company, and again there is
no state action. Apparently, authorization and approval would require the kind of hearing
that was held in Pollak, where the Public Utilities Commission expressly stated that the
bus company's installation of radios in buses and streetcars was not inconsistent with the
public convenience, safety, and necessity.
Id. at 370-71.
167. Id. at 357.
168. He found the proposition inconsistent with, for example, Rentman and Moose Lodge,
both of which had indicated that any state authorization that tends to encourage the action under
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logical conclusion. To require an order from a state agency to engage
in the conduct alleged to be invalid is, of course, to eliminate from con-

sideration any case in which the argument for state action is founded
upon state involvement with private conduct. This is to find state
action only when a state legislature commands race discrimination

by positive enactment, or a deputy sheriff himself leads a band of gunmen to impose summary punishment upon civil rights workers, or a
state court orders a litigant to discriminate against blacks in selling his
property. These are the classic cases in which state action is explicit. At
the very least the public function cases would seem to stand for the
proposition that indirect state action, funneled through private hands,
can also violate the fourteenth amendment."6 9 Indeed, only a half dozen
pages earlier in Jackson, the Court had stated its task as deciding
when the actions of a private entity "may be fairly treated as that of

the State

....

"170

Of course, even a rule requiring considered approval or authoriza-

tion of a private entity's actions, indeed even one requiring a nexus
between the state and the particular private action under attack, sweeps

away the expansive notions of state action that were suggested, and
some thought adopted, during the Warren Court years. Clearly nothing
in Jackson permits state action to be found in a state's failure to protect
individual interests against the acts of other individuals or private
groups and organizations. And certainly nothing in Jackson suggests
that the state law that underlies private ordering of any kind and necessarily operates in every case to give legal effect to private actions might

itself constitute sufficient state action to implicate the fourteenth
attack will be sufficient to invoke constitutional limitations on that action. Id. at 369 n.2.

169. See text accompanying notes 28-43 supra. Of course, it is possible but unlikely that
the Court intended to discard the public function rationale altogether. In a recent opinion, the
Second Circuit concluded that "the service involved must not only be one which is traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the state but . . . it must in addition be one which the state itself is
under an affirmative duty to provide." New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc.,
512 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1975). There being few if any services the state must provide, such a
holding would effectively overrule the public function cases. The language in Jackson, taken
literally, might even suggest a return to the view that an action of a state agent that itself violates
state law cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. See text accompanying notes 22-27 supra. Once
again, it is unlikely that Justice Rehnquist intended to go too far.
170. 419 U.S. at 351 (emphasis supplied). It has been argued that Justice Rehnquist "took
pains to stress that the absence of any proof of state initiation [of the action under attack) or
enforcement would not necessarily be dispositive in all cases." Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d
285, 288 (2d Cir. 1975).
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amendment. 71 In short, the Court rejected the view that it should effec-

tively disregard the state action limitation and proceed immediately to
a balancing test to determine whether the conceded state action violates
the Constitution. On the contrary, Jackson settled upon a wooden state
action concept that follows the familiar two-step pattern of first looking
for sufficient state action to invoke the fourteenth amendment-now

requiring evidence of official participation in the private conduct under
attack-and only upon finding state action as a threshold matter treating the merits of the alleged substantive violation.' Thus, a finding of
state action carries a very specific meaning. It is not that the state in
some shadowy fashion has brought about or permitted conduct in circumstances that justify the invocation of constitutional limitations.7 3
When the Burger Court finds state action in a case, it means that the
private actor involved is the state for purposes of fourteenth amendment
171. See text accompanying notes 57-106 supra. That the post-Jackson %%orld will admit or
no such argument is made clear by Judge Wisdom's recent opinion in Barrera v. Security Bldg. &
Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975). In that case the court upheld a Texas statutory scheme
that permitted creditors to foreclose on deeds of trust without judicial proceedings. In a passage
that recognized the expansive state action argument but nevertheless rejected it as inconsistent with
Jackson, Judge Wisdom wrote:
A sale under a deed of trust, to be an effective creditor remedy, must of course pass
good title. The contract that provides for a power of sale thus relies, ultimately, on the
state's acknowledgement of the legal effect of the involuntary change in ou nership brought
about by the exercise of the power of sale. That the state merely recognizes the legal effect
of such private arrangements does not convert them into state acts for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes. . . . Virtually all formal private arrangements assume, at some
point, the supportive role of the state. To hold that the state, by recognizing the legal effect
of those arrangements, converts them into state acts for constitutional purposes would
effectively erase to a significant extent the constitutional line between private and state
action and subject to judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment virtually all private
arrangements that purport to have binding legal effect.
519 F.2d at 1170. To be sure. Although Judge Wisdom's language suggests that the plaintiffs"
argument asks far too much of the Constitution, one suspects that he might have been sympathetic
to it a few brief years ago. Now, however, with the Burger Court's decisions on the books, he is
clearly right that the argument has been soundly rejected-at least insofar as the fourteenth
amendment [of its own force] is concerned. But see text accompanying notes 389-98 infra.
172. This is not to say that the results reached will necessarily be different because of the
different analysis. Those who would take a broader view of state action would still institute a
balancing test to determine whether the state involvement violates the fourteenth amendment. And
that balance might well take into consideration the connection between the state action conceded
to be present and the ostensibly private conduct under attack. In discussing the application of the
fourteenth amendment to charitable institutions, for example. Professor Lewis has said that "Itihe
important consideration for the state action problem is whether exemption involves the government
in an endorsement of the specific policies and goals of an exempt organization." Lewis. supra note
24, at 1108.
173. See note 59 supra.
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analysis."' This is an exceedingly narrow construction, especially in
light of the development of the state action doctrine over the last 3
decades. 7 5 Precisely why the present Court has taken such a position is
174. Cf Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 133
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). One may fairly ask, however, why it is important to tie the
particular conduct under attack to government. If the question in a case in which a private entity
is sued is whether the entity is an arm of the state, whether it is the state, then a general assessment
of its relationship to government similar to the Burton approach would seem appropriate.
175. The Burger Court may draw support from Judge Friendly's treatment of the tax exemption cases. He has argued that there is a crucial distinction to be drawn between precedents holding
that public officials may be enjoined from granting tax exemptions to institutions that practice
racial discrimination and cases in which a plaintiff sues a private institution, seeking to impose
constitutional restrictions upon its activities by proving sufficient governmental contacts. When a
public official is sued, the question is not whether sufficient state action is present but whether the
conceded state action violates the Constitution. If it does, the remedy is an order lifting the
exemption. In actions directly against private institutions, on the other hand, a finding of state
action must mean a holding that the institution is an arm of the state, exposing it to all manner of
constitutional restrictions both in its relations with outsiders and in its internal affairs. In some
narrowly defined cases Judge Friendly would be prepared to hold that government agents might
be ordered to withhold an exemption. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); cf
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam sub nom, Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971). However, he views cases finding tax exempt institutions subject to constitutional
limits "analytically unsound, dangerously open-ended, and at war with controlling precedent
.
... Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 636 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). Compare Jackson v. Statler Foundation, supra, with McGlotten
v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court). See also Bittker & Kaufman,
Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing"the InternalRevenue Code, 82 YAt. L.J. 5I. 61-63
(1972). Taking Judge Friendly's position a bit further, it is arguable that the Constitution never
should be invoked in a lawsuit that names someone or something other than a public body or agent
as defendant. If that is the case, and if the Burger Court adopts a similar view, the real problem
in Moose Lodge was the plaintiffs decision to sue the Lodge rather than the Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Board, and the problem in Jackson was that Metropolitan and not the Public Utilities
Commission was named as defendant.
If there is a satisfying answer to Judge Friendly, perhaps it lies in an understanding of the
different perspectives from which state action cases may be analyzed. On the one hand, the question
may be put as whether the action of some ostensibly private entity is sufficiently bound up with
the state to justify ascribing the action to the government and subjecting it to constitutional
scrutiny. This is the approach generally taken when a private concern is named as defendant. On
the other hand, the same case may be viewed from the perspective of the state officials who
allegedly have ties to the private action under attack, and the question may be rerramed as whether
what the officials have done violates the Constitution. The case that comes first to mind is Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), discussed in text accompanying notes 88-106 supra. Given the
positive enactment of a constitutional amendment in Reitman, there was no serious question
whether state action was involved. The issue in the case was whether the admitted state action
violated the fourteenth amendment as an encouragement to race discrimination. Nevertheless,
Reitman is properly recognized as a key case in the development of state action doctrine. See
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), discussed in note 115 supra.
Not surprisingly, the discussion leads back to the argument made just after Shelley that the
search for state action is misleading-that state action is always present when plaintiffs can point
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unclear from the cases, but a number of possibilities come to mind.'
The principal basis for the apparent retreat may lie in the Burger

Court's essential conservatism. The men who have come to the Court
since 1969 have taken the bench with the firm conviction that in a
to state involvement of any sort. See note 152 supra; cf Gilmore v. City or Montgomery. 417 U.S.
556, 582 (1974) (White, J., concurring). On this reasoning, it should make no constitutional
difference whether private entities or governmental officials are named as defendants in fourteenth
amendment cases. Cf. Goodloe v. Davis, 514 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1975) (private service club can
be named as defendant in suit challenging the discriminatory operation of public athletic facilities).
Once it is established that what the state is doing violates the Constitution, the private entity or
the state itself can presumably choose from two alternatives. Either all ties to government must
somehow be severed, as when a tax exemption is withdrawn, see Coit v. Green, supra. or the entity
must change its policy, as when a restaurant stops discriminating on the basis of race. See Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Of course, if the very expansive notion of
state action suggested earlier in this article is embraced, there will be no way for the private concern
to rid itself entirely of state involvement. The underlying state law that recognizes a private right
to discriminate can never be escaped. At all events, however, Judge Friendly's real concern seems
to be with the proper remedy for unconstitutional state action when it is identified rather than with
the substantive question whether the action is indeed invalid.
176. It is, of course, possible that the results reached in the most recent cases stem not so
much from the Court's changing notions of state action as from its views on the substantive issues
that must be reached if sufficient state action is found. It has already been suggested that in Tanner
the Court was much more concerned with the substantive first amendment question than %%ithstate
action. See note 145 supra. In Jackson the majority may have hesitated to find state action in order
to avoid facing the question whether, assuming the application of the due proces clause, a consumer of electrical power is entitled to a hearing prior to termination of service. The Court'%recent
decisions indicate substantial uncertainty about what process is due in various factual situation .
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Note. vupra
note 156. Compare Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). and Fuentes v. Shcvin.
407 U.S. 67 (1972). with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). and North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). In his dissent in Jackson Justice Marshall
suggested that "[tihe majority's conclusion that there is no state action in this case is likely guided
in part by its reluctance to impose on a utility company burdens that might ultimately hurt
consumers more than they would help them. Elaborate hearings prior to termination might he quite
expensive, and for a responsible company there might be relatively few cases in shich such hearings
would do any good." 419 U.S. at 373. Justice Marshall's solution, however. %as not to %ithhold
application of the due process clause altogether but instead to require relativel) little process.
perhaps only informal prior notice, before electrical service may be terminated. Marshall %as
additionally troubled that the majority's position, in part determined by the character of the
constitutional violation alleged, might be extended to other cases-namely those involving racial
discrimination. A handful of lower court opinions have adopted the view that a les stringent
standard for finding state action should be applied in race discrimination cases than in others. E.g..
Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927. 931-33 (Ist Cir.). rert. denied.
419 U.S. 1001 (1974); Jackson v. Statler Foundation. 496 F.2d 623. 635 (2d Cir. 1974). cert. denied.
420 U.S. 927 (1975). James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1974). At least one circuit has
indicated a willingness to look for state action with special care in sex discrimination cases. Weise
v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court itself has never taken such a
position in race or sex classification cases. See Henkin, supra note 50. at 473 n.2: cf, Adicks v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970) (Brennan. J.. concurring and dissenting).
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democratic society the judiciary should and must exercise restraint. An
activist Court that wades quickly, perhaps too quickly, into the thick
of what are arguably legislative concerns soon finds itself at sea, unable
to perform its fundamental function of reasoned adjudication., This
Court would adhere to precedent, at least so long as the logic of
precedent does not offend,' and would reject modes of analysis that
force its members to make value judgments for their fellow citizens. It
is understandable, then, that this Court should seek to avoid the further
erosion of the state action limitation on the fourteenth amendment, for,
to be sure, the demise of that concept necessarily would thrust the Court
further into increasingly complex social problems.' Blurring into the
Court's resistance to activism is its related judgment that, whatever the
need for judicial intervention in local affairs during the past few decades,
177. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970): Burke &
Reber, State Action. Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendnent, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1017 (1973); Wechsler, supra note 33.
178. In discussing Moose Lodge, Professor Kurland wrote:
No doubt that there is some validity in the dissenting position if it is taken to assert that
the Court as earlier constituted, perhaps even as of last Term, would have reached a
different conclusion. But there is nothing in the proposition that prior decisions compel the
result that they would reach. The decisions on state action remained unprincipled, except
to the extent that it be regarded as a principle to expand the concept even if rational
justification is not forthcoming. It is obvious that the new Court is not going to he so
latitudinarian in its reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's strictures. But it can take this
stand even while paying full obligation to stare decisis.
Kurland, supra note 116, at 190.
179. The time is gone, of course, when anyone seriously contends that the work of the
Supreme Court might be done without the delicate balancing of various societal and individual
interests and values. As Professor Kurland has put it, "there are only as many such living 'strict
constructionists' as there are living dodo birds." Kurland, supra note 115. at 266. Nevertheless,
the Burger Court has attempted to limit its value judgments in most instances. In its equal
protection decisions, for example, the Court has largely rejected the two-tier analysis developed in
the Warren Court years because of its tendency to require the Court to assess the importance oF
competing interests in order to ascertain the appropriate standard of review. While the more
flexible analysis adopted instead also calls for judgment, the Court now exercises that judgment
on the merits of the classification under attack by applying an intermediate standard of review in
most cases and then balancing interests in deciding whether the classification satisfies the four.
teenth amendment. See Gunther, The Supreme Court. 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evoll.
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection. 86 HARv L. Ri.v. I
(1972): cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 418 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting). On the other hand,
in very recent cases the Court has revived what can only be regarded as substantive due process
doctrine in cases involving personal privacy. E.g., Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Here the
Court has been much criticized for its alleged willingness to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YAI 1: L.J. 920
(1973): Tribe. The Supreme Court, 1972 Term. Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. I (1973). But see Heymann & Barzclay, The Forevt
and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973).
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this is a time for stock-taking. There are indications that the Burger
Court believes that the great social upheavals of the fifties and sixties
are over and, accordingly, whatever may be said for the moral leadership of the Court during those troubled times,' in the seventies the
Court's role should be more passive.' This Court conceives of itself as
fundamentally a dispute-resolving institution empowered to make law
only insofar as it is necessary in case-by-case adjudication. That, of
course, is theory to which all would subscribe, indeed, theory commanded by Article 111.112 But the Burger Court perhaps places greater
emphasis upon its limited role in the constitutional scheme than did its
predecessor. Now more than ever, in these days following the spirited
civil rights movement of the sixties when the issues affecting individual
liberty are less crisp and clear,' the Court should not stray from its
180.

See Wright, Professor Bickel. The Scholarly Tradition. and the Supreme Court. 84

L. REV. 769, 804 (1971).
181. After examining the cases, Professor Kurland concluded:
In terms of voting patterns during the 1969 Term on civil rights cases. one could
discern, if one had to, three blocs. The one most sympathetic to the utiliiation of the judicial
process for aiding black equality included only Justices Douglas and Brennan. The one least
willing to write social policy inhibiting individual racial discrimination would contain the
new Chief Justice and Justices Harlan and White. In the middle, but leaning to%%ard the
second group, would be Justices Black, Stewart. and Marshall. with the last recusing himself
in most of the cases.

HARV.

Kurland, Enter the Burger Court. The Constitutional Business of the Supreme Court. 0. T 1969.
1970 Sup. CT. REV. I, 19.

The data then is clear that the Minnesota Twins [the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun] have expanded into the Nixon quartet [with the coming of Justices Rehnquist and
Powell], while the Warren Court trio [Justices Douglas, Brennan. and Marshalli remains a
minority of three ...
T the issues deriving from the consistent confrontation of the black and %%hite
.That
races in this country will continue to call for judicial resolution seems patent. That the
Court's attitude is changing from one of commitment to give black litigants %hat the) uant
to one perhaps more consonant with the concept of the equality of the races isalso apparent.
Kurland, supra note 116, at 185, 187.
182. For recent cases treating the "case or controversy" limitation on the exercise of federal
judicial power, see Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974): United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
183. See J. WILKINSON, SERVING JUSTICE 136-37 (1974). It is quite true that the cases
presenting brutal beatings, murders, and reprehensible affronts to dignity no longer reach the Court
in the numbers in which they came during the Warren Court years. In Jackson. for example. the
issue was not overt race discrimination but a less odious question of rational procedure. See note
176 supra. In this vein it has been suggested that the application of the fourtenth amendment
requires two elements: "governmental action in fact, and governmental action in a eontevt al
sufficiently grave social implication to persuade the Suprente Court of the necessit,' l lederal

correction." Clark, supra note 48, at 1002 (emphasis supplied).
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assigned place in this peculiarly American scheme. This is a Court that
wants to decide, will decide, only what is necessary to decide.
Moreover, this is a Court with a genuine concern for the system of
federalism, an ideal the Court finds at the core of the American constitutional structure.'' It must be remembered that, when the Court determines that a case does not present sufficient state action to implicate the Constitution, the effect is to remand the underlying problem
to the states for resolution as they see fit. It is hardly questionable in
our time that the states are empowered to make far-reaching changes
in the law governing private affairs. The police power to legislate for
the public health, safety, morals, and welfare is limited only by ultimate
constitutional bounds that play virtually no role in the day-to-day work
of state legislatures and courts.8 5 To be specific, it can hardly be
doubted that the states might have reached, indeed may yet reach, the
same results sought by the litigants in the major state action cases-but
through nonconstitutional means. Thus, Missouri might have outlawed
restrictive covenants, the Wilmington Parking Authority might have
inserted in its contract with the Eagle Coffee Shoppe a prohibition on
race discrimination, California voters might have rejected Proposition
14 and thereby chosen to retain existing open housing legislation, Pennsylvania might have adopted a public accommodation law, the city of
Portland might have conditioned its support of Lloyd Center on the
Center's agreement to permit expression-related activity in the mall, the
city of Montgomery might have barred the discriminatory use of its
public facilities, and, finally, Pennsylvania might have added to its many
utility regulations one more requiring notice and a hearing before service is terminated. The point is belabored but important. The Burger
Court sees in every state action case the fundamental question whether
the problem presented should be constitutionalized, whether it should
be resolved by the Court itself as a matter of constitutional adjudication
or, instead, left to the judgment of the state involved. To the extent more
and more problems are constitutionalized, less and less is consequently
184. Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinions in Moose Lodge and Jackson indicate a pronounced
appreciation for federalism, and Justice Powell is even better known as one enamored or the
decentralization of power in this system. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquei. 411
U.S. I, 44 (1973). Professor Howard has pointed out that the only memorandum Powell carried
to his confirmation hearings was a statement that emphasized the related notions of judicial
restraint and federalism. Howard, Mr. JusticePowell and the Energing Nixon Majority. 70 Mici'.
L. Riv. 445, 451 (1972). See also Burke & Reber, supra note 177, at 1014.
185. E.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
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left to the states, and the system of federalism, in some minds at least,
suffers proportionately.
Against the temperament of the Burger Court is set the history of
the Nation in this half-century. It can be persuasively argued that the
Warren Court took the lead in the protection of individual liberties not
because of the personal political views of the sitting Justices but because
the Congress, state courts, and perhaps most importantly state legislatures defaulted in their primary role in the ordering of human affairs.,,
There are times in the course of a nation's history when what it is right
to do is apparent to all with eyes to see, but when as a practical matter
corrective legislation cannot muster sufficient support to meet the growing need for reform. The American answer has been the Supreme Court,
which can take an essentially moral position, supported as well as possible by existing law and precedent, and facilitate national coalescence
around the identified ideal. There are obvious theoretical objections to
this process, all of which come down to the charge that the Court is a
fundamentally undemocratic institution, purposefully designed to be
unresponsive to the people who in this system are deemed to hold ultimate power.11 Government is legitimate only when it governs with the
consent of the governed. This is, of course, all very true, and friends of
the Warren Court would hardly dispute the basics of the argument.
Nevertheless, it must be understood that while the Nation surely does
look principally to the legislative branch to perform the law declaration
function, in the American system the Supreme Court has traditionally
stood as the defender of minorities and the individual against the majority will.' It is precisely because the Court need not be responsive to
186. Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court. 46 WAsII. L. Ri-'. 3 (l'70).
Professor Cox has made the point:
But constitutional adjudication is part of government and government mul he pragmatic as well as ideal. In the practical world there is. and probably has to be. a good deal
of play in the joints. If one arm of government cannot or will not solve an insistent problem.
the pressure falls upon another. It would have been best. no doubt. for the Congr to have
taken the initiative in compelling school desegregation, but legislative action %a blocked
by the power of the southern congressmen and the filibuster. The Executive theoretically
could have given more leadership. As a practical matter, however, the task of initiating steps
to realize a national ideal fell to the Court: either it had to act or nothing %ouldhave been
done. Similarly, the state legislatures initially and. when they failed, the Congres should
have dealt with the spreading cancer of malapportionment . . . . The 'ame ik true of
judicial activism in criminal procedure.
Cox, supra note 10, at 122.
187. See generally A. BICKEL, supra note 177.
188. Wright, supra note 180, at 785. Even one of the Warren Court's peri-tent critics
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political pressures that it is able to hold the threat of majoritarian
tyranny in check. Were this not so, the great promise of the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment would be relegated to lofty theory
that never finds its way to application in a concrete case. Thus, the
argument that "activism" in the Supreme Court is to be avoided for fear
of usurping the legislative function may fail to recognize the role of the
Court and the Constitution in this system. It is in times when individual
liberty is threatened by the action or inaction of legislatures that the
Court must intervene.
In the cases for which the Warren Court is best remembered, hindsight finds ample justification for judicial intervention to safeguard individual liberty. In decisions involving the constitutional aspects of the
criminal process, the Court imposed process on an irrational system rife
with patently unfair methods of prosecution.'
Similarly, in the
apportionment cases the Court acted only when state legislatures had
shown themselves unwilling to make the changes necessary to preserve
participatory democracy."' Even in the crucial field of race relations,
the Warren Court hardly "injected itself' into the complex problems
facing the Nation.' Moreover, after stating the pertinent constitutional
principles, the Court has regularly relied for the enforcement of its basic
holdings on local officials acting in light of local conditions. Only when
the "energies of our federal process" were "employed in the ingenuities
of evasion" did the Court become more adamant.' The unfortunate
conclusion to be drawn is that even after the Court has pulled the
country away from impasse, in all too many places a recalcitrant majorwarned the incoming Nixon appointees that "the vital role of the Court is to protect the individual
against the incursions of the Leviathan." Kurland, supra note 115. at 321.
189. In discussing particularly the Warren Court's decisions affecting police practices. Professor Amsterdam offered these views:
The ubiquitous lack of legislative and executive attention to the problems of police treatment of suspects both forces the Court into the role of lawmaker in this area and makes it
virtually impossible for the Court effectively to play that role.
This point has been largely ignored by the Court's conservative critics. The judicial
"activism" that they deplore . . . has been the almost inevitable consequence of the failure
of other agencies of law to assume responsibility for regulating police practices. . . . In
the area of controls upon the police, a vast abnegation of responsibility . . . has forced the
Court to construct all the law regulating the everyday functioning of the police. Of course,
the Court has responded by being "activist": it has had to.
Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases. 45 N.Y.U.L. RItv.
785. 790 (1970) (emphasis in original).
190. See A. Cox, supra note 103, at 117-18.
191. P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 172 (1961).
192. Id. at 173.

1975]

The Burger Court State Action

ity will afford little protection for individual liberty. The tendency in this
society is to view compliance with minimal constitutional requirements
not only to be "fair" but also to be all the protection to which the

individual is entitled.9 3 Accordingly, if the Burger Court's purpose is
to restrict its own impact in defense of liberty in favor of permitting
other organs of government-particularly state legislatures-to take up
the slack, there is little reason to anticipate a favorable response. A
glance at the Court's decisions in recent Terms should put to rest any
thought that the states are now prepared to accept the fair apportionment of legislative bodies and racial equality without vigilant judicial
oversight.'94 There is even less reason to think that private entities like
Lloyd Corporation or Metropolitan Edison will mend their ways voluntarily. Absent corrective state statutes or regulations, an unlikely prospect, these companies will continue doing just what they have done in
the past, now with the perceived approval of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
193. As Justice Frankfurter put it, "[t]he tendency of focusing attention on constitutionalit)
is to make constitutionality synonymous with wisdom, to regard a Ia%as all right if it is constitutional." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624. 670 (1943) (dissenting
opinion). To some extent, of course, the Court itself may bear the lame for the states" refusal to
take responsibility for the protection of individual liberty beyond the floor established b the
Constitution. Perhaps the Court's willingness to protect the individual in the past has left other
agencies of government insensitive to their own responsibilities. Of this Professor Lksi,. has u ritten:
[Tihere remains the tendency of many people to equate conduct constitutionall) pcrmisihlc
with conduct that is morally right. The area of race relations is one in %%hich man) courts
will follow the Supreme Court's directions, but with great care %%illavoid taking one step
forward not positively required by those directions. The responsibility for developmcnt of
this area of the law having long ago been shifted to the Court by some states, the Court
must realize that when it draws the line circumscribing the po~%er of the Constitution to
resolve problems of racial discrimination, these states will remain ssithin the confines of the
circle.
Lewis, supra note 68, at 1467. There is a decided predisposition. then. to see no spur to legislati e
action in a Supreme Court decision refusing to exercise federal judicial poa cr to protect indisidual
liberty. On the contrary, the opposite conclusion is drawn, and the decision is read to apprate
whatever conduct was challenged. Indeed, there is some basis for arguing that the Court's actiism
in constitutional adjudication can discourage the states from themselves interpreting the Federal
Constitution to protect individual liberty. Cf. Connecticut v. Menillo. 96 . Ct. 170 (1975) (ste
court erred in holding that Federal Constitution made state abortion statute null and %oid). Oregon
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (state may not impose greater restrictions on police actisit% as a
matter of federal constitutional law than those the United States Supreme Court finds ncccssar)).
194. E.g., Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973): White v. Weiser. 412 U S 783 (1973)
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The Impact of Federal Legislation-An Aside for the CBS Case

This article has been concerned so far only with the Supreme
Court's development of the concept of state action as a limitation on
the invocation of the fourteenth amendment. On this question Jackson
is the most recent and definitive statement, and the conclusion to be
drawn from that opinion is that the newly constituted Court takes an
exceedingly narrow view of the circumstances in which the fourteenth
amendment of its own force comes into play. In other words, the Burger

Court apparently will be slow to exercise federal judicial power in local
affairs by applying the fourteenth amendment to an increasing number
of cases. The great expansion of judicial power in past years has come
to an end. On the other hand, the picture of the Court's thinking is not
complete without attention to the related discussion in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee.'

The CBS case involved one of the most significant first amendment
questions to reach the Court in recent years. Roughly, the Democratic
National Committee wished to establish an affirmative dimension to the
first amendment that would require broadcasters to sell air time for
political advertisements.' 96 The Committee had attempted to purchase
195. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
196. The question whether the first amendment imposes any affirmative duties on government to facilitate the exercise of expression-related rights has been exhaustively treated in the
literature. E.g., J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHoi? (1973); T. EMIERSON. supra note
144, at 646. The principal focus of the discussion has been on the broadcast media, which have
traditionally been subjected to controls that would have been invalid if applied to newspapers. See
National Broadcasting Company v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Robinson. The FCC and
the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN.
L. REv. 67 (1967). In general, it is argued that the fundamental purpose of the first amendment i,
to ensure that the public at large is exposed to all manner of opinion and information regarding
public issues and that, given the concentration of control existent in the broadcasting industry, the
only effective way to see that unpopular views are heard is to provide an opportunity for those
who hold such views to themselves obtain air time to offer their opinions to others. Barron. Acce
to the Press -A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641. 1653-54 (1967): Johnson
& Westen. A Twentieth Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57
VA. L. REv. 574 (1971). But see Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflectionv
on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768 (1972). After the setback in the CBS case,
proponents of a right of access failed to persuade the Court that newspapers might validly be
required to publish offerings from outsiders. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 418 U.S.
241 (1974).
More narrowly, the petitioners in CBS contended that since the broadcasters who had refused
to sell time for editorial advertisements sold time to commercial advertisers, the resulting discrimination on the basis of content violated the first amendment on an analogy to the public forum
cases. See Police Dcp't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court
rejected that argument on the ground that broadcasters are required to give evenhanded treatment
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time from several independent broadcasters and, when they were refused, asked the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for a

ruling that a broadcaster's rejection of all political advertisements violates the Communications Act and the first amendment.' r The FCC

determined that a ban on editorials is permissible so long as the broadcaster meets its statutory obligation to provide full and fair coverage of
public issues."9 8 That judgment was affirmed in the Supreme Court by
an odd alignment of opinions.' 99 In one section of his opinion for the
to public issues under the FCC's Fairness Doctrine and, accordingly, the vicls of the petitioners
were heard, albeit through the mouths of news commentators rather than their o%'n. 412 U.S. at
128-3 1; see note 198 infra. In dissent, Justice Brennan declined to distinguish the public fonrum cas
and would have found unconstitutional discrimination. 412 U.S. at 200-01.
197. The Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970). contains provisions
requiring broadcasters to operate in the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970). The FCC is
empowered to oversee the industry, to make such rules and regulations. and to adjudicate such
matters as the public convenience, interest, or necessity require. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970). In CBS
the petitioners contended before the Commission and the circuit court, and ultimatel) before the
Supreme Court, that aside from the first amendment they were entitled under the Act to purchase
time from broadcasters. As the Chief Justice conceived the issues, many of the policies embodied
in the statutory "public interest" standard had been drawn from the first amendment and an
interpretation of the statute thus "necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles."
412 U.S. at 122. The statutory and constitutional questions in the-case thus tended to blur once
the Court had passed over the threshold hurdle of finding sufficient governmental action to in%oke
the first amendment. Id. at 170 n.2 (Brennan. J., dissenting). Contra. id. at 142-43 (Stearn. J..
concurring).
198. Title 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(4) (1970), has been read as a codification of the Fairness
Doctrine, established by the FCC in its early decisions and a statement published in 1949. Report
on Editorializingby BroadcastLicensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949): see Fairness Doctrineand Public
Interest Standards,39 Fed. Reg. 26372 (1974). Essentially, the Fairness Doctrine imposes a tMofold duty upon licensees. They must give adequate treatment to matters of public concern, and
the coverage of those issues must fairly reflect conflicting views. Although in some circumstances
existing FCC rules require the broadcaster to permit members of the public to use its facilities, in
general the Fairness Doctrine does not govern who the licensee puts in front of the camera to coer
public issues, so long as someone does it and that someone does it fairly. See note 210 infra.
Normally, then, broadcasters meet their Fairness Doctrine responsibilities through public affair,
programming by their own employees. While the Fairness Doctrine itself is clearly an intrusion
into the journalistic discretion of broadcasters, the Supreme Court has upheld it against constitutional attack. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). But see 412 U.S. at 186
n.21 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (giving Red Lion a narrow reading): id. at 154 (Douglas. J..concurring) (indicating a willingness to overrule Red Lion entirely).
199. The Chief Justice wrote for the Court in a four-part decision. Parts I and II resicecd
the Red Lion litigation, the Court's general deference to legislative judgment on constitutional
matters, and the history of federal regulation of the broadcasting industry. In these tuo introductory and mood-setting sections of his opinion, the Chief Justice carried a majorit) of the Court%
members, apparently all but the dissenters. But in part Ill, in which the Chief Justice determined
that there was insufficient governmental involvement in the broadcasters' ban on political ad'crtisements to invoke the first amendment, only Justices Rehnquist and Stewart concurred. Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and White found it unnecessary to decide that question. 412 U.S. at 147 (White.
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Court the Chief Justice determined that the actions of private broadcasters are not subject to the first amendment even though they are

heavily regulated by the federal government and enjoy a partial monopoly of the airwaves.2 0 If the Chief Justice had garnered the support of
a majority, he might have concluded his opinion without going further.2 1 But only Justices Rehnquist and Stewart subscribed to his treatment of the threshold issue.202 Accordingly, the Chief Justice assumed
that sufficient governmental action existed to implicate the first amendment and went on to hold the ban on political editorials valid. 2 3 On
the substantive issue he carried the additional votes of Justices White,
Blackmun, and Powell. Remarkably, the latter three apparently found
the governmental action issue so difficult that they chose to avoid it and
deal directly with the first amendment question presented. Having de-

cided that the broadcasters' policy could be upheld in any event, they
declined to address the threshold issue on the ground that it could no
2 4
longer affect the outcome of the case.

J., concurring), id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Douglas avoided the governmental
action issue, and concluded on the merits that not only was the ban on editorial advertising valid
but that the Fairness Doctrine might be an unconstitutional infringement upon broadcusters'
freedom of speech. See note 202 infra. He was understandably careful to point out that he had
not participated in Red Lion. 412 U.S. at 154. Justice Brennan dissented in an opinion in which
Justice Marshall concurred. Id. at 170.
200. For a contrary argument, see Johnson & Westen, supra note 196. A student note
published in the same volume reviewed the relevant theories and concluded that the JohnsonWesten view "remains without authoritative support." Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media.
57 VA. L. REV. 636, 656 (1971).
201. Indeed, in the tradition of the indefatigable advocate, the dissent argued that since the
Chief Justice lacked the support of a majority in his treatment of the governmental action issue,
the last part of his opinion must be considered obiter dicta to the extent it reached the substantive
first amendment issue. 412 U.S. at 171 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202. Justice Douglas was faced at the outset with his many prior statements that mere
licensing by government is sufficient to invoke constitutional limitations on the acts of licensees.
E.g.. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (dissenting opinion). In his separatc
concurring opinion in CBS he circumvented those opinions by the statement, certainly correct, that
his view had not been accepted and that, in any event, the Chief Justice's opinion had not decided
"whether a broadcast licensee is a federal agency within the context of these cases." 412 U.S. at
150 (emphasis supplied).
203. 412 U.S. at 130-32.
204. In his separate concurring opinion Justice Stewart objected strenuously. He suid that
the conflation of the statutory and constitutional issues was "quite wrong ... for the simple rclson
that the First Amendment and the public interest standard of the statute are not coextensive." 412
U.S. at 142. In his absolutist view of the case, to find sufficient governmental action to invoke the
first amendment would be to find that broadcast licensees are government for purposes of constitutional analysis. If that were the case, there would be no protection for the broadcasters themselve%,
for the first amendment confers no right to speak on government. Justice Stewart wrote:
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533

On the question whether the government was sufficiently involved
in the broadcasters' policy to require review under the first amendment,
the opinion of the Chief Justice was both predictable and illuminating.
After a review of the history of federal regulation of the broadcasting
industry in the first two parts of his opinion, he turned in part III to
the governmental action question. The circuit court had held that the
broadcasters' policy was subject to the first amendment because private

broadcasters are "proxies" or "fiduciaries" of the people, granted monopoly use of part of the public domain. 215 Perhaps anticipating
Jackson, the Chief Justice rejected the view that significant involvement
alone might implicate the first amendment; instead "there must be cautious analysis of the quality and degree of Government relationship to
the particularacts in question. '0 5 In the beginning, Congress made the

fundamental judgment that, while other nations chose to place the
broadcast media under governmental ownership and control, in the
United States broadcasting should be left in private hands, subject to
extensive governmental regulation.2 11 Since then the FCC has acted as
an overseer to assure that broadcasters meet their statutory responsibility to be fair in the treatment of public issues."' The result, in the Burger
Were the Government really operating the electronic press, it would. as my Brother Douglas
points out, be prevented by the First Amendment from selection of broadcast content and
the exercise of editorial judgment. It would not be permitted in the name of "'fairess'" to
deny time to any person or group on the grounds that their views had been heard "enough."
Yet broadcasters perform precisely these functions and enjoy precisely these rrcedoni under
the Act. The constitutional and statutory issues in these cases are thus quite different.
Id. at 143 (emphasis in original), see T. EMERSON, supra note 144. at 663.
205. 412 U.S. at 115: see Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC. 450 F2d
642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In dissent, Justice Brennan essentially adopted the circuit court'%vie%.
Hie emphasized that broadcasters use a public resource, that they depend upon government for their
right to use this public resource, and that they operate under regulations promulgated h) the
FCC-including the Fairness Doctrine which Justice Brennan found to be directly related to the
ban on all editorial advertisements. 412 U.S. at 172-81.
206. Id. at 115 (emphasis supplied). see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.. 419 US. .145
(1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 155-76 supra.
207. 412 U.S. at 117. See generally W. EMERY, BROADCASTING AND Go%-RNsINT (1971).
208. See note 198 supra. It is perhaps useful to note that the Chief Justice urote in C8S
against a background of regulation that over the years had been the subject of extensive debate.
disagreement, and litigation. Yet arguably at least, out of that history had come a roughly uorkable administrative scheme for wrestling with the enormously complex problems created h) modern
communications systems. As a circuit judge, the Chief Justice had himself been instrumental in
the development of a scheme more attuned to the needs of minority interests. See Office of
Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (espanding
the definition of standing in FCC matters). It is, then, entirely likely that the Chief Justice %as
hesitant to announce a new constitutional principle that would upset the precarious balance struck
by prior decisions and the FCC's many-faceted controls. Since in the vie%% of at least t%%o
of the
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reading, has been a basic division of responsibility between independent
broadcasters and the FCC. While the FCC demands that broadcasters
give full and fair treatment to public issues, it is for broadcasters themselves to decide how their responsibilities will be carried out."'9 Within

limits,"" it is for the broadcaster to determine whose voice carries information about public issues over the airwaves to the station's customers.
This is the federal legislative scheme. Accordingly, the Chief Justice
concluded that the particular policy under attack in CBS was related
not to the overseer role played by the FCC, but rather to the essentially

private conduct of the independent broadcaster in deciding to treat
public issues with commentary by station employees instead of providing air time to outside groups. On this reading of the case, there was
no rational nexus between the FCC's regulation of broadcasters and the
specific policy under attack. 2"'
To shore up this basic holding, the Chief Justice next turned to the
state action precedents. He cited Moose Lodge for the familiar proposition that mere regulation by the state does not constitute state action
and distinguished Burton on the ground that in CBS the government
was not involved in a symbiotic relationship with the broadcasters
Court's members, Stewart and Douglas, a finding of governmental action would do precisely that.
it is perhaps understandable that the Chief Justice came to the brink and then balked.
209. In his separate concurring opinion, Justice White repeated the view that neither the
Fairness Doctrine nor any other provision of the Act or regulation promulgated by the FCC
requires broadcasters to permit outsiders to use their facilities.
Congress intended that the Fairness Doctrine be complied with, but it also intended that
broadcasters have wide discretion with respect to the method of compliance. There is no
requirement that broadcasters accept editorial ads: they could, instead, provide their own
programs, with their own format, opinion and opinion sources. Congress intended that there
be no right of access such as claimed in these cases- and, in the Commission's view, to
recognize that right would require major revisions in statutory and regulatory policy.
412 U.S. at 147 (emphasis in original): see note 198 supra.
210. There are some exceptions to the general proposition that the Fairness Doctrine permits
broadcasters to satisfy their responsibilities by programming of their choice. In Red Lion itself
the Court dealt with-and upheld-the personal attack aspect of the Doctrine, which requires a
licensee to afford a political candidate an opportunity to respond on the air if he is personally
attacked by the station or if the station endorses an opposing candidate. 47 C.F.R. § 73.679 (1973):
see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Fairness Doctrine is to be
distinguished from the equal time requirements concerning the use of the broadcast media by
qualified candidates for public office. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970). Use of Broadcast Facilities hI,
Candidates for Public Office, 35 Fed. Reg. 13038 (1970): Friedenthal & Medalie. The Impact o/
Federal Regulation on Political Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Communications Act, 72 HARV.
L. REv. 445 (1959). cf. 412 U.S. at 186 n.21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. Justice Brennan took strenuous exception. 412 U.S. at 177-78 (Brennan, J.. dissenting):
see note 205, supra.
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through which it might benefit from the challenged private conduct.21t
He had more difficulty with Pollak, in which the Court had found
sufficient governmental involvement in the policy of putting radio receivers in public buses in the District of Columbia.213 In that case, the
Chief Justice contended, the Public Utilities Commission had not only
investigated and approved the policy, but had done so pursuant to express congressional authorization to intervene in the affairs of the car-

rier. In CBS, on the other hand, while the FCC had approved the ban
on editorial advertisements as not inconsistent with the Communications Act, it had come to that conclusion in light of Congress' longstanding view that such matters should be left to private journalistic
discretion. 24 Additionally, the Chief Justice argued that the bus line in
Pollak could not itself claim first amendment protection, while broadcasters surely can. 21 In conclusion he again pressed the point that a

holding that broadcasters are subject to the first amendment would
upset a half century of congressional communications policy. 2t6
212. Id. at 119; see text accompanying note 124 supra.
213. See text accompanying notes 160-66 supra.
214. 412 U.S. at 119-21; cf Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.Tornillo. 418 U S. 241 (1974).
215. Justice Stewart made the most of the point. Taking ttie position that a decision to
invoke the first amendment in CBS would be a decision that broadcasters are government. Stessart
could not conceive of simultaneously holding that broadcasters might retain their o'sn first amend.
ment rights. If broadcasters are government they can only establish reasonable schedulcs for
dividing up air time among all comers, much the same as park police can v'alidl) fis time limitfor use of a public soapbox. If broadcasters are government, they can be no more than traffic cop'.
for the first amendment offers no protection to speech by government. See T. EwiiRso-. cupra
note 144, at 663. In Stewart's view, such a proposition was untenable in light of the Communica.
tions Act, and he accordingly voted against finding governmental action in the case. In diqsent.
Justice Brennan found the Stewart view to reflect "acomplete misunderstanding of the nature of
ihe governmental involvement in these cases." 412 U.S. at 181 n.12. Far from making broadcaster
themselves the government, Brennan contended that invoking the first amendment uould mercl)
cause the Court to engage in balancing the first amendment rights of broadcasters against those
of others who wish to purchase time for editorial advertising. The Brennan position partakes of
the notion that the governmental or state action inquiry goes not to finding agents of gosernment
but instead to identifying sufficient governmental involvement in private action to justif%holding
government ultimately responsible for what is done privately. See note 59 supra. This disagreement
on the fundamentals of the issue left the two men passing as ships in the night.
216. The precise holding in CBS was narrow-that the Communications Act. and perhapt
the first amendment do not establish a right of access to the broadcast media for persons %sho%%ish
to purchase air time for editorial advertisements. See note 197 supra. It is clear that the Court
was influenced by the existence of the Fairness Doctrine. which it %%as thought ssould prccnt
discrimination against unpopular viewpoints. See note 196supra.Significantl). the Court refrained
from holding that Congress or the FCC acting on its own cannot in the future impose a right of
access upon broadcast licensees, if one or the other finds it in the public interest to do so. Indeed.
the Chief Justice expressly pretermitted that issue. 412 U.S. at 118-19. If the government %crcto

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 27:479

Given the exceedingly difficult first amendment question in21CBS,
7
the position taken by the Chief Justice is hardly without defense. Yet
his treatment of Pollak was less than convincing in light of the FCC's
consideration and approval of the broadcasters' policy. Pollak was
clearly the closest precedent to the facts in CBS, for in that case, too,
the first amendment's application to the actions of the federal government was involved. On the other hand, the cases upon which Chief
Justice Burger relied for his result involved not federal governmental
action but state action.2 18 Moose Lodge and Burton were fourteenth
amendment cases requiring the Court to take into account the values
of federalism in determining whether federal judicial power should be
exercised. In CBS federalism was not at issue. At most the fourteenth
amendment cases were analogous precedents;" 9 they could not govern
because they were founded at least in part upon constitutional considerations not present in CBS. Although the Chief Justice passed over this
distinction without discussion, it is clear that he understood very well
that Moose Lodge could not control CBS. Hence his more extensive
treatment of Pollak, the only real precedent with which he had to deal.
Even without federalism as a basis for failing to find sufficient
governmental involvement to invoke the Constitution, the Chief Justice
concluded that the first amendment did not apply to the broadcasters'
policy. He did so in response to another powerful constitutional principle-the Court's deference to the acts of its co-equal branch, the Congress.2 ' Paradoxically, while in fourteenth amendment cases a state's
significant involvement in private conduct leads to the conclusion that
sufficient state action should be found, in cases involving the Bill of
Rights extensive involvement by the Congress may cut the other way.
Substantial federal governmental involvement may in some cases justify
promulgate such a rule, it is entirely unclear whether the Court would uphold it. given the view%
of Justices Stewart and Douglas and the deferential language used by the Chief Justice in describing
the values of private journalistic discretion. Id. at 120-21. Nevertheless, several model acts have
been proposed. See. e.g.. Comment, Right of Access to the Broadcast Media for Paid Edlitorial
Advertisements A Plea to Congress, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 258 (1974).
217. See. e.g., Traynor, Speech Inpediments and Hurricane Flo: The Implications of a
Right of Reply to Newspapers, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 247 (1974).
218. See text accompanying note 212 supra.
219. Only Justice Stewart expressly recognized that "[tlhe evolution of the 'state action'
concept under the Fourteenth Amendment is one available analogy." 412 U.S. at 133 (footnote
omitted) (emphasis supplied). And even he may not have been thinking of federalism. Elsewhere
in his opinion Stewart suggested that it was the broadcasters' claim to first amendment rights of
their own that distinguished Moose Lodge and Pollak. Id. at 140-41 & n.l I.
220. See note 208 supra.
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the application of constitutional limitations to private acts. That occurred in Pollak, which has never been overruled. Yet involvement that
is tied to a congressional attempt to protect the same interests safeguarded by the Constitution presents a different case. The invocation
of the Constitution of its own force to frustrate the congressional
scheme is essentially the exercise of the Court's enormous power of
judicial review, which, of course, is not implicated in fourteenth amendment cases in which the Congress is not involved. 2t1 Even the Warren
Court only rarely challenged the interpretation given constitutional provisions by the Congress. 2 The newly constituted Burger Court is, if
anything, more deferential to the legislative branch. It is not surprising,
then, that some of the Court's caution should spill over into its consideration of the threshold governmental action issue. In CBS the Chief
Justice emphasized that the Communications Act did not contemplate
that individual broadcasters would be viewed as acting for the national
government.22 To hold otherwise because of the extensive regulatory
scheme established by that Act would be to upset the congressional plan.
Such a holding would reject Congress' attempt to avoid governmental
control of the media and, instead, to regulate private broadcasting in
the public interest. It would be to tell Congress that, no matter what its
intent, it has taken control of the broadcasting industry-at least for
purposes of applying constitutional limitations to the conduct of individual broadcasters.
The CBS case, then, illustrates yet another aspect of the Burger
Court's tendency toward judicial restraint. If this Court is hesitant to
exercise federal judicial power in state matters by way of the fourteenth
amendment, it is even more hesitant to challenge the constitutionality
of congressional action in related fields. This is of crucial significance
for the protection of individual liberty. Once again, the effect of failing
to find state action in a fourteenth amendment case is to remand the
underlying social problem to other agencies of government.,' If state
legislatures and courts do not respond, perhaps the Congress will and,
221. Although "judicial review" may be given a broader meaning, perhaps taking into
account the Court's review of state legislation or other action, review in its pristine form is that
which was involved in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). the rcvie or acts or
Congress. This "pure" judicial review raises a number of problems not present in the reiview of
state action but does not involve others, for example, federalism. See Frank. Review and Basic
Liberties, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 109 (Cahn ed. 1954).
222. See Frank, supra note 221.
223. See text accompanying notes 207 & 216 supra.
224. See text accompanying notes 184 & 185 supra.
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if CBS is a fair guide, it is likely in such circumstances that the Burger
Court will accede. Then, while federal power will still be exercised, it
will be legislative rather than judicial power, a significant distinction to
a Court that sees for itself a relatively passive role. If this is correct,
then it may be expected that the Burger Court will be prepared to
approve federal legislation designed to protect individual liberties even
while it withdraws from aggressive judicial action in cases involving the
Constitution of its own force.
III.

CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CIVIL WAR
AMENDMENTS

You must take care of the civil rights bill,-my bill, the civil rights
bill,-don't let it fail!
-Charles Sumner
(on his death bed in 1874)111
A.

Federal Civil Rights Legislation-A Synopsis

In the years immediately following the Civil War the Reconstruction Congress successfully initiated and the states ratified three constitutional amendments: the thirteenth amendment in 1865, the fourteenth
in 1868, and the fifteenth in 1870.211 Although the amendments were
self-executing, each contained a final section giving the Congress power
to enforce the amendment itself with appropriate legislation." 7 And, in
the early years, the Radical-controlled Congress was quick to exercise
its new-found power to promote individual liberty. The first enactment,
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,221 contained language that was later recast
225. I B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: Civil RIGITS 657
(1970). Senator Charles Sumner, a Republican from Massachusetts, was the driving force behind
much of the congressional action in behalf of individual liberty during the Civil War period. It
was he who drafted the Civil Rights Act of 1875, discussed infra, and his death just before the
crucial vote is said to have been the catalyst for passage.
226. The text of the amendments is set forth in notes 3, 6,& 8 supra. The dates given are
the dates of ratification.
227. Indeed, the enforcement provisions may have been the primary focus of the framers,
who were principally interested in expanding the power of the Congress rather than the federal
judiciary, which had not in the recent past been sympathetic to the Radical cause. R. HARRIS, Tiiv
QUEST FOR EQUALITY 53-54 (1960); J. JAMES, supra note 7, at 184. Frantz, supra note 16, at 135354.
228. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
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as the first section of the fourteenth amendment in response to doubts

concerning its constitutionality under the thirteenth amendment.m2
Other sections of the Act condemned discrimination against black people in the making and enforcing of contracts and in transactions affecting real and personal property. 03° In the next year the Anti-Peonage
Act2s3 made it a criminal offense to hold or return any person to a
condition of slavery. In 1870 Congress, in response to Ku Klux Klan
activity in the Southern States, enacted the Enforcement Act, "32 which
229. At the time, the only plausible source of authority for the Act %as the enforcement
clause of the thirteenth amendment, and proponents pinned their claims for validity to that provi.
sion. Opponents contended that the thirteenth amendment was limited to the abolition of slavery
and that it could not therefore support sweeping civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination. Even Congressman Bingham of Ohio, a Republican supporter of civil right, for blacks.
questioned the Congress' power to enact the proposed legislation without further constitutional
authority. See Gressman. The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation. 50 Micii. L. RI-v.
1323 (1952). Bingham later became the principal draftsman of the fourteenth amendment hich
was intended, at least by some in the Congress, to shore up constitutional support for the earlier
legislation. See ten Broek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United StatesConsumnmation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 CAL:F. L. REV. 171.
200-02 (1951). See generally H. FLACK, supra note 7, at 20. For an exhaustive treatment of the
thirteenth amendment generally, see Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 12 HousToN L. REV. I. 330, 592 (1975).
230. Passed over President Johnson's veto, the key provisions of the 1866 Act are preserved
today as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970):
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence.
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment. pains.
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
And as 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970):
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory.
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold. and convey real
and personal property.
In the criminal code, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) is also derived from the 1866 Act. See United States
v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 83 (1951) (appendix to opinion of Frankfurter. J.).
231. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (codified in scattered sections of 18.42
U.S.C.). The Anti-Peonage Act was a relatively noncontroversial statute intended to end the
Spanish peonage system in the New Mexico Territory. The Act was upheld in Clyatt v. United
States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). See also United States v. Reynolds. 235 U.S. 133 (1914): Baile) v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Gressman, supra note 229, at 1328: Putzel. Federal Civil Rights
Enforcement. A Current Appraisal, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 442 (1951).
232. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. After the war military governments had
been established in 10 southern states, and there was pressure from Congress both to permit blacks
to vote and to ratify the fourteenth amendment as soon as possible. Organized in 1866, the Klan
began a terrorist campaign to thwart the will of Congress and the martial governments. In 1868 a
wave of murders and assaults spread through the South in an attempt to deter black people from
voting. The Enforcement Act sought to enforce the newly ratified fourteenth and fifteenth amendments by bringing such activities within the scope of the federal criminal laws. United States v.
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established criminal penalties for violations of the fifteenth amendment's prohibition of racial discrimination in voting. Section 18 of the
1870 legislation reenacted the key provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, this time on the authority of the fourteenth amendment, apparently to assure the validity of that important legislation.233 The Force
Act of 187121 went beyond the Enforcements Act's use of criminal
penalties and established machinery for monitoring elections to ensure,
through federal election officials, that blacks were not denied the right
to vote. The Ku Klux Klan Act, 235 enacted in 1871 on the authority of
the fourteenth amendment, provided criminal and civil sanctions to
deter infringements upon civil rights and authorized the federal government to deal effectively with the conspiratorial violence that was then
sweeping the Southern States. Finally, the most broad-ranging of all the
Reconstruction legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 1875,3 also enacted
on the authority of the fourteenth amendment, barred racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, public conveyances, theaters,
and other recreational facilities. With the 1875 Act, however, congressional activity in the civil rights field came to a halt, not to be revived
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 803-05 (1966). The Act was upheld in Ex parte Yarbrough. 110 U.S. 651
(1884). Its key provisions have survived in 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970). See United States v. Williams.
341 U.S. 70, 83 (1951) (appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
233. See note 229 supra.
234. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433. The Force Act provided for the appointment
of federal officials to supervise elections in larger cities and towns, both in the South and in the
North, in order to protect the right of black people to vote. I B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 225, at
547. The Act was upheld in Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), and was retained until repealed
in 1894. See text accompanying note 239 infra.
235. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. Early in the year President Grant had sent a
special message to Congress requesting legislation authorizing the government to act against the
Klan. In testimony taken in congressional hearings the Klan's activities were extensively documented and thus formed the factual record for the legislation ultimately enacted, The Act, the key
provisions of which survive in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970). established civil and criminal
sanctions for violations of civil rights and additionally gave the President power to declare martial
law in areas where he found it necessary to protect the rights of black people, In October 1871
President Grant used the power granted in the Act when he sent federal troops to several counties
in South Carolina. I B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 225, at 591-92. Gressman, supra note 229, at 1334.
see Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
236. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (codified in scattered sections of 10. 42
U.S.C.).
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was the most important of the post-Civil War statutes
designed to ensure equal rights for the Negro. As such, it constituted the culmination of
the program of the Radical Republicans, which had begun with the Thirteenth Amendment
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. . . . The 1875 statute climaxed a decade of efforts by
the Radical Republicans to elevate the ideal of racial equality to the legal plane.
I B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 225, at 657.
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for 80 years. In point of fact, the 1875 Act itself was adopted by a lame
duck Radical Congress after many Republicans lost their seats in the
1874 elections.2 Only the timely death of Senator Sumner, the bill's
principal sponsor, prompted the defeated congressmen to pass it before
leaving office.2ss When the Democratic Party won control of the government in 1892, most of the provisions related to voting in the Enforcement Act of 1870 and the Force Act of 1871 were repealed.ssa
After decades of inactivity, the Congress once again took up the
cause of individual liberty in the late stages of the Eisenhower Administration. The Civil Rights Act of 195740 established the Commission on
Civil Rights, legislatively endorsed the Civil Rights Division already
established in the Justice Department, and authorized the Attorney
General to seek injunctions to protect voting rights. The Civil Rights
Act of 196021 went further, but still did not accomplish a great deal in
the face of strong opposition in the Senate. After a Senate filibuster had
blocked a plan to establish a system of administrative registrars to
assure nondiscriminatory election procedures in the South, the Act in
its final form created a scheme by which court-appointed referees might
monitor elections. 2 But in the Civil Rights Act of 19642U Congress
produced the most far-reaching civil rights legislation ever enacted. The
Act contains 11 titles, each dealing with a significant aspect of the
intractable problem of racial discrimination. 24 In the three most important sections, titles II, VI, and VII, the Congress launched a far-ranging
attack on discrimination in public accommodations, federally funded
projects, and employment. Title II, banning discrimination in public
237. Id. at 658-59.
238. See note 225 supra.
239. Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch 25, 28 Stat. 36.
240. Act of Sept. 9, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections
of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.); see 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 225, at 837-39: Buchanan. supra note 229. at
610-13.

241.

Act of May 6. 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified in scattered sections of

18, 20, 42 U.S.C.); see 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 225, at 935-38.

242. See 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 225, at 935-38.
243. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of
5, 28, 42 U.S.C.) [principally codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-h (1970)1: see Buchanan. supra note
229, at 614-15.
244. The titles, in brief, deal with voting rights (I). injunctive relief against discrimination
in places of public accommodation (II), desegregation of public facilities (111). desegregation of
public education (IV), the Commission on Civil Rights (V), nondiscrimination in programs funded
by the federal government (VI), nondiscrimination in employment (VII), registration and voting
statistics (VIII), procedure in removal cases (IX), community relations services (X). and miscellaneous matters (XI). See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 HARv. L. REv. 684 (1965).

542

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 27:479

accommodations in language that tracks the 1875 Civil Rights Act, 4 '
finds its authority not in the enforcement section of the fourteenth
amendment but rather in the expansive commerce clause. 4 Title VI,
which condemns discrimination in programs receiving federal funds, is
based upon Congress' power to lay and collect taxes, which has long
been held to include the power to spend upon conditions established by
the Congress.2 7 Title VII makes it an unfair employment practice for
an employer engaged in interstate commerce to discriminate on the
basis of race, religion, or sex.248 The Voting Rights Act of 19654 soon
followed to enforce the fifteenth amendment by suspending state literacy tests and similar voting impediments when substantial discrimination is found, suspending new voting requirements pending review by
federal authorities to determine whether they may perpetuate discrimination, and assigning federal examiners to identify qualified electors.
Finally, Congress provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1968211 for broadranging protection from discrimination in housing.
245. See text accompanying note 236 supra.
246. See 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 225, at 1019. The reach of the legislation is thus limited
to those establishments that can be linked to the flow of commerce across state lines. Given openended precedents under the commerce clause, however, it is clear that Congress has power to
regulate most places of public accommodation. See Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private
Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Antendnents,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 461-62 (1974).
247. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 225, at 1019.
248. The original act exempted from coverage employers with fewer than 25 employees,
most labor unions, educational institutions, and state and federal governments. The Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. 11. 1972). amended the
1964 Act to bring these groups within its scope. Labor unions and employers, including governmental and educational employers, with as few as 15 employees are now covered. See Sape & Hart.
Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of1972,40 GEo. WAsH. L. Rtv.
824, 847 (1972); Comment, Suing the State Under Title VII in the Face of the Eleventh
Amendment, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1099. See also Note, Federal Employee Civil Actions Under the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972: The Right to De Novo Review, 12 HoUsToN L. Rt'v.
178 (1974).
249. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973p (1970).
250. Act of April I1, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections
of 18, 25, 28, 42 U.S.C.). The constitutional basis for the fair housing provisions of the 1968 Act
is obscure. It has been suggested that the Act might be upheld under the Congress' power to enforce
the fourteenth amendment. E.g., Cox, supra note 10, at 118. However, the courts that have thus
far considered the question have held that the thirteenth amendment is the constitutional ground.
E.g., United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 414
U.S. 826 (1973) (upholding the ban on "blockbusting"); United States v, Hunter, 459 F.2d 205,
214 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972) (upholding the ban on discriminatory advertising).
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B.

The Judicial Response

The Supreme Court decisions construing federal civil rights legislation fall, like the statutes themselves, into two broad categories: the
early cases on the Civil War legislation and more recent cases examining
both the older statutes and the modern legislation enacted since 1957.
In order to reach this article's particular concern-the Burger Court's
treatment of civil rights legislation-it is necessary to break the second
category down into subcategories and to distinguish some modern decisions as products of the Warren Court, thereby identifying others as the
work of the Burger Court. A fixed date for the end of the Warren Court
era is difficult to identify because of the staged entrance of President
Nixon's appointees. When Chief Justice Burger was seated in 1969, he
hardly took control of the Court. It was not until 1972 and the seating
of Justices Powell and Rehnquist that the Court took on a distinct new
look, and perhaps it is misleading to regard any decision handed down
prior to that time as having been decided by the "Burger Court." On
the other hand, some decisions during the interim period bear the mark
of the new Chief Justice and the second Nixon appointee, Justice Blackmun. Accordingly, in the discussion below such cases will be cited as
illustrations of the thinking of the Court as it is now constituted.
I. The Commerce Clause Decisions.-Sincethe early legislation
was uniformly based upon the enforcement clauses of the Civil War
amendments,21t the judicial decisions of that period do not reflect how
the Court might have viewed civil rights statutes grounded in the commerce clause. On the other hand, since the great expansion of federal
power under that clause did not begin until the 1937 realignment, it is
probable that such legislation would not have fared well. 22 More recently, however, the commerce power has become virtually limitless,25
and it was hardly surprising that when Congress based the public accommodations and employment provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
on that power, the Warren Court had no difficulty upholding the legislation. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,251 decided a bare

5 months after the Act was signed into law, the Court held that Congress
could rationally determine that racial discrimination in public establish251. U.S. CONST. amends. XII1. XIV, XV; see notes 3. 6. & 8 supra.
252. See Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economny. 1933-1946. 59 HAR'.
L. REV. 645, 681-82 (1946).
253. See. e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
254. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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ments might discourage the interstate travel of black people. In a companion case, Katzenbach v. McClung,155 the Court extended the Act to
a restaurant that enjoyed no patronage from interstate travelers but
served food that had moved in interstate commerce. The two decisions
virtually overruled the Civil Rights Cases,2 56 which had struck down the
very similar Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the ground that Congress
lacked power to enforce the fourteenth amendment by legislation reaching private action . 7 The Warren Court's position, then, seemed clear.
Far from following the lead of the Reconstruction precedents, the Court
was prepared to add to its constitutional decisions protecting individual
liberty a concomitant line of cases upholding statutory enactments with
a similar purpose.
Yet Heart of Atlanta and McClung came late in the day, a decade
after the Warren Court had set the tone of its Term in the Segregation
8
Cases21
and only 5 years before Chief Justice Warren's retirement. In
a real sense it was the incoming Burger Court that was to be faced with
the difficult issues in statutory construction. Thus, it was of crucial
significance that the new Chief Justice himself authored the Court's
1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Company. 59 In Griggs the Court
was not confronted with the threshold question whether the 1964 Act
was valid, but instead was called upon to construe Title VII of the Act,
the section dealing with employment discrimination. In a landmark
opinion, Chief Justice Burger held that racial discrimination within the
meaning of the Act depends not upon the evil intent of employers but
rather upon the consequences of their employment practices. Irrespective of motive, when it is shown that educational and testing requirements operate to disqualify black job applicants at a substantially higher
rate than whites, Title VII prohibits employers from requiring a high
school diploma or a passing mark on a standard intelligence test as a
condition of employment, unless such requirements are shown to be
255. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
256. 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
257. In light of the Court's decision to turn both cases on the commerce clause, the question
whether the Civil Rights Cases remain viable was expressly left open. 379 U.S. at 252. However.
in separate concurring opinions Justices Douglas and Goldberg stated that they would have pre.
ferred the fourteenth amendment ground in order to make clear that individual liberty is to be given
more constitutional protection than goods moving in commerce. 379 U.S. at 279-80, 293.
258. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
259. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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rationally related to job performance. 26 The decision was greeted with
well-deserved praise:
Although issued without fanfare, Griggs is in the tradition of the great
cases of constitutional and tort law which announce and apply fundamental legal principles to the resolution of basic and difficult problems of
human relationships.
The case was decided during a time in which the Supreme Court
appeared to be shifting toward a cautious approach to constitutional
issues. Yet, it is a sensitive, liberal interpretation of title VII. It has the
imprimatur of permanence and may become a symbol of the Burger
Court's concern for equal opportunity. Although the Court may take a
more cautious approach to constitutional rights of minorities, Griggs
makes clear that26 sympathetic interpretation of statutory rights is the
order of the day. '
This is the point precisely. At the same time the Burger Court declines
to exercise federal judicial power to protect individual liberty through
the Constitution of its own force, the Court is forthrightly prepared to
give a liberal reading to congressional action designed to achieve the
same ends.2 11 In a case such as Griggs the Court is able to do at once
the two things it thinks the Supreme Court ought to do-restrain itself
in the exercise of its enormous power and defer to the extent possible
to the constitutional and policy judgments of the Congress.sa
260. Id. at 429-33.
261. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 62-63 (1972) (emphasis in original) (footnotes
omitted).
262. For other liberal, if less far-reaching, constructions, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Court's
most recent opinion treats the showing necessary to establish that preemployment tests are sufficiently job-related to pass muster under Title VII. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 422 U.S. 405
(1975). While the Nixon appointees expressed reservations in Albemnarle, their separate opinions
reflected no hesitation to fully enforce civil rights legislation. Perhaps indicating that the lower
courts, too, recognize that the Burger Court is more comfortable construing legislation than in
exercising constitutional judgment, very recent decisions have found private disability plans that
deny benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities to discriminate against female employees in violation of Title VII, even though the Supreme Court, in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), held
that such plans do not violate the equal protection clause. E.g., Communications Workers v.
AT&T, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.),
cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987 (1975); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975).
Apparently, the assumption is that the Burger Court will distinguish between the constitutional
and statutory standards. On Title VII generally, see Developments in the Law: Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109 (1971).
263. See text accompanying notes 177-85 supra.
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2. The Fifteenth Amendment Decisions.-The Supreme Court's
approach to civil rights legislation was from the outset guided by the

standard that the three Civil War amendments "[wiere intended to be,
what they really are, limitations on the power of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress." '64 Accordingly, Congress may enact
any appropriate legislation that furthers the objectives of the amendments.2 6 Congressional attempts to enforce the fifteenth amendment's

ban on race discrimination in voting met with general success in the
early decisions. Although the Court held that the fifteenth amendment
does not confer an affirmative right to vote on black people but only

prohibits the denial of the franchise on the basis of race,66 in other cases
the Court approved the voting provisions of the Enforcement Act of
187067 and the Force Act of 1871.65 The Warren Court embraced the
modern fifteenth amendment legislation with equal warmth. In rapid

succession the Court upheld the principal provisions of the 195725 and
196020 Civil Rights Acts and, in South Carolinav. Katzenbach,2 1 gave

sweeping approval to the more significant Voting Rights Act of 1965.22
In South Carolina the Court entertained an original action to en-

join enforcement of a complex statutory scheme designed to eliminate
racial discrimination at the polls in the Southern States. The primary
issue was the validity of a provision that suspended literacy tests and

similar devices for 5 years in any state or county in which the Attorney
General determined that such a test had been used and the Bureau of

the Census certified that less than half the adult population had voted

in the previous Presidential election. 7 3 The objective was to identify
264. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (involving the enforcement of the fourteenth
amendment); see Emerson, Congress' Power to Enhance The Civil War Amendments, 49 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 544 (1974).
265. See text accompanying note 277 infra.
266. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); see James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
267. Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); see note 232 supra and accompanying text.
268. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (apparently relying on the fourteenth amendment); see note 234 supra and accompanying text.
269. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58
(1960) (involving provisions authorizing the Attorney General to seek injunctions against discriminatory practices); see Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960) (approving the creation of the Civil
Rights Commission); note 240 supra and accompanying text.
270. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S.
128 (1965); Alabama v. United States, 371 U.S. 37 (1962); see notes 241 & 242 supra and
accompanying text.
271. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
272. See note 249 supra and accompanying text.
273. The Southern States particularly objected to this "triggering" device which brought the
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those areas in which black people had been denied the right to vote by
the use of literacy tests nondiscriminatory on their face but administered
in a discriminatory manner.2 4 Although the Court itself had never held
that literacy tests might violate the fifteenth amendment, 21 South

Carolina held that Congress might employ any reasonable means to
avert the danger of discrimination. The upshot was that Congress is

empowered under the enforcement section of the fifteenth amendment
to enact prophylactic measures when it reasonably determines, as it did
in the 1965 Act, that such measures are necessary to further the objectives of the amendment itself.261 In a crucial passage South Carolina
held that congressional power in the case was subject only to the open-

ended standard set forth in the "necessary and proper" clause precedents:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutionalY7 7

On this principle the Court was unanimous, although Justice Black took
the position that the Act's provisions requiring affected states to obtain
federal approval before changing state election laws impermissibly infringed upon states' responsibility for their own law. - 78 The door to
machinery of the Act into play upon an administrative finding of discrimination. Contending that
the resultant difference in treatment among the states penalized the South, they argued that the
doctrine of equality of states barred legislation directed only to a few identifiable states. In response
the Court held that the doctrine dealt only with the terms upon which states are admitted to the
Union, Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), and did not prevent Congress from legislating against
an evil it found in some states and feared might spread to others. 383 U.S. at 328-29.
274. The South CarolinaCourt noted that "[d iscriminatory administration of voting qualifications has been found in all eight Alabama cases, in all nine Louisiana cases, and in all nine
Mississippi cases which have gone to final judgment." 383 U.S. at 312 (footnote omitted). The
Court also drew illustrations from the lower courts. In United States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d 818. 821
(5th Cir. 1962), a Mississippi registrar had rejected six blacks, all of whom were college graduates.
Three held master's degrees.
275. Indeed, the Court had held in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360
U.S. 45 (1959), that literacy tests do not necessarily discriminate against black voters.
276. 383 U.S. at 326-27.
277. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), quoted In 383 U.S. at
326; accord. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879), quoted in 383 U.S. at 327.
278. Justice Black first made it clear that he fully agreed that Congress had power under
the enforcement clause of the fifteenth amendment to suspend literacy tests found to be discriminatory, to authorize federal examiners to monitor elections, and to establish a triggering device for
application of the new Act. On this latter question he seemed to hold that the Court should not
even have inquired whether the Congress had acted rationally. For Black it was enough that the
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congressional enforcement of the Civil War amendments was thus
thrown open, allowing the legislative branch to promote individual liberty to the extent reason permits.

Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined the Court in
1969 openly prepared to enforce civil rights legislation with the same
vigor as had their predecessors. In Perkins v. Mathews79 they joined in
a concurring opinion that clearly sided with the Court on the broad issue
of congressional power under the enforcement provisions. Nor did the
mood change when Justices Powell and Rehnquist took their seats in
1972. In Georgia v. United States28 0 the majority extended the approval

provisions of the Act to apportionment schemes, the Chief Justice and
Justice Blackmun again concurring. Justices Powell and Rehnquist
joined a dissenting opinion by Justice White that agreed that the Act
reached apportionment plans but took the position that the Attorney
General had not objected to the plan in the manner contemplated by the
statute.211 Justice Powell's separate dissenting opinion seemed to agree

with Justice Black that the approval provisions infringed upon state
responsibility, but on the more significant question of congressional
power generally to enforce the fifteenth amendment he forthrightly
argued that Congress has not only the power but the duty to legislate
an end to racial discrimination in voting.282
legislature had exercised its "hitherto unquestioned and undisputed power to decide when, where,
and upon what conditions its laws shall go into effect." 383 U.S. at 356. But Justice Black could
not approve the provision in the Act requiring states subject to it to obtain the approval of the
Attorney General and the federal courts before making changes in their election laws. On that
question he said that Congress had sought to use its fifteenth amendment power in a manner that
conflicted with basic structural principles of the Constitution. Not only did the provision require
the rendering of an advisory opinion, in Black's view, but it made the states' power to amend their
own laws and state constitutions depend upon the approval of federal authorities in Washington.
Id. at 358-62. In subsequent cases, however, the Court continued to uphold the approval provisions
of the 1965 Act. Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); see Gaston County v. United
States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969). Justice Black dissented in both Allen and Gaston.
279. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
280. 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
281. Id. at 543 (White, J., dissenting).
282. Justice Powell made his views clear:
I have no doubt as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact
appropriate legislation to assure that the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied,
abridged, or infringed in any way "on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." Indeed, in my view there is more than a power to enact such legislation, there
is a duty. My disagreement is with the unprecedented requirement of advance review of state
or local legislative acts by federal authorities, rendered the more noxious by its selective
application to only a few States.
Id.'at 545 n.* (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). Of course, having taken the position with

1975]

The Burger Court State Action

In Oregon v. Mitchelpa the Court again addressed the question
of the scope of congressional power to legislatively enforce the fifteenth
amendment. In 1970 Congress had extended the 1965 Act for another

5 years, barred the use of literacy tests in all elections, and lowered the
voting age in all elections to age 18.21 Oregon's challenge to the latter

two provisions provoked a series of opinions requiring 184 pages in the
official reports. Significantly, even as they sharply split on the age

requirement issue, the Justices were unanimous in the judgment that
Congress had power to ban literacy tests nation-wide. Justice Stewart,
in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, saw

"no constitutional impediment" to the action.m Not only might Congress bar the discriminatory use of such tests, but it might determine

that even a fairly administered literacy test impermissibly tends to sort
blacks out of the electoral process.2t1The disagreement in Oregon came

over the age requirements. Justice Black agreed that Congress could fix
age requirements for national elections under Article I, but he was not
persuaded that the voting age might be lowered for state and local
elections on the basis of the fourteenth amendment.2z Since the other
Justices were divided on the question,m Justice Black's vote was decisive, and he prepared the Court's opinion upholding the age requirement
for national elections but striking down the similar provision for state
and local elections.28
Justice White that in this case the Attorney General had not properly objected to the changes in
Georgia's state laws, Justice Powell did not reach the constitutional question whether, given a
proper objection, the state might validly be required to seek federal approval before instituting the
planned changes. Powell's reference to a congressional duty to legislate under the enforcement
section of the fifteenth amendment has not been reiterated in subsequent cases.
283. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
284. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973c, 1973aa to 1973bb4 (1970).
285. 400 U.S. at 283.
286. See Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
287. Of course, the age limit provisions of the 1970 legislation could not be supported by
the fifteenth amendment. Justice Black pointed out that the Congress had made no legislative
finding that states which required voters to be 21 years of age used the age requirement to
discriminate on the basis of race. Indeed, he doubted that any such finding could be supported by
substantial evidence. 400 U.S. at 130.
288. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall took the position that the entire Act
was valid. 400 U.S. at 135 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id. at 229 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by
White and Marshall, JJ.). Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun and the Chief Justice would
have invalidated the voting age provisions for both federal and state elections. Id. at 154 (opinion
of Harlan, J.); id. at 281-82 (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and Blackmun, J.).
289. The 1970 Act also fixed residency requirements and established procedures for absentee
voting in elections for Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors. All members of the Court except
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3. The Thirteenth Amendment Decisions.-While the fifteenth
amendment cases give some indication of the Burger Court's willingness
to construe enforcement legislation liberally, cases involving civil rights
legislation enacted on the authority of the thirteenth amendment, which
is not limited to state action, offer more fertile ground for an exploration of the Court's position. With the exception of a few decisions by
individual Justices on circuit,90 the Reconstruction Court gave the thirteenth amendment a narrow reading. In the Civil Rights Cases,9 ' the
Court said that it would be "running the slavery argument into the
ground" to hold that the public accommodations provisions of the 1875
Civil Rights Act were authorized by an amendment that only abolished
involuntary servitude.292 Similarly, in Hodges v. United States2 3 the
Court held that only conduct that actually enslaves a person can be
made punishable under a criminal statute enacted to enforce the thirteenth amendment. Once the 1866 Act had been reenacted to shore up
its constitutional underpinnings,294 both the Congress and the Court
turned their focus away from
the thirteenth amendment, which drifted
25
accordingly into obscurity.
Yet a century later, in the last year of Chief Justice Warren's career
on the Court, the 1866 Act and the original constitutional basis for its
enactment, the thirteenth amendment, were revived in the muchcriticized decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.291 The petitioners in
Jones had filed a complaint in the district court that was as startling as
it was simple. They alleged that the defendant, a builder, had refused
to sell them a house in its subdivision solely because they were black,
and that the refusal violated section 1982 of the codified version of the
1866 Act.297 After a tortured review of the relevant legislative history, 218
Justice Harlan agreed that those provisions weic constitutional. 400 U.S. at 213-16 (opinion of
Harlan, J.). Since the decision in Oregon the twenty-sixth amendment has achieved the result
Congress unsuccessfully sought to accomplish by legislation.
290. See Frantz, supra note 16, at 1365-70.
291. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
292. Id. at 24.
293. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
294. See note 229 supra; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
295. See ten Broek, supra note 229, at 200-02.
296. 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see Henkin, The Supreme Court. 1967 Term. Foreword: o
Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 82-87 (1968); Larson, The New Law of Race Relations,
1969 Wis. L. REV. 470.
297. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970); see note 230 supra.
298. See Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio. Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT. REV.
89..See generally C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECON-

STRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1888 (1971).
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Justice Stewart's majority opinion concluded that 1982 means what it

says-discrimination against blacks in the housing market, even discrimination unconnected with government, is unlawful. 2 Drawing
heavily on dicta from the Civil Rights Cases ° l and squarely overruling

Hodges,0 ' the Court held that 1982 could validly reach private discrimination in order to abolish the "badges and incidents of slavery"

in the United States.02 The thirteenth amendment had itself, at the
very least, 3 3 prohibited slavery in this country; and Jones now held

299. In coming to the conclusion that 1982 reaches private racial discrimination, the Court
rejected the contention that because the 1866 Act was reenacted in 1870 under the apparent
authority of the fourteenth amendment the Congress intended to limit the Act to state action. In
the only recent application of 1982, Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). the action of a federal
judge in the District of Columbia had been involved. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(decided with Hurd); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). While the Court agreed
that dicta in Hurd and some older decisions seemed to say that state action is required, Virginia
v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1879), the "cardinal rule. . . that repeals by implication are not
favored," Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936), ruled the day in Jones.
Accordingly, at least as to the property-related rights protected by the 1866 Act, reenactment in
section 18 of the 1870 Act had no erosive effect. Jones did not squarely decide the same question
regarding the right under section 1981 to make and enforce contracts. See note 326 Infra. Of
course, if Congress has power to reach private action under the enforcement section of the fourteenth amendment as will be argued infra, the source of 1981 and 1982 in the 1866 or 1870 Acts is
immaterial.
300. As Professor Henkin put it:
The Court quoted from the Civil Rights Cases that Congress has the 'power to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.'
. . . The earlier Court might well have agreed that state laws denying to Negroes equality
in fundamental respects were a badge of slavery, but it expressly denied that private discrimination was such a vestige of slavery. The Court in Mayer also gave some weight to the
fact that all the Justices in the Civil Rights Cases agreed that Congress had authority to
adopt the provision of the 1866 Act which was invoked in Mayer. But that surely was
because they rejected the reading of that provision now adopted by the Court.
Henkin, supra note 296, at 87 n.79. The Jones Court actually took a view of the 1866 Act similar
to that of the first Justice Harlan in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases. See note 14 supra. But
even he seemed to limit the Act's intrusion into private conduct to "corporations and individuals
in the exercise of their public or quasi-public functions.
109 U.S. at 43: see Watt & Orlikoff.
supra note 6.
301. 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. Hodges could not withstand the Jones Court's square holding
that congressional power under the thirteenth amendment reaches beyond penalizing actual enslavement to racial discrimination with vestiges of slavery. Similarly, the holding in the Civil Rights
Cases that Congress' power was limited to lifting restrictions on former slaves' legal status was
also effectively if not expressly rejected in Jones. See Note, supra note 246, at 466-67.
302. 392 U.S. at 440.
303. The Court expressly declined to say whether the thirteenth amendment of its own force
might bar any private discrimination that constitutes a badge or incident of slavery. 392 U.S. at
439. Yet, on the face of it, it is difficult to see why the Congress can say what is or is not a vestige
of slavery in a statute like the 1866 Act while the Court, acting on the authority of a self-executing
constitutional amendment, cannot. That is to say, why did the Jones Court find 1982 necessary to
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that Congress has power to enforce that amendment by barring even

private action tending to perpetuate the "relics" of that discarded social
order. Just as it had in the voting rights cases, the Court embraced the
formulation developed under the "necessary and proper" clause as the
only limit on congressional enforcement power." 4
In dissent, Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White, objected both

to the Court's questionable reading of historical materials and to its
willingness to decide the case at all on the authority of a statute long
forgotten after a century of disuse." 5 Justice Harlan urged that the
strike down private discrimination in the housing market? Might not the same result have been
reached without the aid of legislation? Once again, of course, the Court offered no judgment on
that score, but it is fair a inference that a statute is necessary. Two points must be made. First, it
seems clear that the Court will permit Congress to enact prophylactic legislation that prohibits
conduct that does not violate the amendment itself but that the Congress finds necessary to head
off violations of the amendment that may occur if precautions are not taken. This, of course, is
what the Court has done in the voting rights cases. See text accompanying note 276 supra. Second,
underscoring the first point is the proposition that the Burger Court wishes to stay its own hand
in the name of judicial restraint and federalism, but is prepared to approve congressional action
to accomplish identical ends. The best indication of the Court's thinking on the scope of the
thirteenth amendment of its own force comes from Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun concurred
separately. Painterupheld the closing of public swimming pools in Jackson, Mississippi in the face
of court-ordered desegregation. In response to the argument that closing the pools violated the
thirteenth amendment, Justice Black wrote:
The denial of the right of Negroes to swim in pools with white people is said to be a 'badge
or incident' of slavery. Consequently, the argument seems to run, this Court should declare
that the city's closing of the pools to keep the two races from swimming together violates
the Thirteenth Amendment. To reach that result from the Thirteenth Amendment would
severely stretch its short simple words and do violence to its history. Establishing this
Court's authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to declare new laws to govern the
thousands of towns and cities of the country would grant it a law-making power far beyond
the imagination of the amendment's authors. Finally, although the Thirteenth Amendment
is a skimpy collection of words to allow this Court to legislate new laws to control the
operation of swimming pools throughout the length and breadth of this Nation, the Amendment does contain other words that we held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. could empower
Congress to outlaw 'badges of slavery.' . . . But Congress has passed no law under this
power to regulate a city's opening or closing of swimming pools or other recreational
facilities.
Id. at 226-27. The upshot is that the Court is not prepared to exercise judicial power on the
authority of the thirteenth amendment itself in many cases in which it is prepared to let Congress
legislate. This, of course, is the essential thesis of this article. Cf. Kinoy, The ConstitutionalRight
of Negro Freedom Revisited: Some First Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 22
RUTGERS L. REV. 537 (1968) (contending that the amendment itself should be invoked).
304. 392 U.S. at 443-44; see text accompanying note 277 supra.
305. 392 U.S. at 449. For an examination of the majority and minority opinions and a
criticism of both, see Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round A t Last: Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272 (1969).

1975]

The Burger Court State Action

Court dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in light of

the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 311 which had been enacted

after argument but before the decision in Jones. While the law could not
affect the rights of the parties in the case, 0 7 the identical relief claimed
by them under 1982 would be available to future litigants under the new
statute.318 Justice Harlan would have sacrificed the interests of the

parties before the Court in order to avoid a far-reaching decision
grounded in an ancient statute, which on its face seemed to provide even

more protection for individual liberty than the complex statutory
3 9
scheme just enacted.

1

306. See note 250 supra.
307. Justice Harlan conceded that the new legislation would not become effective for 7
months after the date of the decision in Jones. It was not his view that the petitioners should have
proceeded pursuant to the new statute or that they should begin again with its support. These
litigants would rise or fall on the Court's interpretation of 1982. 392 U.S. at 476-80.
308. While Justice Harlan made clear that he was not prepared to decide the constitutional
validity of the new legislation in Jones, he noted that the new Act was "presumptively constitutional." 392 U.S. at 478. The Court has never squarely held that the 1968 Act is valid. but there
is little doubt on the question. See note 250 supra.
309. The majority in Jones recognized that the language of 1982 is broad and that it is not
subject to many of the exceptions to the scope of the 1968 Act. Nevertheless, the Court insisted
that 1982 is not a "comprehensive open housing law.*" 392 U.S. at 413. Unlike the 1968 Act. 1982
is restricted to race discrimination and does not reach discrimination on the basis of religion or
national origin; it does not on its face reach even racial discrimination in the provision of services
or facilities related to the sale or rental of housing; it establishes no administrative system of
enforcement; and it does not on its face support an award of damages-as opposed to the injunctive
relief obtained in Jones. See generally Smedley, A Comparative Analysis of Title VIII and Section
1982, 22 VAND. L. REv. 459 (1969). All this is true, of course. but even as the Court wrote it was
clear that in time the limits of 1982 would have to be probed, and at some point the statute would
have to be reconciled with the much more complex 1968 legislation. While the simpler language
in 1982 certainly does not expressly prohibit discrimination in all the many particulars that might
be imagined, it remained only for the statutory construction process to read such protections into
the old statute in order to ensure that its purpose is achieved. In the next term. for example, the
Court had no difficulty finding that 1982 authorizes the award of damages or any other appropriate
remedy when a violation is shown. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In
cases since Jones and Sullivan litigants challenging racial discrimination in housing have cited both
1982 and the applicable provisions of the 1968 Act in order to have the benefits of both. See. e.g..
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 n.8 (1972). And the lower federal
courts are even now wrestling with the cases in which the protections provided by the two statutes
do not overlap. The 1968 Act appears superior to 1982 in protecting against discrimination on the
basis of religion and national origin as well as race, in prohibiting discriminatory advertising and
brokerage practices, and in barring discriminatory financing. See cases cited in Note. supra note
246, at 471 n.125. On the other hand, 1982 applies to all transactions involving both personal and
commercial property, while the 1968 Act is principally concerned with private dwellings. In addition, 1982 has generally not been held subject to the exemptions and the procedural requirements
set forth in the 1968 Act. Id. at 471-72 nn. 128 & 129. On the difficulties with procedure under
the new legislation, see D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LA'w 640-42 (19713).
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But the Harlan position was rejected in Jones and again in Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,3 1 decided the following Term. Sullivan
involved a private swimming pool corporation whose bylaws provided
that a member who leased his home in the neighborhood could assign
his membership in the corporation to his tenant, subject to the approval
of the board of directors. When the board refused to approve an assignment to a black tenant, suit was instituted in reliance upon 1982. In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Douglas did not pause to consider whether
the assignment was real or personal property, saying that 1982 protects
both in any event and there could be no doubt that the black tenant had
paid part of his monthly rent for the use of the pool."' Accordingly,
the refusal of the board to approve the assignment constituted an interference with the petitioner's right to lease his property. Sullivan, involv-

ing as it did the use of a private swimming pool, raised the question of
the scope of 1982 in an emotion-charged context. The defendant corpo-

ration contended, plausibly enough, that its operations were protected
31"
under the exception for private clubs in the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
which the corporation urged the Court to import into 1982. The Court
passed lightly over the issue with the comment that since the corporation

was freely open to all whites in the geographic area without regard to
membership criteria other than race, the swimming pool could not have
the benefit of the exception in any event. 1 3 In dissent, Justices Harlan

and White, now joined by the new Chief Justice, again protested that
310. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
311. Id. at 236-37; see note 230 supra.
312. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970):
The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope
of subsection (b) of this section.
See Note, The Private Club Exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in Judicial
Confusion, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1112 (1969). The 1964 Act, of course, is concerned with public
accommodations rather than housing transactions, but the expansive notion of property adopted
in Sullivan brought 1982 to bear on the same problem with which the 1964 Act was designed to
deal. Professor Henkin reasonably asked whether even Jones made the 1964 Act superfluous by
apparently reading 1982 to prohibit discrimination in all property transactions. When a lunch
counter refuses to serve blacks, it discriminates in the provision of services in violation of the 1964
Act, but also refuses to sell personal property-food and drink-arguably in violation of 1982.
Importantly, 1982 would apply to businesses whose operations do not affect interstate commerce.
With the revival of 1981 in Tillman, the same transaction might also be considered an invalid
infringement on the right to make and enforce contracts. See Henkin, supra note 296, at 85; text
accompanying note 325 infra.
313. 396 U.S. at 236.
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the Court should avoid reliance upon the 1866 Act when the much more
recent 1968 legislation was available. 3"1
The stage was set for a retreat from Jones and Sullivan four years
later in Tillman v.Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc.1"' Justice Harlan had left the Court, but by all accounts the new appointees
were even less disposed to extend the development of 1982. It was not
to be so. In a unanimous decision behind Justice Blackmun the Court
ratified everything that had gone before and found even new ground to
break. The case involved another private swimming pool corporation
and allegations that it had violated various federal statutes.3' 6 This
corporation's bylaws did not entitle a member to assign his membership
to a tenant, but membership was nonetheless tied to property ownership
in the neighborhood. A person who owned property within a fixed area
surrounding the pool was entitled to three preferences when applying for
membership: (1) He need not be recommended for membership by a
present member; (2) his application received a priority over applications
from persons not residing in the area; and (3) if he became a member,
he was able to pass on a "first-option" to his successor in title.31 1The
preferences were most important during periods when membership in
the corporation was full, as it was when the events in Tillman took place.
All this was enough for the Court. Without the slightest suggestion of
a narrow definition of "property" within the meaning of 1982, the Court
adopted an amorphous notion it could only describe as a "bundle of
rights" associated with property ownership and use.3 81 The unmistakable aim was to take the statute at face value and to interpret it to
prohibit any race discrimination reasonably related to property-an
unexpected approach for a Court thought to be unsympathetic to individual liberty.
Once again the Court was urged to limit 1982 by finding in it an
implied exemption similar to that for private clubs in the 1964 Civil
314. 396 U.S. at 241. Sullivan was one of the first cases decided by the Court after Chief
Justice Burger took his seat. While at the time itseemed that his dissenting vote signaled a coming
retreat from Jones, more recently in Tillman those thoughts were put to rest.
315. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
316. The petitioners alleged violations or the 1866 and 1870 Acts. 42 U.S.C s% 1981.
1982 (1970), and the public accommodations provision or the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(a) (1970). See 410 U.S. at 434.
317. 410 U.S. at 433.

318. Justice Blackmun's language was as follows: "When an organization links membership
benefits to residency in a narrow geographical area, that decision infuses those benefits into the
bundle of rights for which an individual pays when buying or leasing within the area." Id. at 437.
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Rights Act, 39 or the exception for "Mrs. Murphy's boarding house"
in the 1968 fair housing legislation. 310 And once again the Court declined on the ground that, in the case at bar, the swimming pool corporation had opened its doors to all white residents within the area. The
corporation could not qualify for exemption in any event, and the question whether 1982 should be qualified by the exception for private clubs
need not be decided. 32 ' Whether the Court will in future cases import
the precise exceptions set forth in the modern acts into 1982 is an open
question, but the issue is hardly critical. 322 Clearly there is some limitation on the reach of 1982, if only a constitutional check on how far the
Congress can intrude into wholly private decision-making. If a noncommercial organization establishes membership requirements that are genuinely selective in order to preserve the associational interests of its
members, it can hardly be contended that the Congress can prohibit the
organization from establishing race as one of its membership criteria.32 The Constitution does protect private bias, when it is honestly
private, and when the time comes the Court will necessarily hold that
1982 does not mean that an individual must choose his dormitory roommate without regard to race.2 4
While Tillman's elaboration on Jones and Sullivan was surprising
enough, the Court went on to revive 1982's companion provision from
the 1866 Civil Rights Act, section 1981.35 The petitioners had alleged
that, in addition to discriminating against blacks in property transactions, the swimming pool corporation had denied blacks an equal opportunity to make and enforce contracts. Although the Court devoted most
319. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970); see note 312 supra.
320. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1970).
The term "Mrs. Murphy's boarding house" refers to an owner-occupied dwelling. In
the interest of associational privacy such dwellings, if sufficiently small, were excluded from
coverage both by Title II [of the 1964 Act] and Title VIII [of the 1968 Act]. The Title II
exemption is for boarding houses of five or fewer rooms that provide "lodging to transient
guests," . . . while the Title VIII exemption is for dwellings that provide "living quarters"

for no more than four families ....
Note, supra note 246, at 476 n.159 (citations omitted).
321. 410 U.S. at 338-39.
322. Note, supra note 246, at 492. Given the congressional view that the exemptions do no
more than protect associational privacy, it seems likely that they limit the reach or civil rights
legislation little more than does the Constitution itself. Indeed, it is entirely possible that in most
cases the Court would find the statutory and constitutional standards coextensive.
323. Cf.Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (setting forth criteria for determining what is
a private club for purposes of the 1964 Act).
324. Moose Lodge No. 101 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
325. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), see note 230 supra.
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of its discussion to 1982, it held as well that the corporation was not
exempt from the reach of 1981, implying in the process that 1981 is to

be given a construction similar to that of 1982.

"-

If that is the case,

individual liberty has yet another significant source of protection. The

lower courts have uniformly held that 1981 prohibits a refusal to enter
a contract on the basis of race3 and, given a definition of "contract"

that is as expansive as that given "property" under 1982, 1981 promises
to wipe out race discrimination in a wide variety of contexts not touched
by existing law, constitutional or statutory. The statute's broad language may be read, for example, to supplement or surpass the protection now offered by the employmentV2 and public accommodations
326. In an extended footnote the Court appeared to decide that 1981. like 1982. reaches
private as well as state action. See note 299 supra. A debate has long raged over the effect or the
1870 reenactment of the 1866 Act, particularly with regard to 1981. In Cook v. Montgomery
Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'don other grounds. 458 F.2d 1119 (5th
Cir. 1972), the district court noted that the 1866 Act protected "all citizens" from discrimination
in transactions related to property and the right of contract. Section 18 of the 1870 Act merely
reenacted the 1866 Act without repeating its terms, and 1982 retains the "all citi/ens'" language.
On the other hand, 1981 protects "all persons." The more inclusive language derives from § 16 of
the 1870 Act, a separate provision apparently enacted to protect Chinese aliens as well as citi/er,.
Comment, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justificationfor a Judicial
Trend, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1024, 1030 (1972). In Cook the district court reasoned that.
notwithstanding the reenactment in § 18, 1981 can find its source only in § 16 ofthe 1870 Act rather
than the earlier Civil Rights Act of 1866 from which 1982 is derived. The conclusion drasn in Cook
was that since 1981 derives from the 1870 Act, which enforced the fourteenth rather than the
thirteenth amendment, then 1981 does not necessarily reach private action as does 1982. Contra
Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971) (viewing the 1866 Act a, the
ultimate source of 1981 and thus applying the contract provision to private action). Although the
Supreme Court has on a number of occasions held that 1981 protects aliens as %sell as black people.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and thus recognized that the "all persons" language
in 1981 can be traced no further back than the 1870 Act, in Tillman it was clear that the Court
viewed the key language as derived, along with 1982, from the 1866 Act. Specifically. the Court
said that while the changes in wording that occurred in the 1870 Act may have reflected the
language of the fourteenth amendment upon which that Act was based. "1tlhe 1866 Act %%as reenacted in 1870, and the predecessor of the present § 1981 was to be 'enforced according to the
provisions' of the 1866 Act." 410 U.S. at 440 n.1 I. While the Court stopped short ofka)ing flatly
that 1981 is not subject to a state action limitation, the clear inference %%asthat the Court viewed
both 1981 and 1982 as grounded in the earlier legislation, the confusion surrounding the 1870 Act
notwithstanding. At all events, more recently in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency. Inc.. 421
U.S. 454 (1975), the Court held that 1981 is based on the thirteenth amendment and does indeed
provide a federal remedy for private racial discrimination falling within its terms.
327. See. e.g., Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1975). Olzman v. Lake Hill, Ssim
Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974): Scott v. Young, 307 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Va. 1969). affd.
421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
328. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970). Clearly, ifan employer discriminates on the basis or race
in employment, he denies black people an equal opportunity to make and enforce contract-.
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (1981 affords a federal rened)
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titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Like 1982, of course, 1981 must be limited, if not by importing
statutory exemptions into it as a method of construction, then by constitutional judgment. All human relationships are not contractual, and it
is beyond argument that Congress cannot, for example, desegregate all
private organizations on the convoluted theory that discriminatory admissions policies deny blacks the right to form a contract. The constitutional analysis here is identical to that the Court must employ when it
interprets 1982. In each case the Court must ask whether the organization has established membership criteria that are genuinely selective. Ir
not, the organization cannot legitimately maintain that it has a constitutionally protected associational interest that prevents government from
prohibiting racial discrimination. If, as in Sullivan and Tillman, membership is open to all whites in an area but no blacks, the private club
label cannot obscure the truth. The organization is not protecting the
warmth of personal relationships but rather is plainly attempting to
evade the statutory prohibition on race discrimination in arm's-length
contractual dealings."' Ultimately the task is indistinguishable from
the balancing process urged on the Court shortly after Shelley v.
Kraemer.3 1 At that time it was urged that the Court should itself
reach and prohibit race discrimination having the most tenuous connection with government, and only when the discriminating party can establish a countervailing, constitutionally protected interest should the
Court countenance discrimination. 33 Now, in the context of interpreting enforcement legislation unencumbered by the state action limitation,
against racial discrimination in private employment). For a review of the cases applying 1981 to
employment discrimination problems, see Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy
for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARV. Civ. RiGtITs-Cv. LItBS. L. Ruv. 56
(1972). Of course, it can also be argued that 1982 bars racial discrimination in employment on the
theory that wages are personal property within the meaning given to the statutory language in
Sullivan and Tillman. Cf Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 96 n.9 (1973) (suggesting but
not deciding the question).
329. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970). If a motel operator or restaurant manager refuses service to
blacks, the discrimination would seem to deny blacks an equal opportunity to make and enforce
contracts for those services. Moreover. 1982 may similarly be brought to bear. When a traveler is
refused a room on the basis of race, surely he is denied an equal opportunity to lease real property
for the night; and if he is refused a cup of coffee at a lunch counter, in a like manner he is denied
an equal opportunity to purchase personal property. See note 312 supra;Seldin. EradicatingRacial
Discriminationat Public Accommodations Not Covered by Title 11. 28 RUTGERS L. Rv. 1 (1974),
330. Cf.Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
331. 334 U.S. 1 (1948), see text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
332. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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the Burger Court appears ready and willing to engage in just that inquiry.
Just where the line is to be drawn may well be determined when

the Supreme Court examines the cases involving 1981 suits to desegregate private segregationist academies. For 3 years civil rights groups
have been following Gonzales v. Fairfax-BrewsterSchool,M in which
the district court held that the discriminatory admissions policies of two

such schools constituted violations of blacks' right to make and enforce
contracts.3 4 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment awarding both
damages and injunctive relief to black children who were denied admission to the schools when admission was generally open to similarly
situated white children.? As might be expected, the dissent emphasized the private nature of the schools and contended with some force
that if 1981 reaches the schools it is unconstitutional.3

Whatever the

intellectual appeal of these views, it must be clear that racial discrimination is, even at this late date in our history, the most pressing problem

confronting American law.37 The shame of racism casts its shadow
over all our lives; it is inescapable. Accordingly, with due deference to
the first amendment-related interests presented in a case such as
Gonzales, it would be unthinkable for the Court to hold that Congress
lacks power to root out and eradicate racial discrimination in the
schooling of elementary school children.33s This is true no matter what
statute is before the Court, no matter when it was enacted, and no

matter what its constitutional authority. It is far too late in the day to
urge that the outrageous double-think of racism lies beyond the power
of the legislative branch. 339 To do so is to ignore 200 years of national
333. 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff d sub nonm. McCrary v. Runyon. 515 F.2d 1082
(4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975).
334. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School. Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
335. For a general discussion of private school segregation. see Note. Segregation Acadeinies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973).
336. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1096 (4th Cir. 1975) (Russell. Field & Widener.
JJ., concurring & dissenting).
337. See Black, supra note 102, at 69: REPORT OF TIlE NATIONAL AD\'IsoR% Cowlwwolls
ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).

338. In Gonzales, since the schools were open to all whites in the area %ho met academic
and financial standards, they could hardly maintain that admission %%as restricted in order to
preserve close personal relations. While enrollment at the two schools %%as lo%% in comparison to
public schools, each school provided places for well over 200 students. 363 F. Supp. at 1201.
339. See generally Buchanan, Federal Regulation of Private Racial Prejudice: . l Studr al
Law in Search of Morality, 56 IOwA L. REV. 473 (1971): Note. Desegregation of Private Schoalnk
Section 1981 as an Alternative to State Action. 62 GEo. L.J. 1363 (1974): Note. The Desegregatian
of Private Schools: Is Section 1981 the Answer? 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1147 (1973).
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striving toward the ideal of equality among men. If, on the other hand,
a case arises in which a private school establishes selection criteria that
go beyond race, and it appears that admission is limited in order to
protect interests that have constitutional significance of their own, an
340
accommodation must and can be reached.
4. The Fourteenth Amendment Decisions.-An examination of
the protection of individual liberty through federal legislation must
come finally to a discussion of congressional power under the enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment.3 4 ' The fifteenth amendment provides a source of authority only for statutes affecting the franchise,3 4 and the thirteenth seems to be limited to discrimination against
persons who can assert a history of involuntary servitude.3 4 3 Conse340. Cf Riley v. Adirondack S. School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973). appeal
pending, 522 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The
Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (1975).
341. See note 3 supra.
342. See note 6 supra.
343. A footnote in the district court's opinion in Gonzales stated:
The analogy to all black academies, all Chinese schools, and all rabbinical schools is
inapposite. These institutions don't fall within the proscription of§ 1981. Whatever else may
be said of their policies, those institutions are free to discriminate against whites, or against
other non-whites if whites are similarly discriminated against, without running afoul of §
1981.
363 F. Supp. at 1204 n.3. This is plausible in light of the language in 1981 that guarantees persons
only the rights enjoyed by whites. See note 230 supra. On the other band, in Hollander v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975), the court held that 1981 does not protect only
blacks, but may come into play in any case of race discrimination. This, too, is plausible. particularly in light of Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905), which upheld the Anti-Peonage Act
of 1867 on the authority of the thirteenth amendment. That Act was aimed primarily at the
peonage system in the New Mexico Territory, rather than at the vestiges of black slavery. Yet
Hollander's assertion that a white person may have the benefit of 1981 if he can establish that he
is being denied rights ordinarily available to members of his race is difficult to accept. If 1981 is
to depend upon the thirteenth amendment, it would seem that a plaintiff must not only show that
he is not being afforded rights available to whites but that the denial is a vestige of slavery. While
there may be some persons other than blacks who can make such an assertion, see Clyatt. supra,
query whether whites are among them. Generally, the cases have restricted the reach of 1981 to
blacks. See. e.g., Macdonald v. Shawnee Country Club, Inc., 438 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.). cert. denied,
403 U.S. 932 (1971) (1981 inapplicable to religious discrimination); League of Academic Women
v. Regents, 343 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (1981 inapplicable to sex discrimination). But see
Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d I110 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that 1981 protects native
Americans). The Supreme Court is due to decide whether a white person can have the benefit of
1981 in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trans. Co., 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 264
(1975). None of this is to say that whites may not rely on 1981 to vindicate the rights of blacks or
to protect their own desires for interracial associations. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park. Inc.,
396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969): cf Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972):
Dematteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Ripp v. Dobbs Houses,
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quently, if Congress is to reach the multifarious instances of arbitrary
treatment of individuals by private entities unaided by disingenuous
appeals to the commerce and taxing powers, the only apparent vehicle
is the fourteenth amendment. This is the amendment that in its own
right prohibits state government from acting arbitrarily; the unanswered
question is whether it permits the Congress to impose similar restrictions upon private action as well in order to shield individual liberty
from the enormous economic and political power amassed by private
entities in the modern age. At this stage in our history, the individual
must contend not only with the excesses of public power but also with
the arbitrariness of faceless corporate giants that claim the right to bar
individuals of their choosing from a dining hall,:" to suppress views
with which they disagree at a shopping center, 33 and to terminate an
individual's essential electrical power without a fair examination of the
underlying facts. 36 Here is the nettle of the thing. If the Burger Court
is unprepared to exercise the power of the federal judiciary to eradicate
arbitrariness wherever it may be found, then congressional power to
legislate a similar result comes immediately to the fore. Other constitutional questions, albeit important on some scale, pale to insignificance
in comparison.
The most apparent impediment to a holding that Congress has
broad authority to reach private action through the fourteenth amendment is Justice Bradley's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases.3 1 In striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 the Court held that the grant of
congressional authority in section five of the amendment permits the
Congress to enact only "corrective legislation" which invalidates discriminatory state laws. 3 8 This is so because the first section of the
amendment is limited by the state action requirement and, in the
Court's view, any legislation to enforce that section must also be diInc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 209 (N.D. Ala. 1973). And, of course, by virtue of its partial derivation
from § 16 of the 1870 Act, 1981 protects aliens even though they can adduce no evidence of
involuntary servitude. See note 326 supra. It has been suggested that the Congre might ha'c acted
in behalf of aliens under its plenary power over immigration and naturalization- Guerra v Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 654 n.32 (5th Cir. 1974).
344. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). discussed in text a compan)ing
notes 117-33 supra.
345. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), discussedin text accompan)ing notes 13446 supra.
346. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). discus-sedintet accompan)ing notes 155-76 supra.
347. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
348. Id. at 11.
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rected to the actions of the states.349 The Court held that by legislating

an end to private discrimination in public accommodations in the 1875
Act, Congress had exceeded its constitutional power and invaded the

province of state responsibility.35 While the issue is not free from
doubt,35 ' in the years since, the reach of congressional power under

section five has generally been thought to be limited to official action
that the fourteenth amendment of its own force prohibits. 52
On the other hand, two recent cases have seemingly revived Congress' enforcement power under the fourteenth amendment. Although
349. Id. at 13-14:
[Ulntil some State law has been passed, or some State action through its officers or agents
has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any proceedings under such legislation, can be called into activity: for the prohibitions of the amendment
are against State laws and acts done under State authority.
350. Justice Bradley emphasized that Congress had not conditioned the operation of the 1875
Act on any action by the states:
An inspection of the law shows that it makes no reference whatever to any supposed
or apprehended violation of the Fourteenth Amendment on the part of the States. It is not
predicated on any such view. It proceeds ex directo to declare that certain acts committed
by individuals shall be deemed offences, and shall be prosecuted and punished by proceed.
ings in the courts of the United States. It does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong committed by the States- it does not make its operation to depend upon any
such wrong committed.
Id. at 14.
351. A survey of the relevant historical materials and a careful examination of the precise
language used in the Civil Rights Cases have convinced Laurent Frantz that Justice Bradley did
not intend to say that Congress can never reach private action through its enforcement power, but
only that Congress must condition such legislation on a state's failure to perform its "responsibility" to enforce equality of civil rights. Frantz, supra note 16 at 1359. On the one hand, given the
decisions on the reach of the fourteenth amendment of its own force, it is difficult to see where
Frantz finds any responsibilityin the states to protect individuals from private action. On the other
hand, as will be seen infra, it may well be that the Burger Court is prepared to allow Congress
broad legislative authority to fill in the gaps in state legislation wherever the Congress sees fit. If
that is the case, then the Court may choose to adopt the Frantz reading of the Civil Rights Cases
or to overrule Justice Bradley's opinion outright.
352. See Frantz, supra note 16, at 1353. And, it must be conceded, there is ample support
for this conclusion in Justice Bradley's opinion:
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is prohibitory in its character, and
prohibitory upon the States.
. . jTlhe
[
last section of the amendment invests Congress with power to enforce it by
appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce the prohibition. To adopt appropriate
legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus
to render them effectually null, void, and innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred
upon Congress, and this is the whole of it.
109 U.S. at 10-1I.
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Katzenbach v. Morgan33 and Oregon v. Mitchell did not involve

statutes aimed at private action, they nevertheless breathed new life into
the hope that federal legislation might yet provide increased protection
for individual liberty. In an opinion by Justice Brennan, Morgan upheld

a provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act that prohibited the states
from denying the franchise to persons with an elementary school educa-

tion in American-flag schools.355 The Act was designed to proscribe the
use of English-language literacy tests to prevent Spanish-speaking

Puerto Ricans in New York from voting.3 6 In alternative holdings
Brennan said, first, that Congress has power under the fourteenth
amendment to legislate prophylactically-that is, to prohibit state ac-

tion that is itself not a violation of the fourteenth amendment but that
potentially may lead to violations37-and,

second, that Congress' supe-

rior fact-finding capacity enables it to identify violations of the fourteenth amendment that the Court itself would not find in the course of
litigation unaided by extensive legislative investigation.3a In the
Oregon case a strong minority of holdover Justices from the Warren

Court, led by Justice Brennan, would have upheld federal legislation
lowering the voting age to 18 in state elections.3 9 The theory of the
dissent was that, relying on the second rationale. in Morgan, Congress

had exercised its superior fact-finding ability and determined that the
state's reasons for retaining the voting age above age 18 could not justify
the resultant discrimination against young voters."'0 In the opinion of
353. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
354. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
355. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1970).
356. 384 U.S. at 652.
357. 384 U.S. at 650-51.
358. Id. at 656.
It is unclear from Justice Brennan's opinion. . . whether Congress has po%%cr under section
5 to define the substantive scope of the amendment. Since Morgan involved %%hat %aessentially an alienage classification restricting the exercise of voting, a judicially denominated "fundamental right," Justice Brennan's second branch could be read narro%%ly a.
acknowledging Congress' power under section 5 to subject a state's justification for such a
classification to its own "compelling state purpose" test. Under this reading of the second
rationale, Congress would not have the power to recognize new "fundamental rights- or
"suspect categories." Rather, with respect to state legislation involving either of these
judicially-defined occasions for strict scrutiny, Congress' superior fact-finding resources
would enable it to override a state justification that the Court. necessaril) engaging in a
more limited inquiry because of institutional restraints, might sustain.
Note, supra note 246, at 506-07. See generally Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due
Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975).
359. 400 U.S. at 240 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting).
360. See note 358 supra.
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Justice Stewart, who wrote for Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, the federal provision could not be upheld because the Constitution
squarely leaves the fixing of qualifications for voting with the states.36 ,
Additionally, he denied that Morgan had approved congressional power
to define the substantive reach of the fourteenth amendment.3 " Justice
Black's tie-breaking vote against the legislation left the Stewart opinion
as the most significant on the question of Congress' enforcement
power.

63

While Oregon may have undermined the second rationale in
Morgan,364 the first ground for that decision apparently remains intact.
Essentially the notion is that Congress has more power than the Court
in dealing with violations of the fourteenth amendment. Although the
Court can intervene only after a state has violated the amendment,
Congress can install protective legislation that reaches even private action that interferes with the state's responsibility to afford equal protection and due process to its citizens. 315 In United States v. Guest 36 the
Court upheld a criminal indictment charging conspiracy to interfere
with the exercise of rights secured by the equal protection clause, in
violation of section 241 of the criminal code. 6 7 Justice Stewart's opin361. 400 U.S. at 294-95 (Stewart, J., concurring & dissenting).
362. In the Morgan case Justice Stewart had been prepared to permit Congress to act against
state laws that discriminated against aliens, who compose what the Court has often characterized
as a suspect class. On the other hand, he viewed the Act in Oregon as a congressional attempt to
identify age classifications for voting as a new constitutionally suspect category without the aid or
prior Supreme Court consideration of the issue. That far he would not permit Congress to go. See
Note, supra note 246, at 508-09; cf. note 358 supra.
363. See text accompanying notes 287-89 supra.
364. See Orloski, The Enforcement Clauses of the Civil War Amendments: A Repository
of Legislative Power, 49 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 493 (1975); Developments: Congressional Power
Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 STAN. L. REv. 885 (1973).
365. The most extensive development of this thesis can be found in Cox, supra note 10. Cf.
note 351 supra.
366. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
367. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970):
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen
in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same:. . .
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.
The statute is derived from the Enforcement Act of 1870. See note 232 supra, The indictment in
Guest charged, first, that the defendants had conspired to intimidate black people in the exercise
of their right to use privately operated places of public accommodation guaranteed by the 1964
Civil Rights Act. But since the indictment failed to allege that the conspiracy had been racially
motivated, the district court dismissed the charge based on the 1964 Act for improper pleading.
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ion for the Court avoided the question whether Congress has power to

reach private action by finding an obscure allegation of state complicity
in the conspiracy.3

8

Justice Brennan, in contrast, would have sustained

the indictment even absent state action. 6" Counting noses among other
concurring Justices, Brennan pointed out that six members of the Court
would hold that Congress has power under section five of the fourteenth

amendment to penalize purely private conspiracies that interfere with a
state's responsibilities under section one.370 Once again repeating the

familiar language quoted in South Carolinav. Katzenbach, the fifteenth
amendment case, and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the thirteenth

amendment case, he said that Congress can enforce the fourteenth
amendment by any appropriate legislation plainly adapted to that end
and not prohibited by some other constitutional provision.,'
While the Brennan position would presumably require the Court to
finally overrule the Civil Rights Cases on the narrow question of congressional power, given the erosion Justice Bradley's opinion has
In the circumstances, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider that judgment on direct

appeal. 383 U.S. at 751-52; see Criminal Appeal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970). The Court accordingly confined itself to an examination of the second paragraph in the indictment. %hichalleged
that the defendants conspired to intimidate blacks in the exercisd of their right to use public
facilities. This charge the Court characterized as embracing rights secured by the equal protection
clause. 383 U.S. at 753.
368. The indictment charged that one means by which the conspiracy %as carried out %as
by causing the arrest of blacks on false charges. Justice Stewart found that allegation broad enough
to cover a charge of "active connivance by agents of the State in the making of the 'false reports.'
or other conduct amounting to official discrimination ...." 383 U.S. at 756-57. While he
conceded that a bill of particulars might reveal an entirely private conspiracy wvith no links to state
officials, Stewart thought it prudent at this stage of the proceedings to put off the difficult question
whether Congress might punish purely private action under its enforcement poer. Id. at 757.
369. 383 U.S. at 774-81 (Brennan, J.,
concurring & dissenting).
370. Justice Brennan's opinion spoke for Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas. and a
separate concurring opinion by Justice Clark, concurred in by Justices Black and Fortas. offered
a similar analysis:
The Court carves out of its opinion the question of the power of Congress. under , 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact legislation implementing the Equal Protection
Clause or any other provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's interpretation
of the indictment clearly avoids the question whether Congress. by appropriate legislation.
has the power to punish private conspiracies that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment
rights, such as the right to utilize public facilities. . . .Although the Court specifically
rejects any such connotation . . . it is, I believe, both appropriate and necessary under the
circumstances here to say that there now can be no doubt that the specific language of* 5
empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state
action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.
383 U.S. at 762.
371. 383 U.S. at 783-84; see notes 277 & 304 supra and accompanying text.
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already suffered, that result seems a relatively insignificant conse-

quence .3 2 Moreover, there is substantial evidence in the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment to support the conclusion that Justice

Bradley was wrong even in 1883. Indeed, in dissent the first Justice
Harlan took precisely that position:
It was perfectly well known that the great danger to the equal enjoyment
by citizens of their rights, as citizens, was to be apprehended not altogether from unfriendly State legislation, but from the hostile action or
corporations and individuals in the States. And it is to be presumed that
it was intended, by that section [section five of the fourteenth amendment], to clothe Congress with power and authority to meet that dan3
37

ger.

Finally, there is a fair amount of authority for the proposition that the
courts can penalize private interference with state attempts to conform
to the fourteenth amendment. If, for example, a federal district court
can hold in contempt a private person whose actions impede a school
board's attempts to desegregate public schools, it follows that the Con-

gress must have that much power374and perhaps more under the enforcement section of the amendment.
Thus far the Court has not turned the first rationale in Morgan and
the concurring opinions in Guest into a square holding, and the lower
federal courts have indicated doubts. 37 The best vehicle for reaching
the question may be section 1985(3) of the codified version of the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871 .311 Section 1985(3) is roughly the civil equivalent
372. Justice Brennan expressly noted that his view of congressional enforcement power was
inconsistent with the position adopted in the Civil Rights Cases. 383 U.S. at 782-83. Since Justice
Bradley's construction of the scope of congressional power under the thirteenth amendment was
substantially rejected in Jones, see note 301 supra, and the 1964 Civil Rights Act left even the result
in the Civil Rights Cases ineffectual, see note 312supra, a holding that Justice Bradley's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment was also incorrect would hardly startle students of constitutional
history. See Scott, Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendtent From the
Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 552 (1971).
373. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 54 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting): see 383 U.S. at 783
n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting). United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 803-06 (1966):
f. J. TEN BROEK, supra note 7, at 185-88, 217; R. HARRIS, supra note 227, tit 53: Frant/, supra
note 16. at 1352-59. Contra, Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light oi State
Action atnd the Fourteenth Amendment, II ST. Louis U.L.J. 331 (1967).
374. E.g., Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.). cert. denied. 360 U.S. 909
(1959); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.). cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957): Brewer v.
Hoxie School Dist. No. 4, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956): see Cox, supra note 10. at 112. 70 I-IARv.
L. REv. 1299, 1301-02 (1957).
375. The cases are reviewed in Note, supra note 246, at 516-17. See note 382 infra.
376. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970): see text accompanying note 235 supra. The Court has only
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of the criminal statute involved in Guest; it establishes a remedy for

conspiracies to deprive persons of the equal protection of the laws.T

In Griffin v. Breckenridge31s the Court construed 1985(3) to reach pri-

vate conspiracies in which there is a "racial, or perhaps otherwise classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' ac-

tion." 379 Turning to the question of constitutional power to enact such
a statute, the Court, in another opinion by Justice Stewart, held that
1985(3) is authorized under the thirteenth amendment as a statutory

cause of action for the imposition of badges or incidents of slavery.Accordingly, the Court avoided dealing with congressional power under
section five of the fourteenth amendment, upon which the Congress had
actually acted in 1871.3' Since Griffin involved black victims of a

private conspiracy, the thirteenth amendment was available as a constitutional ground, but in other cases in the lower courts a decision on the
fourteenth amendment power of Congress has been necessary. On that
rarely dealt with 1985. See. e.g., Alice v. Medrano. 416 U.S. 802 (1974): Lauchli v.United States.
405 U.S. 965 (1972) (denying certiorari) (Douglas. J.. dissenting); D)son v. Stein. 401 U.S. 200
(1971).
377. The statute establishes a civil action for damages and injunctive relief under the follot.
ing circumstances:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directl) or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laus. or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all pcrons %ithin
such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws ....
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
378. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
379. Id. at 102. This limitation was necessary to avoid the charge that 1985(3). if applicable
to private conspiracies, would constitute a federal tort law. The odd language of 1985(3) reflects
its purpose to deal with the Ku Klux Klan just after the Civil War. leading the Court to comment
that the statute must have been directed at private conspiracies. Persons uho "go in disguise on
the highway" are hardly likely to be officers on their governmental rounds. 403 U.S. at 98: see
United States v. Williams. 341 U.S. 70, 76 (1951). The Court declined to say %%hatsort. of clam.
based discrimination outside race might come within the statute, and the losscr courts have strug.
gled with the problem since. Compare Hahn v. Sargent. 523 F.2d 461 (Ist Cir. 1975) (%inglc
plaintiff unable to maintain an action), with Glasson v. City of Louisville. 518 F,2d 899 (6th Cir.
1975) (the statute reaches conspiracies against a class composed of those %sho are critical of the
President-a very large class indeed).
380. 403 U.S. at 104-06; see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.. 392 U.S. 409. 440 (1968).
discussed in text accompanying notes 296-309 supra. Justice Stewart also garnered the support of
all but Justice Harlan for an alternative theory that 1985(3) might be supported h) Congress' Poucr
to protect the right to travel. 403 U.S. at 105-06. See Note. The Right to Travel Anuther
ConstitutionalStandard for Local Land Use Regulations? 39 U. Ciim. L. Rt. 612 (1972)
381. 403 U.S. at 107.

568
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382
crucial question the circuits are split.
Of course, even if Congress can reach private action that interferes
with a state's responsibility under the fourteenth amendment, it does not
necessarily follow that there are no restraints on its enforcement power.
To take a familiar example, it has been contended that Congress can
53
legislate an end to discrimination in privately operated restaurants.1
This is, of course, precisely what the Civil Rights Cases held that Congress cannot do, but the argument holds that after Morgan and Guest
that precedent must be reexamined. "4 The question that comes to mind
is this: Where is the interference with state constitutional responsibility?
It is one thing to hold that Congress can punish private citizens who
seize a prisoner from state custody and lynch him, thus interfering with
the state's duty to give the prisoner a fair trial, 8 and quite another to
hold that the proprietor of a local cafe can be punished for failing to
serve blacks on the theory that his private action somehow makes it
more difficult for the state to afford black people the equal protection
of the laws. The argument for interference in the latter case is difficult
to grasp. "6 If the state has enacted a statute which prohibits race

382. The Eighth Circuit has held that Congress has power to reach wholly private conspir.
acies through the fourteenth amendment. Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en
banc): cf Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973): Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247
(3d Cir. 1971). The Fifth Circuit first followed Action, supra, but then withdrew its opinion before
rehearing. In a memorandum dismissing the cause as moot, the court indicated the gravity of the
issue by directing the district court to withdraw its opinion as well "so that it will spawn no legal
precedents." Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206. 216 (5th Cir. 1975). The Fourth Circuit
has rejected Action, choosing to wait for direction from Congress or the Supreme Court. Bell:my
v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974). Other circuits have used various techniques
to avoid the question, indicating their view that, at the very least, there are grave doubts about the
'validity of Action. E.g., Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972); see Note, vupra
note 246, at 516-17.
383. In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), in which the question was whether the
fourteenth amendment of its own force proscribes trespass convictions for restaurant sit-ins. see
text accompanying notes 80-87 supra, even Justice Black's dissent suggested that the existence or
federal legislation might have changed his view. 378 U.S. at 335-43.
384. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 782-83 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting): see Note, Fourteenth Amendment CongressionalPower to Legislate Against Private Discrinmnations: The Guest Case, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 586 (1967).
385. Cf United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
386. Professor Cox nevertheless insists that interference can be found. "If A steals B's horse.
B has been deprived, strictly speaking, of his enjoyment of the constitutional right not to have the
state take the horse without just compensation .... " Cox, supra note 10, at 117. Yet the
argument is tenuous at best, and Cox concedes that "[tlhere would be an utter lack of proportion
between the federal punishment of all horse stealing and the federal interest in safeguarding
enjoyment of the constitutional right of horse-owners to have the states refrain from taking their
property without due process of law." Id.
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discrimination in public accommodations, perhaps it can be argued that
a violation of the statute interferes with the state's good faith attempt

to comply with the spirit of the fourteenth amendment.:"' Yet it is
precisely because the states have thus far been unwilling to enact such
legislation that the intervention of federal power is necessary. If a state

statute already prohibits discrimination at the cafe, it hardly need be
pondered whether the Congress has power to do the same. The crucial

case is one in which no state statute exists. Up to now at least, the Court
has resisted the argument that the states have an affirmative duty to

enact legislation prohibiting private discrimination. 3 U Will the Burger
Court now permit the Congress to legislate where the states can but do
not act? If this is the case, once again it appears that the Court will allow

the Congress to root out the very evils the Court itself will not reach on
the authority of the fourteenth amendment of its own force.311 It must
be recalled that the expansive theories urged on the Court 10 years ago
would have viewed state inaction in the face of private discrimination

as a violation of the fourteenth amendment, thus recognizing that all
transactions between individuals look ultimately to state law for legal

effect and that the state is accordingly responsible for what it permits
as well as for what it requires of individuals. 90 Even the Warren Court
was reluctant to go so far on the authority of the fourteenth amendment
alone, and surely the Burger Court is unprepared to do so. It can be

argued, however, that this Court is prepared to embrace the same broad
definition of state action when Congress has legislated in an area 3in
which the states have power to act in defense of individual liberty.

1

387. It should be recalled that the Court has rejected the contention that a violation of stat
law cannot also violate the fourteenth amendment. See text accompanying notes 22.27 supra In
addition, one reading of Bradley's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases places emphasis on his
assumption that under state law race discrimination in public accommodations %%as alread) proscribed. Accordingly, it may have been the federal Act's attempt to preempt parallel state la%%
that
Justice Bradley found objectionable. Frantz, supra note 16, at 1365-66.
388. But cf.Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), discussed in text accompan)ing notes
96-106 supra.
389. See text accompanying notes 331-32 supra.
390. See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
391. Professor Cox reaches a similar conclusion but for slightly different reasons. In his
view, "ifthere is an interference with fourteenth amendment rights in any one case-as Guest holds
there is-then there is an interference in every instance and the only remaining question is %Nhethcr
the interference is sufficiently significant to warrant the exercise of national poser.*" Cox. supra
note 10, at 117. After Morgan, Cox suggests that the Court may well leave that judgment to the
Congress. He builds his argument for broad congressional power on the logical proposition that
private action against individuals ultimately interferes with the state's responsibility to afford those
individuals sone rights in some fashion. See note 386 supra. Thus, he would defend open housing
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This is to recognize that the search for state action is misleading after

all-at least insofar as legislative enforcement of the fourteenth amendment is concerned. It is to find in the Congress the very power to
intervene in local affairs to protect individual liberty that the Court,
since Moose Lodge, has declined for itself.
The implications of such power are enormous. Given its head,
Congress might revive the 1875 Act to ban racial discrimination in all
public accommodations, not merely those affecting interstate commerce. Thus the result in Moose Lodge might be legislatively turned
around.392 Similar legislation might be enacted to ban various forms of
discrimination in employment and housing. Moreover, Congress might
proscribe not only racial discrimination and irrational classifications
based on national origin, religion, or sex.393 Under the fourteenth
amendment Congress might prohibit any irrational classification that
treats similarly situated persons in a discriminatory manner. Going
further, Congress might impose upon private entities the same restriclegislation based on the fourteenth amendment as a congressional guarantee of the state's ability
to provide public services on an equal basis. Put simply, the argument is essentially that Congress
can act to ensure that the state will be able to-when the state finally gets around to doing what it
has power to do. In contrast, the argument in the text suggests that the Burger Court, having lived
through the Warren Court years, is prepared to go even further. The proposition is that the Burger
Court will permit Congress to enact legislation that would be within the state's power, irrespective
of whether the state acts or not. This is to embrace the most expansive theories of fourteenth
amendment jurisprudence advanced over the years, yet to place the Congress in the position urged
for the Court itself. Since all legal meaning attaching to relations among individuals may be
ascribed to the state, inaction in an area where state power exists is alone sufficient to warrant
federal legislation to protect individual liberty.
392. Indeed, it has been suggested that the 1875 Act, never repealed by Congress, might now
be used by the Attorney General or private plaintiffs. Nimmer, A ProposalforJudicial Vindication
of a Previously UnconstitutionalLaw: The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 65 CoLuI. L. Riv. 1394
(1965). The opinion in Moose Lodge emphasized that the only issue before the Court was the
question whether the Lodge was sufficiently linked with the state to implicate the fourteenth
amendment of its own force. The Pennsylvania courts had found that the Lodge was not a place
of public accommodations within the meaning of the state Human Relations Act, Pennsylvania
Human Relations Comm'n v. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge No. 107, 220 Pa. Super. 356. 286
A.2d 374 (1971), and the parties had stipulated that the Lodge was in all respects private. Accord.
ingly, the case was tried "solely on the theory that granting a Pennsylvania liquor license to a club
assumed to be purely private was sufficient state involvement to trigger the Equal Protection
Clause." 407 U.S. at 179 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting). There was, then, no occasion to consider
other theories of state action, to determine whether the Lodge was subject to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, or, given congressional power to reach private action under the fourteenth amendment, to
consider whether the Lodge was sufficiently private as to be beyond the reach of governmental
interference in its internal affairs. ld; see text accompanying notes 323-24, 330-40 supra.
393. The categories set forth in the text are, of course, the classifications proscribed by the
public accommodations, employment, and housing provisions of the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights
Acts. See notes 243 & 250 supra.
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tions now applied to government under the due process clause. Thus,
Congress might require Lloyd Center to tolerate reasonable expression-

related activity in its mall and demand that Metropolitan Edison afford
its customers a fair hearing before service is terminated. In sum, if
section five is read broadly the Congress might discard the distinction

between the public and private sectors and impose on the latter all the
constitutional limitations to which government is subject-in order to
protect individual liberty from any significant threat. 9 1
The proposition strikes at the heart of federalism, yet it is of vital

importance to recognize that the exercise of legislative power arguably
poses a lesser danger than does the use of judicial power by a Supreme

Court composed of life-tenured appointees. The Congress is subject in
the first instance to the desires of the electorate and, unlike the Constitution itself or Supreme Court pronouncements on its meaning, legislative
enactments can be changed without undue difficulty. Given these
truths, it can fairly be argued that the Burger Court will countenance

legislation enacted by Congress with due deference to its coordinate
branch. Moreover, there remain important restraints. First, the existence of power is not to be confused with its exercise. The Congress' own
discretion in determining how and when to exercise its enforcement
power will no doubt counsel restraint in some instances."'8 Surely Con-

gress can be depended upon to watch its step; if anything, the legislative
department may need prodding if individual liberty is to receive ade-

quate protection.397 And, second, there are constitutional limits on the
394. But see text accompanying note 398 infra. This is precisely %hat Justice Bradley feared
in the Civil Rights Cases:
If this legislation [the Civil Rights Act of 1875] is appropriate for enforcing the prohibi.
tions of the amendment, it is difficult to see where it is to stop. Why may not Congress
with equal show of authority enact a code of laws for the enforcement and vindication of
all rights of life liberty, and property?. . . [W]hy should not Congress proceed at once to
prescribe due process of law for the protection of every one of these fundamental rights, in
every possible case . . . .The truth is, that the implication of a power to legislate in this
manner is based upon the assumption that if the States are forbidden to legislate or act in
a particular way on a particular subject, and power is conferred upon Congress to enforce
the prohibition, this gives Congress power to legislate generally upon that subject, and not
merely power to provide modes of redress against such State legislation or action. The
assumption is certainly unsound.
109 U.S. at 14-15; see Cox, supra note 10, at 118-19.
395. But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 n.14 (1974) (indicating that the Court
may not hesitate to overrule its own precedents involving constitutional intcrprctations--on the
theory that amending the Constitution itself is "practically impossible").
396. See Cox, supra note 10, at 118-19.
397. Cf.Kinoy,supranote 303, at 544; text accompanying notes 186-94 supra. Building upon
views expressed in his earlier article, Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom. 21
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extent to which any legislation can reach into private affairs to require
individuals and groups to refrain from actions that would be barred to
government. Even as the public-private dichotomy fades in arm's-length
transactions among individuals, business entities, and government,
other constitutionally protected interests survive in genuinely private
human behavior. And when federal legislation appears to favor, for
example, the right of one individual to be free of racial discrimination
over the right of another to privacy, it will be the Court's task to balance
the considerations and come to an accommodation of competing interests. Congress can hardly intrude into a private home to proscribe arbitrary decision-making, and there can be no doubt that in cases raising
genuine privacy issues the Court 'can construe federal legislation to
apply only where it constitutionally can.39
IV.

CONCLUSION

Great constitutional provisions must be administered with caution.
Some play must be allowed for the joints of the machine, and it must be
remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.
-Mr. Justice Holmes399
This article's evaluation of the Burger Court's state action decisions has been necessarily ambivalent. On the one hand, the Court's
marked retreat from Warren Court precedents appears at best a dangerous doctrinal departure and at worst a surrender of judicial responsibility. The fundamental principle of majority rule in democratic government aside, the fact remains that, at least in this country, legislative
majorities have been notoriously insensitive to individual interests. The
very existence of the Bill of Rights and the three Civil War amendments
attests to the need to protect minorities from unfettered majoritarian
power. It is then startling, to say the least, to find in the Burger Court's

decisions the notion that the maintenance of individual liberty should
RUTGERS L. REv. 387 (1967), Professor Kinoy maintains that while Jones is clearly a challenge to
the legislature to act in behalf of black people faced with discrimination at the hands or private
entities, history teaches that the Congress cannot act alone. Kinoy would have the Court play the
more significant role by applying the thirteenth amendment of its own force to proscribe badges
and incidents of slavery. See note 303 supra.
398. See text accompanying notes 323-24, 330-40 supra.
399. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (opinion of the Court).
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generally be left to state legislatures or the Congress. These are the very
bodies from which the individual often needs protection. And historically that protection has come from the courts, charged as they are with
interpreting the Constitution that stands between the individual and his
government. In sum, when in recent cases the Burger Court has declined
to invoke the Constitution of its own force, the task of safeguarding the
individual has fallen to majority-controlled legislatures that have historically been slow to take up the burden. That the Court hopes the legislative branch will prove equal to the task seems apparent; that the Court's
hopes will be realized is less clear.
On the other hand, this article has contended that there is a glimmer of hope to be found in the Court's decisions involving federal legislation designed to protect the individual from arbitrary treatment by
both government and private entities. Here the Court has permitted,
even encouraged, legislative answers to the most perplexing individual
liberty issues. The unsettling fear is that this society is increasingly
governed by faceless bureaucracies that in time will churn up personal
liberty in an endless maze of arbitrary decision-making. If this is not to
be so, the time is ripe for rational, compassionate governmental action
to alter the course of events. During the Warren Court years the Nation
looked to the Supreme Court to carve out of the complexity a constitutional haven for the individual. Yet, for all its successes, the Court
proved unequal to the task. In this system one branch of the national
government cannot for long shoulder the entire burden; it was, indeed,
far from accidental that the Warren era opened with Brown and closed
with Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co."" The future demands a persistent
sensitivity to the meaning for individual liberty of the ever-growing
power of big government and big business. What is required is precision-careful line-drawing that sorts out the confusion and protects
liberty from the excesses of both. From the cases it appears that the
Burger Court sees this as a legislative function. That judgment having
been made, if liberty is to be maintained in the Nation's third century,
it must be served by a grand partnership between the judicial and legislative branches.410 The Justices must stand ready to uphold reasonable
congressional action, and the Congress must push forward with legisla400. Kinoy, supra note 303, at 539 (contending that the thirteenth amendment itscir should
be read to prohibit much racial discrimination).
401. See Cox, supra note 10, at 122.
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tive programs to reach by whatever means, but principally by its enforcement power under the fourteenth amendment, all threats to liberty
posed by the modern industrial state.

